Vincent J. Curtis
11 Dec 2017
November being the month of remembrance, November 2017 was a
good month to read a newly released history of a battalion of the Canadian
Expeditionary Force of World War I. It Can’t Last Forever is a history of
the 19th Battalion, CEF, written by David Campbell, a professor of
history who received his doctorate for his history of the 2nd
Division of the Canadian Corps, of which the 19th was a part.
We remember the Canadian Corps of World War I for the mud of
Passchendaele and for the brilliant victory at Vimy Ridge. Perhaps we dimly recall the Hundred Days
campaign at the end; but when we think of World War I, we think of the mud of
Flanders.
This is unfortunate. In
doing so, we miss is what the Canadian Corps developed into by the end, in
virtue of Canadian talent and innovation.
When we think of the Somme, we think of tens of thousands dying for
hundreds of yards, while Vimy saw a dramatic gain of 4,500 yards in a morning.
What we might want to reflect upon is that relentless Canadian
machine of the Hundred Days campaign - that drove the enemy before it at rates
of 6,000 and 7,000 yards a day - using techniques that foreshadowed World War
II.
Military theorists date the beginning of maneuver warfare
with the German infiltration (or “Hutier”) tactics used in the Operation
Michael offensives that began on March 21st, 1918. But the technique thought of today as
Maneuver Warfare, -blitzkrieg - with
its coordinated application of ground strafing aircraft, tanks, advancing infantry,
and supporting artillery, was first used against the Germans in the Hundred Day
campaign. By the Canadians.
Yes, the aircraft of WWI were more of a nuisance than a force
multiplier, and the tanks never could be relied upon, and were very slow. But they were there, and impressed the
Germans.
By 1918, a platoon in a Canadian Corps battalion was
organized into two sections of riflemen, one section of Lewis gunners, and one
section of “bombers.” The bombers were
those expert in throwing Mills bombs (which later became the 36 grenade) and in
firing rifle grenades (predecessor of the 60 mm mortar). This latter section, supported or augmented
by the Lewis gunners, took out the machine gun nests that formed one of the
principle features of the German defense.
They coordinated fire and movement with the infantry sections to
overcome pockets of resistance. By the
end of the Hundred Days, tanks had become mechanically reliable enough to
provide - at times - armoured cover for advancing infantry, and to destroy wire
and some of those nasty machine gun nests.
With its rolling and standing barrages, the artillery fire
of a thousand guns became a science. Lacking
wireless radios, detailed control was exerted by field telephone, whose wires were
easily broken, and with signal rockets that called for protective fire. Artillery fire was supplemented by the
Canadian Machine Gun Corps, equipped with armoured cars and Vickers Heavy
Machine Guns for neutralizing an area with indirect fire plunging vertically
into trenches.
Trenches during this time were still dug; but with movement
as large and as fast as occurred during the Hundred Days, field defenses were
quick and expedient and lacked the sophisticated depth of the Somme or the
Hindenburg Line. By keeping up the
pressure, the break in was not the bloodbath it was at the Somme.
During a forward thrust, allied forces pushed as far as
their artillery support could reach, and then tended to stall as German
artillery began to dominate the field.
Once the allied guns were moved up, increasingly by mechanical
transport, forward movement by the infantry would resume.
A striking feature of the Canadian Corps was that was a
learning institution. Starting with
Arthur Currie, commander of 1st Division, and later Corps Commander,
and British General Julien Byng, the Canadian leadership strove to learn,
disseminate, and apply the lessons of war being fought around them. When not in immediate reserve, Canadian
troops practiced their individual and collective skills. Every infanteer practiced his marksmanship,
his use of the bayonet, throwing Mills bombs and shooting rifle grenades. They practiced with the Lewis gun, even if
that wasn’t their formal job.
After polishing individual skills, section, platoon, and
company tactics were practiced. The men
were kept physically fit by long marches and sporting events. By the Hundred Days, it was understood that
each man had to be able to fill in for someone else. The losses among platoon commanders was the
highest proportionately of any rank, and so being able to take command of the
platoon in battle was a secondary skill developed in the subordinate leaders.
The Canadian emphasis on patrolling emerged in the Canadian
Corps early in the war. “No man’s land
belongs to us.” was one resolution of the Corps, and trench raids were a common
feature of the war years, both as a means of protection and as a means of
gathering intelligence. Sniping was
another skill applied with vigour in the Corps.
The procedure of “relief in place” was perfected in World War I. By the Hundred Days, the Canadian Corps were
past masters of phase lines, passing through, and vertical and horizontal
coordination.
Much bad has been written about the leadership of Sam Hughes,
Minister of Militia. He had little use
for British generals and for the alleged expertise of the regulars. He relied upon the genius of Canada’s
civilian professionals to mobilize and to mould the CEF. He ensured that Canadians fought together in
one recognized unit with an eye towards the recognition of Canada after the war
as a power independent of Britain. The brilliant performance of the Canadian
Corps at Vimy and the power the Corps demonstrated during the Hundred Days
fulfilled that vision.
-30-
A version of this appears in the Jan 2018 edition of Esprit de Corps magazine.
No comments:
Post a Comment