Planning for mobilization in 2002

Vincent J. Curtis

14 Nov 2025.

 In May, 2002, I submitted an article to the Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin entitled “From Here to There: Phase IV mobilization and the New Army Strategy.”  I don’t know if it was ever published, but this 6050 word opus covered the problems of mobilization through its four phases in light of the-then recently released “New Army Strategy” and before our major Afghanistan deployment. (of course, the NAS and full mobilization were completely incompatible.) It looks like the Army is once again reviewing plans to raise armed forces through at least a phase III mobilization.  To save time, and to provide old insights, below are the first few paragraphs of that 2002 paper.

The army exists to destroy Canada’s enemies.  In natural order of priority, the army is expected to defend from external threat the national territory of Canada, then North America, then the territory of its treaty allies such as NATO.  The army may be called upon by the Canadian government to make war upon a foreign country not contemplated under the previous three heads, as we are now doing in Afghanistan.  The army may also be called upon to contribute forces in support of United Nations operations, or undertake a range of customary domestic operations.  These latter uses of the army are decidedly of a second tier priority to that of the defense of Canada and of her interests against a direct external threat.  An army, in the first instance, is an instrument for war fighting, and all the other subsidiary capabilities of an army stem from that.

 Phase IV mobilization refers to the level of mobilization at which the entire country is roused for war.  A War Emergency is declared, the militia is called out, freedoms are restricted, and Canadian industry is turned over to war production.  It represents the maximum level of effort the country can exert in self-defense.  Twice in our history, in World Wars I and II, Canada stood on this footing.

The role of the Regular army in peacetime is not to fight a war.  The Regular army provides for the immediate defense requirements of Canada and the day-to-day deterrence against attack of Canada’s interests.  It makes the plans, conducts the training, and develops the doctrine of the army for its primary and secondary missions.  It serves as the basis for an operational commitment, but the capability of the Regular army and the scope of its overseas missions are strictly limited by the defense budget. The Regular army, as presently constituted, would never be called upon to fight in a major war, for it is too small to fight and its soldiers too well trained to waste in battle.  At best it could engage in strictly limited conflicts with a low risk of casualties.

The New Army Strategy is a plan of change that moves the Regular Force in the direction opposite to full mobilization.  Armour and artillery are going to be reduced in readiness.  Certain combat capabilities such as pioneers and mortar platoon are going to be stripped out of a doctrinal battalion.  The capabilities of the brigade group are going to be modularized into company-sized bodies so that a deployed unit or sub-unit can be more easily task tailored. The organizational structure of a task tailored unit may not resemble that of a conventional battalion at all; and losing pioneer and mortar platoons, the battalion is less of a combined arms team than it was.

The aim of the New Army Strategy is to create, in the Regular Force, a model army that is “more agile and lethal, tactically decisive and medium weight”.  None of these properties are absolute, they are relative, and depend upon the enemy and terrain.  For that reason, the Regular Force is expected to become “capable of continuous adaptation and task tailoring across the spectrum of conflict.”  This flexibility will be achieved by the Regular Force becoming “knowledge-based and command-centric.” 

The reason for these changes boils down to money: too much deployment, too little budget, and an urgent need to modernize. Part of the purpose of the New Army Strategy is to maximize deployable manpower for operations other than war.  Another part is to prepare the Regular Force, within our limited budget, to accept niche roles within a larger allied structure for combat like operations, and to maximize our combat power through the use of the new technologies.

The New Army Strategy is founded on the belief that until the government radically changes its policy on defense funding, the days of full, mechanized brigade operations by Canada are over.  Indeed, supporters of the New Army Strategy have argued that those days are over for everyone.  The United States Army and Air Force are now so technologically superior that they have made the army of every potential enemy of ours obsolete.  Nobody can stand in the field against an American armoured division supported by American air power.  Our potential enemies, it is argued, will not in the foreseeable future attempt to employ mechanized forces to impose their will against Canadian interests but will instead employ the techniques of asymmetric warfare, cyberwarfare, and terrorism to forward their aims.  Our enemies of the future may not even be governments.  Mechanized brigade groups are not able to shield us from these kinds of threats and these kinds of enemies.  In any event, Canada is quite unlikely to go it alone against an external threat; and with our spare defense budget and at a Phase II mobilization level, the New Army Strategy will enable the Regular Force at least to participate somewhere in a U.S. or U.N. led force.

