Monday, May 9, 2016

Procurement Policy and the Future of Canadian Military Power


Vincent J. Curtis                                                                                                                                

7 December 2015                                                                                                                              


                If there is one thing that Canadian military procurement policy does for the critic, it is to provide him with abundant grist for the mill.  With a new government comes a new opportunity to change procurement aims for the better.  Procurement, or lack thereof, during the lifetime of the new government will largely, short of a major war, decide Canada’s military capabilities for the next generation or two of war fighters (as they would be called in America).

It has been the assumption of Canadian policy since World War II that Canada would not be attacked by a foreign power, except as an accident in the exchange of nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia.  The end of the cold war made Canadians feel safer ensconced as they were in North America, far from trouble and protected by three oceans and the United States.

The rise of ISIS and of deliverable nuclear weapons by such hostile and unpredictable countries like North Korea and Iran ought to be noticed by Canadian policy makers.  It is now possible for Canada to be struck by a bolt from the blue.  We will not be invaded, but nevertheless acts of war against Canada will become more possible in the next decade or two.

One diplomatic means of reducing Canada’s exposure is to adopt a policy of neutrality with respect to the United States and ISIS, North Korea, and Iran.  Military weakness is one means of making effective that diplomatic approach, though the economic repercussions Canada might suffer at the hands of the United States as a result of being neutral or at least ineffective could be considerable.  The cancellation of the Keystone XL pipeline is one example of America harming Canadian economic interests.  Tougher scrutiny at the border of Canadian travellers and goods is another.

In any case, it would be wiser for Canada to possess the means of striking a telling blow against anyone, state or non-state actor, who would make themselves our enemy than to be utterly defenseless and dependent upon others.  And this is where procurement comes in.

Canada should possess the means of striking offensive blows independently of any assisting power.  Since the rise of NATO, Canada has always been prepared to strike her blows as part of a coalition of powers, as was done in Afghanistan and is presently being done in Iraq and Syria.  Being able to strike a blow independently means that Canada won’t have rely on any other power to complete the mission.  Such capability gives Canada greater flexibility on the world stage, and also a greater respect for her power.

Given financial constraints, Canada’s diplomatic position in the world, and the capabilities of the various elemental services, the navy is the service best positioned to possess that strategic strike capability.  It won’t get it under the current procurement plan of acquiring nothing but frigates.

In terms of sheer tonnage, the procurement plan for the navy is to acquire sixteen of four thousand ton frigates.  What has been proposed instead is to acquire twelve such frigates, and put the remaining tonnage into a nuclear-powered battle cruiser armed with cruise missiles and big guns for offensive punch.  A cruiser in the twenty thousand ton range would have the size to deliver a solid blow, and being nuclear powered, it would be able to cruise indefinitely without the need to refuel on a mission.

The argument against battleships has been that they are vulnerable to air power.  However, the enemies against which that cruiser would be deployed have no air power to speak of, and as a part of a naval task force with allies the air cover would be provided by the other contributors.  The vulnerability argument fails against the proposal.

The RCAF is the other service in need of new, major procurement.  The CF-18s will reach the end of their service lives starting about the year 2020, but the proposed replacement, the F-35, won’t be ready in time and may not be available at a price Canada is willing to pay.  There are alternatives.

The F-16 is still being built and will continue to be a first or second line fighter and fighter-bomber in use by the United States and NATO allies for another decade or two.  The fly-away cost of an F-16 Is in the range of $24 million dollars.  The acquisition of 65 or so F-16s would fill the twenty year gap between the time the F-35 first becomes available and the time it is a mature aircraft whose development costs have been depreciated.

The other alternative represents a decision against the F-35, and it is the F-18 Super Hornet.  This aircraft is capable of operating seamlessly with the CF-18s presently in service, and except for stealth is just as capable an aircraft as the F-35 would be.  A number of EA-18 Growlers would have to be purchased as well, as these aircraft provide the electronic jamming that make up for the Super Hornet’s lack of stealthiness.  Is the RCAF brass up to developing the tactics for integrating the Super Hornet with CF-18s and the Growler?

This is being written on the 74th anniversary of Pearl Harbor.  The idea of a bolt from the blue from across an ocean was just as unthinkable to the United States government then as one would be today to the Canadian government.  Canada is not an irresponsible power, and can be trusted with actual striking power.
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A version of this was published in Esprit de Corp magazine

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