Why JUBLIEE? A Dieppe Special

WHY THE RAID WAS UNDERTAKEN

Vincent J. Curtis

14 Apr 22

August 19, 2022, marks the 80^th anniversary of the raid on Dieppe, Operation JUBILEE.  About twenty years ago, I wrote a paper examining the reason for the raid, and in particular whether the raid was undertaken to impress Joseph Stalin and keep the Soviet Union in the war.  Below is the conclusion.

Churchill ordered that a division sized raid be launched on the coast of Europe following the success of the St. Nazaire commando raid in March, 1942.  The original plan, code named Rutter, was abandoned in July, 1942, because it was feared that security had been compromised, and General Montgomery, then C-in-C Southeastern Command, strongly believed that it should not be remounted.  Churchill, in his memoirs, took full responsibility for intervening and making sure that some large scale raid was launched in 1942 because until an operation of that scale was undertaken, no responsible general would take the responsibility for planning the main invasion.  Churchill described the raid as a “reconnaissance-in-force.”

If these words of Churchill are to be regarded as final, then the purpose of the raid was to overcome the professional timidity of the British generals in respect of the main invasion.  It had nothing to do with Russia except insofar as it was part of the general plan of nuisance raids to draw German troops into France.  Responsibility for the disaster must be laid entirely upon the incompetent planning of those in charge.

If these words of Churchill are not to be regarded as the last on the subject, then account should be taken of a book written by Col John Hughes-Wilson entitled “Military Intelligence Blunders.”  He claims that Mountbatten, without authority, used the inadequate resources available to him as Chief of Combined Operations to execute Jubilee in a bid to enhance his personal standing in the public eye, and perhaps to be named as Supreme Commander under Churchill.  Because Mountbatten had to keep the Chiefs of Staff in the dark, the attack was launched without proper resources, lacked detailed up-to-date intelligence of the German defenses, and lacked the full support of the British Home Commands.

The use of Canadian troops rather that British troops for the raid played into Mountbatten’s hands because the employment of British troops would have tipped off the British Chiefs of Staff as to what Mountbatten was up to.  According to Hughes-Wilson, Churchill in his memoirs accepted responsibility and Mountbatten’s account because no Cabinet documents to contradict Mountbatten could be found.  Mountbatten gambled excessively on surprise, and lost.  If this was indeed the reason the raid was launched, a desire to influence Russian leadership was the furthest thing from the planners’ mind.

Canada participated in the raid because of the desire, and perhaps the real need, to get Canadian troops involved in the ground war.  By not pulling the plug on the final plan of Combined Operations, the Canadian Generals contributed mightily to the disaster.  General McNaughton in particular bears a heavy responsibility for allowing the Canadian troops under his command to be delivered up.

General McNaughton was the engineering mind behind the artillery fire plan that swept Canadian troops to victory at Vimy Ridge in the previous war.  That experience alone should have taught him that for infantry to advance into strong, prepared defenses, a creeping artillery barrage of that kind and scale was necessary for success.  But a barrage of that kind would have entailed the destruction of the port facilities and town, the capture of which intact was the object of the exercise.  This dilemma should have alerted McNaughton to the fundamental flaw in the plan.  The fire support necessary to guarantee success on the ground would have destroyed the object meant to be captured undamaged.  Because McNaughton failed to apply the war experience he gained at Vimy Ridge to the first ground operation involving the Canadian troops under his command, the operation went ahead as planned by Mountbatten, and the disaster with Canadian troops ensued.

Allied planners never did solve the problem of delivering a creeping artillery barrage, and so settled on invading a place not heavily fortified, not strongly manned,  and across a broad front, Normandy.  They brought with them artificial harbours (Mulberries), PLUTO, Hobart’s “funnies”, and specialized landing craft, particularly LSTs.

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