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On the science of attribution and Thomism

Vincent J. Curtis

4 Apr 2026

Ross McKittrick is a professor of Economics at the University of Guelph, and he has become famous for his interventions in climate science. This is possible because the mathematical methods often used in climate science, regression analysis, are the bread-and-butter of economic analysis; and someone well-versed in statistical analysis is well-positioned to spot errors in the application of economic analytical methods to climate data analysis. McKittrick is an expert in a field of poorly trained amateurs applying mathematical methods they clearly don’t understand.

Dr. McKittrick presented a paper at the October, 2021 ICCC conference that had been published in the August edition of Climate Dynamics, in which he, and his co-author Richard Tol, proved invalid a method of analysis used in climate science since 1999, and begun in a paper referred to as ‘AT99.’

The science of attribution begins with the propositions that; (a) we can observe patterns and changes in climate data; (b) it can be hard to tell if there’s been a statistically significant change in the climate; and (c) it’s hard to prove that those changes were caused by GHG emissions.  The attribution methodology works by comparing observed patterns to patterns from climate models. This requires that we assume that climate models provide a true and complete representation of the climate, and that involves a statistical methodology known as regression analysis.

The beginnings of a logical fallacy are already evident. A model is a representation of reality, and if the model fails to accurately forecast the behavior of reality, it is assumed here that there’s something wrong with reality. This is a form of begging the question. A second problem arises from the data used to construct the model: is it truly representative, or is there a sampling problem unrecognized by the modellers? Sampling could be a problem if not a long enough period of time was sampled for data; in addition, there’s an implicit assumption of stasis in the climate and model.  ‘Alteration/ is not a change deemed within the principle of the climate.  Attribution tries to get around these logic problems by adjusting the parameters of the model to fit observed reality, and if more GHG is required by the model to fit the new data, that is grounds for attributing GHG as the cause of the deviation of reality from the expectations of the model. There is a fallacy in this also, but it goes unobserved by the Attributors.

Attribution was begun in 1999 with a paper entitled, “Checking for model consistency in in optimal fingerprinting” by Myles Allen and Simon Tett, published in the journal Climate Dynamics (AT99). The authors claimed to have provided an unbiased and ‘optimal’ (precise) measurement of the size of effects of GHGs on climate patterns (the ‘Fingerprint’), which allowed researchers to check that the statistical models are properly specified (the RC or residual consistency test). Theirs was a regression method. The IPCC grew to love the method, and claims it gives results that show unequivocally that “human activities” or “anthropogenic emissions” were responsible for the “observed warming over the last fifty years.”

Another logical error lies hidden in these words. By “human activities” and “anthropogenic emissions” they mean carbon dioxide, and hence “warming”, “climate change”, and alleged increases in incidents of bad weather were caused by carbon dioxide. There is no effort to correlate in detail rising concentration with rising temperature, extreme weather events, or other effects, as one would expect in a linear regression analysis; blaming carbon dioxide is the broad assumption.

McKittrick and Tol examined the certainty in the IPCC-approved fingerprinting method. AT99 specifically invoked the Gauss-Markov theorem to prove that their method of regression estimation was unbiased and efficient, or as precise as possible. (BLUE: best linear unbiased estimator)

McKittrick observed that AT99 made a number of errors with respect to the Gauss-Markov theorem: the authors didn’t state it correctly, and failed to noticer that it did not apply to their estimator! Hence, there is no basis for confidence in the estimator that others thought there was. AT99 results are biased, completely misleading, and largely meaningless. McKittrick found that it was unclear what the RC test actually tested, the test wasn’t derived in the usual way, no mathematical derivation of the test was presented, the RC test doesn’t relate to the Gauss-Markov theorem, and it doesn’t actually test what the authors said it tested.  The RC test is a completely meaningless statistic, said McKittrick.

The errors in the use of the Gauss-Markov theorem jump off the page to those experienced in using it and statistical analysis in general; and so the question arises, why didn’t anyone in the field notice this before McKittrick? He speculates that people with a lot of experience in statistical analysis haven’t been looking at this literature, and hence the theoretical inaccuracies have gone hitherto undetected.

McKittrick sums up the situation with a pair of quotes from his co-author, Richard Tol, who tweeted on Aug 21, 2021, “Allen & Tett introduced an FGLS estimator that is completely wrong and a test to show that they’re right, when they’re not.” And another on Aug 20, 2021, “Another literature that is entirely wrong…”  There is, in short, no reason to believe that AT99 fingerprinting method produces valid results; and a lot of the literature attributing changes in atmospheric moisture, snow cover, forest fires, etc. are based on a method that gives wrong and meaningless results.

Thus, the basis for claims of certainty of around climate attribution is mathematically flawed and invalid.

Those of a philosophical bend will find interesting a back-door introduction of Thomism into the “science of attribution”. To say that one’s model is a true and accurate representation of a climate is to say that the model is a true understanding the form, or essence, of the climate. Following upon that are efficient and final causality, or end-directedness, of the climate; the form directing the climate towards a normative range of ends, which may be weather events. If ends other than these normative weather events occur, these anomalies or perturbations may be caused by “human activities” and “anthropogenic emissions”, which are nothing but efficient causes of change to the end-directedness, to the essence, of the climate being perturbed. The climate is expected to behave in accordance with the essence or form understood in the model. “Alteration” is not a change deemed within the principle of the climate, and hence, when reality doesn’t follow the model, the cause of that anomalous behavior, or alteration, is deemed due to external forcing, possibly by man’s emissions of carbon dioxide into the air, being the efficient causes of that alteration.  The element of morality follows upon putting the efficient causality of ‘climate change’ on the activities of man, even as the proximate agent of change is carbon dioxide. Following upon that, the attributors attribute efficient causality to carbon dioxide - for bad weather events!

Since Newton, physical sciences have attempted to eliminate efficient and final causality, forms and essences, from the picture, and places all the causal eggs in the matter and in mechanisms. The science of attribution offers no mechanisms by which small increments in carbon dioxide cause changes in large atmospheric processes, or “weather events” (a possible violation of the principle of proportionate causality).  Climate science, in attribution, adopts a Thomist view of the physical world, including that of immorality in its efficient causes.

From its early days, the climate “crisis” has been a means of casting moral opprobrium upon the United States and Europe for their cultural and economic successes, and was used as a means of undermining a foundation of those economic successes, namely cheap and abundant energy. Newtonian science, with its materialism and mechanisms, does not readily lend itself to casting moral aspersions; but a Thomist view of the world, with its recognition of formal, efficient, and final causes, as well as material causes, enables the casting of moral blame upon its efficient causes, namely “anthropogenic emissions” and “human activities”, or, in short, America and Europe. Hence, the peculiar adoption of a Thomist analysis in what should be a Newtonian science

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Vampires

Vampire Drones

Vincent J. Curtis

1 Nov 25

When you hear the word ‘vampire’, you think of bats, Count Dracula; and I’ve even heard of a ‘vampire facial’! But that’s not what we’re talking about here. This about another kind of vampire: the Vampire drone.

The Vampire drone is a product of L3 Harris (NYSE: LHX); production began in 2022 for Ukraine, and procurement was funded by the first aid package of $3 Billion from the United States. The Vampire system is essentially a re-purposed laser-guided rocket. These rockets cost only about $35,000 per (cheap!), making them economical to use against their intended target, Shahed drones, which cost about $50,000 each; Vampires are much less expensive than the Coyote Block 2s, which. run a little over $125,000 per. The economics of the Vampire drone tilts in favor of the defender over the attacker. (For comparison, a Stinger missile runs $400k, and an SM2 about $2.2M).

A cool name like VAMPIRE has to stand for something: it’s an acronym for:  

Vehicle Agnostic, Modular Palletized, ISR Rocket Equipment. (The marketing guys at L3 Harris got a little creative, and there’s more to come.)  As advertised, it is a low-cost, mobile, counter-UAV “solution.” (Does any military supplier offer something other than a “solution”?). In January, 2022, L3 Harris got $40 million to build 14 of them, and by August, they were ready for shipment to Ukraine.

To keep costs low, the system uses off-the-shelf components already in production for other projects. The rockets themselves are taken from Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (APKWS), which, in turn, uses “dumb” Hydra 70 rockets and makes them “smart”.  These laser-guided rockets are currently used by the U.S. Army, USN, USMC, and USAF for air-to-ground strikes, and volume production keeps unit cost down.

Vampire rockets are fired from a land LRG4 launcher made by Arnold Defense.  Weighing only 60 lbs, the launcher holds 4 rockets, and will fit on a Toyota Hilux, or, if you’re into old classics, an M-113.

The Westcam (once a Canadian company, bought by L3) MX10D RSTA pods are carried on the MQ9 Reaper, OA1K Skyraider 2, and is the detector and designator for the Vampire system. The Westcam optical system relies on line of sight: from a height of 6’, it can see 3 miles to the horizon; at a height of 35’, it can see 7 miles, close to the range of the rocket of 9 miles.

Fire is controlled by a tablet, mountable in the cab of the truck, using a program called “Widow software”, which integrates with the forward area air-defense C&C network (FAD C2).

In Ukraine, the Vampire is used to defend sensitive rear-area and logistics points; it is not autonomous, not all-weather, and not designed to handle mass drone attacks alone. Vampires would comprise a close-in kinetic kill layer in a layered anti-drone defense, which would also include jammers, spoofers, and guns. The system works well when target is visible, line of sight can be maintained, and crews are trained; it struggles when targets are flying erratically, diving fast behind cover, and visibility is poor. Smoke, dust, complex terrain, fog, electronic dazzlers and reflective surfaces all contribute to poor visibility because they interfere with laser designation, but Vampires are less susceptible to jamming, as radar or GPS guided systems are. The Vampires can fill in where radar and electronic warfare might struggle.

In October, 2025, L3 Harris announced expansion of the Vampire system, with more marketing creativity.  The ‘Stalker’ XR is the Vampire system intended for land deployment on a truck and that uses the Arnold Hydra system MLHS, with a 23 rocket capacity.  The Vampire ‘Killcode:’ is a pair of antennas that shoot radio “bullets.”  The Vampire ‘BAT’: (Base Anti-Drone Turret) is an automatic weapon that uses non-kinetic effects to minimize collateral damage.  Finally, the Vampire ‘CASKET’ (Containerized Anti-drone System with Kinetic Effects Turret is a self-contained Vampire in a box that is ready for rapid deployment in remote locations.

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Drone On

Vincent J. Curtis

19 Oct 2025

When you say the word “drone”, a Highlander will think of the wooden tubes that protrude from bagpipes.  A beekeeper will think of a male bee whose sole function in life is to service the queen.  A dedicated YouTube watcher might think of someone droning on about the latest inanities in Ottawa or Washington.

But that’s not what we’re talking about.  Drones are in the news because of their use in the Russo-Ukraine war, and because of the announcement of a $5 billion purchase of Coyote drones for the U.S. Army.  The Coyote is a small, expendable, unmanned “aircraft system” simple enough that it could be reverse-engineered by an Iranian manufacturer; but in fact will be purchased from that gargantuan U.S. military contractor, Raytheon.

The Coyote comes in two arrangements and three Blocks.  The first arrangement is pusher-propellor driven, and comprise Block 1; the second arrangement is jet-turbine and rocket powered and comprises Block 2 and 3.  The unit cost of a Block 1 is $15,000, while those of Blocks 2 and 3 run around $100,000 per.

The Block 1 is about 3’ long and weighs 13 lbs., its electric motor is battery powered. Its wingspan is 59’’, and the wings pop out immediately after launch, which can be pneumatically from a tube, or air dropped from altitude as high as 30,000’.  It is ISR capable, and carries a 4 lb explosive warhead with a proximity fuse.  A Block 1 can be used to intercept small incoming drones, and in that role is guided partly by a Ku band proprietary radar system as well as on-board sensors.  The flying, or loiter, time of a Block 1 can up to two hours, with a cruising speed of 60 mph and a dash speed of up to 80 mph.

The jet-powered Block 2s, are launched from a missile launch tube at an exit velocity of near Mach 0.9, though its cruising speed is closer to 370 mph.  This version is a little over 4’ long, and weighs about 15 lbs. It has an effective intercept range of about 10 miles. It too is guided by a combination of Ku band radar and on-board sensors.  At an estimated price tag of $125.000 per, the Coyote Block 2s offer a far cheaper alternative to drone interception than an AIM-9 air-to-air missile, or an SM-2, which run a couple million per. The Block 2s are capable of re-engagement if it misses on the first pass. It kills either kinetically, by smashing into the incoming drone, or by exploding a warhead that produces a shroud of shrapnel that can destroy a swarm of incoming drones. It can engage targets as far as 9 miles away.

The drone warfare in Ukraine prompted the U.S. Army to look for a counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS), which led to the Block 3s in a configuration called LE SR, for Low-cost Expandable Small Range. This configuration can be launched from a TOW missile launcher, and is capable of air-intercept, ISR, EW, signal relay and precision ground-strike.  In an early test, using a non-kinetic, directed energy warhead. i.e. microwaves, (making it recoverable) a Block 3 defeated a swarm of 10 drones.  The Block 3s can operate as autonomous swarms.

The U.S. Army purchase is for their M-LIDs and FS-LIDS systems, (for Mobile- and Fixed Site Low, Slow, Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System). The Block 3 is to provide a “hard-kill’ layer after incoming drones get past jammers and spoofers which also comprise the LID.  The big purchase was for 6,000 Block 2c’s and 700 Block 3s, which will carry an electronic warfare or directed energy weapon, enabling them to be reused.  The Blocks 2 and 3 are intended to defend against the Iranian Shahed drones, which are used by Russian against Ukraine.

Raytheon is exporting its radars and Coyote systems, and the CAF can get with the program with little up-front capital cost: for the radars, launchers, and generators, and US$125,000 per recoverable missile.

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Kapelsche Veer

Vincent J. Curtis

26 Aug 2025

 In a waterlogged area of the Netherlands northeast of Brada, a subsidiary, swift-flowing channel of the Maas River runs along to the south side of the main channel, creating an island called Kapelsche Veer. The island is five miles long and one mile wide at its widest, and sports dykes up to 20’ high on the south side.  When not frozen, much of the land is boggy and impassible to tanks; attack frontages are one company wide, which meant that the assaulting force would be only equal in number to the defenders.  A small inlet on the north side of the island forms a harbour, and on either side of the inlet were two reinforced houses, which came to be called objectives Grapes (on the east) and Raspberry (on the west).

21^st Army Group was by mid- January, 1945, hard up against the south bank of the Maas River everywhere except at Kapelsche Veer. German paratrooper general Kurt Student held the island with a re-enforced company of his best paratroopers, and he kept the garrison fresh by replacing them every three or four days. They were supported by artillery batteries, self-propelled guns and mortar batteries on the north side of the river. 

The defenders were well dug in, and the approaches were open, and snow covered.  Army Group HQ decided that this small foothold of the Germans must be eliminated. 

The capture of Kapelsche Veer was turned over to the 4^th Canadian Armoured Div, and thence to the 10^th Bde (Brig JC Jefferson, OC).

The attack plan (Op ELEPHANT) ultimately required two battalions of infantry (L&W, A&SH of C), one tank regiment (SAR), and some 300 guns in artillery support.  There would be no preparatory bombardment.  In the original plan, the attack would begin in daylight on Jan 26^th by only one battalion, through a smoke screen. Wasps (flamethrowing Bren gun carriers) would accompany the attacking infantry.  Two infantry companies would attack from the east, and one from the west simultaneously, the objective being the harbor.  A bridge (nicknamed the Mad Whole’s Dream), prepared by RCE, would be hauled into place on the eastern end of the island at the commencement of the operation, enabling tanks to cross over, 

At 07:15 on 26 Jan, 1945, the smoke screen was laid.  At 07:25, C Coy Lincoln & Welland Regt. supported by four Wasps, crossed the bridge and linked up on the island with A Coy which had crossed the channel in Buffalo infantry carriers; a canoe party attempted to cross also, and was decimated by German fire. Of the 60 men of this party, 15 made it half-way over.   A Coy reached the house called Objective Grapes, but were driven back by German fire.  At 09:45 A Coy halted and dug in.  Nearby, from the other fortified house, codenamed Raspberry, the German paratroops counterattacked, and drove A Coy all the way back to C Coy’s position; C Coy in the process lost all its officers.  At 11:30 the attack was aborted, and both companies were withdrawn from the island.

In the west, B Coy, L&W, crossed in Buffalos and headed for Raspberry; but they too were stopped by heavy German fire.  By 12:00 hrs, this attack too had failed.  Brig Jefferson ordered the L&W to try again from the west, and sent the A&SH of C from the east with tank support.

The bridge in the east (the Mad Whore’s Dream) could take tanks, but in the west, the Shermans would have to be rafted over.  Approaching from the east, two Stuart tanks crossed the bridge but couldn’t make it up the tall dyke bank, and they and the accompanying Argylls came under heavy mortar fire.  In the west, a snowstorm and German patrols delayed the construction of the tank raft.  The infantry-only attacks on 27 Jan. were defeated on both ends of the island by German mortars, machine guns, and artillery fire.  Armour was the only way to break the stalemate.  Canadian artillery, however, was slowing down the German’s ability to reinforce the garrison, and only parts of a pioneer and an anti-tank platoon could re-enforce the fallschermjagers.

On Jan 28, two Sherman tanks crossed the bridge on the eastern end, and three Shermans were rafted across to the western end of the island; but the temperature had risen, and the frozen ground turned into mud. The second Shermans in the west became bogged down, blocking the one behind it, while the lead Sherman led the Lincs towards Raspberry.  German fire stopped them.  In the east, four tanks moved towards Grapes, where the Argylls were stopped by mortar and machine gun fire.  By 14:00, the Canadian attack had paused. One Sherman shelled a 25 man German platoon, killing 17 and wounding 5.  This caused German fire to slacken, and the Argylls managed to capture Grapes, followed by the Lincs capturing Raspberry.  Numerous German paratroops remained in bunkers and tunnels beneath the houses.  That night, they counter attacked and recaptured both buildings.  On 29 Jan, German mortar fire increased in ferocity, Canadian 25 pdrs replied with 14,000 shells. At 07:00, The Argylls and Lincs again assaulted Grapes and Raspberry. Mud was a big problem. Tanks were bogged down everywhere.  At 12:45, the Argyll arm of the attack, supported by two SAR Shermans, saw the Argylls retake Grapes, but Raspberry remained German.

The Germans were down to 70 men, including 20 wounded.  They held positions around Raspberry and on the west side of the harbor.  At dawn on Jan 30^th, two Shermans opened up on Raspberry, but not until 11:15 did infantry attack, and got nowhere as they were mown down by machine gun fire and mortars.  100 yards short of Raspberry, at 15:00 hrs, they tried again and were repulsed.  At 15:30, under a flag of truce, the Canadians were allowed to collect their wounded and dead.  Then, with four Shermans in support, Canadians tried for a third time, and the Argylls took Raspberry at the bayonet point.  However, advance beyond Raspberry was stopped by the German paratroops, 

On the eastern side, a German panzerfaust team knocked out one of the Shermans.  At 08:00 on Jan 31^st, the Argylls, pushing westward, linked up the Lincs; the Germans having evacuated the island during the night. 

German casualties were 64 KIA and WIA, with 34 PWs.  The Canadians suffered 133 KIA and WIA.

The CO of the Argylls, Lt-Col Dave Stewart, the hero of Hill 195, was relieved of command on Jan 25^th, having seen the original plan and refusing to lead his battalion on such a stupid misadventure.

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Drones, or Tac Air?

Drones versus NATO fires.

Vincent J. Curtis

25 Aug 2025

 The Russo-Ukraine war has seen a significant rise in the use of tactical drones; the Israelis too made much use of drones in their Op RISING LION air offensive against Iran.  Most readers will be familiar with the Reaper and Global Hawk drones, but these new types are smaller, cheaper, and used both for spotting and for tactical strike purposes.  The Ukrainians are using theirs as a practical substitute for Tac Air, long-range artillery, and guided missiles; and ‘substitutes’ is the point, according to Professor Justin Bronk, writing for the RUSI.

These newer drones come in two types, first-person view (FPV) uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), and one-way attack (OWA). Both are playing an increasing role in Ukraine’s defense. Russia has also, by orders of magnitude, scaled up her UAS and OWA capabilities. The battlefields of Ukraine now see millions of FPV-UAS, and thousands of OWA drones to supplement conventional cruise and ballistic missiles for long range strike campaigns.

Professor Bronk lists four reasons why NATO should not follow Ukraine’s example: (1) doing so plays into Russian hands; (2) the Ukrainians are making a virtue of a necessity, as they are lacking in traditional fires; (3) Ukraine still isn’t winning the war despite their proficiency in drones; and (4) drones are fill-ins and supplements to, not replacements for, traditions NATO fires.

Professor Bronk believes it would be a mistake to think that drones “render(s) Western equipment and doctrinal notions such as air superiority and armoured maneuver warfare irrelevant or obsolete.” Rather, he sees drones as a supplement to ‘legacy’ platforms such as artillery, tanks, fighter aircraft, and submarines. The Israelis used drones for SEAD/DEAD against Iran; in the latter case, massed drones acted as “window” once did, saturating Iranian air defense radars, and with some taking on the role of “Wild Weasels.”

Bronk does believe it important for NATO to develop their own counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities, since Russian forces would be expected to use UAS on a vast scale.

The Russians forces already have formidable C-UAS capabilities, which include electronic jamming, modified infantry weapons, and short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems integrated at all levels of their ground forces. Russian forces are already well-adapted to defend against drones, and losses among Ukrainian drone operators are mounting rapidly. However, the training required for C-UAS capability means less training against NATO’s areas of military strength.

Bronk observes that Ukrainian forces inflicted devastating defeats on Russian forces using massed artillery, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and well-motivated infantry; and the switch to reliance on UAS has been driven by necessity, for when available, high-end ATGMs, anti-tank BONUS artillery rounds and regular artillery are preferred by Ukrainian commanders to counter Russian attempts to break through the frontlines. These latter systems are far more responsive and more reliable in knocking out vehicles and in suppressing mass infantry. FPVs are useful for inflicting a steady level of attrition against personnel and vehicles where the frontlines are static.

Bronk feels that UAS should enhance NATO firepower, but not replace NATO artillery and aircraft, which can strike targets responsively.  Drones can enable air forces, long range artillery, and high-end munitions such as AGM-88G AARGM-ER and GMLRS to get through to key targets without interception.

He argues, “nothing can compete with direct-attack munitions such as the GBU-38 JDAM or Paveway IV bombs where air superiority or at least access has been achieved. For unit costs in the region of $20-30,000, such bombs can destroy armoured vehicles, fighting positions, supply dumps, warehouses, factories and command posts. They can be delivered by a single jet with a targeting pod on each sortie.”

Bronk says that it is far easier to counter massed, cheap FPV and OWA drones used for primary lethality than to counter the airpower, long range fires, armour, artillery and mortars of a professional joint force.

Nevertheless, C-UAS capabilities remain essential, and should be seen as a theatre-entry standard for NATO armies in any Article V context against Russia.

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Is NOTCANZ in trouble?

Vincent J. Curtis

14 Aug 2025

NOTCANZ, elsewhere known as AUKUS, (for Australia, United Kingdom, United States) is a military alliance within the Anglosphere that does not include Canada or New Zealand.  It was organized for the purpose of transferring US nuclear submarine propulsion technology to the Royal Australian Navy. Its wider purpose was to counter increased Chinese presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

Something nuclear is a new departure for Oz.  The settled policy of Australia since Hiroshima was to shun nuclear power technology, and there have never been nuclear power electric generators in Australia.  The country has no means of dealing with nuclear waste. By contrast, Canada was an early world leader in the development of peaceful nuclear power, with the first CANDU reactor in service in 1962.  The nuclear reactor at McMaster University in Hamilton, ON, has since 1959 supplied the world with medical radionucleotides. But the political powers in Oz wanted nothing to do with nuclear technology.

The NOTCANZ saga began when Australia started looking for replacements for their Collins class diesel-electric submarines, which had been built in the 1990s by Kockums, a subsidiary of Saab.  The Australians turned to the French, and ordered a dozen of the French Barracuda class submarines, which are nuclear powered, but Oz wanted them with conventional diesel-electric propulsion; these were to be called the Attack class.

This complication caused delays and cost overruns that had the Australians worried. Despite assurances from President Macron himself about the rapid fulfillment of the contract, the Australians suddenly dropped the contract, and embraced an offer for US nuclear propulsion technology for the new fleet of Aussie subs. The cry of “maudit anglais” could be heard from Paris to Canberra, and the Australians paid the French some US$584 million to settle the cancellation.

Aussie submariners had worked aboard US nuclear powered subs, and were absolutely sold on the superior capabilities of nuclear propulsion for the task in view, namely the countering of Chinese presence in the Indo-Pacific region, a strategic end that happily coincided with American strategic policy.  Going with American technology had strategic advantages to the RAN: one being it would strengthen the strategic alliance between the RAN and the USN generally, and especially for the end of countering China; another lying in the difference between French and American nuclear propulsion technology.

American nuclear propulsion technology calls for the uranium to be enriched to the level of 93 percent, whereas the French technology utilizes uranium enriched only to the 6 percent level.  The higher American enrichment enables the reactors to run for the life of the submarine, making refueling unnecessary; the lower enrichment of the French technology requires refueling after ten years service.  Because Australia has no means of dealing with the nuclear waste from refueled nuclear submarines, any jump to nuclear propulsion would favor an American option.  And so, on September 21, 2021, AUKUS was born.

The two Pillars of AUKUS are (1) the acquiring by Australia of nuclear powered attack submarines, the AUKUS class, and the rotational basing of US and UK nuclear powered subs in Australia; while (2) entails “the collaborative development of advanced capabilities in six technological areas: undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, autonomy, advanced cyber, hypersonic, and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic warfare; and two broader functional areas: innovation and information sharing.”

Then, in June 2025, just like that, the United States Department of Defense launched a review whether to scrap the AUKUS agreement with Australia and the United Kingdom.

As we’ve seen, the US is falling behind in deliveries of nuclear subs for its own fleet; the capability of delivering AUKUS class boats may not be there; and the US will not deprive itself of nuclear subs in order to fulfill a commitment to another country, no matter how close an ally.

There is a diplomatic opening for Canada here. It is to acquire French Barracuda class subs, with the prospect of leveraging a closer military and diplomatic alliance with France, counterweighting our dependency on the US.

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