Time to Reorient the CF?

 

 

 

Vincent J. Curtis 


27 Sept 12

 

With a new Chief of Defense Staff coming from the RCAF, who is committed to the purchase of the F-35, any dreams of the CF operating as a Joint Force are out the window.  For a generation, at least.

 

With the examples of blitzkrieg, the AirLand Battle concept, Maneuver Warfare, and the United States Marine Corps to look at, you would think that the highest strategic thinkers in NDHQ and in the MND’s office would gaining an inkling of Air – Land joint operations.  That has not happened.

 

Paul Hellyer’s idea of a single service never extended beyond the administrative.  He sought to eliminate the silly administrative barriers created by three legally separate services and inter-service rivalry.  Hellyer never thought about the three services actually working together and in harmony to defeat the enemy in a battle.

 

The purchase of the F-35 will eliminate for a generation the chance for a Canadian AirLand battle concept because nobody is going to use a stealth fighter to bust tanks, bunkers, or to shoot up enemy ground forces.  And there will be no money left over to buy something that can, after spending that wad on air superiority fighters.

 

So a new question appears: is the CF as currently constituted best suited to be “strategically relevant and tactically decisive” over the next thirty years?  Instead of a predominance of Land forces, should the CF be reoriented to favor air and/or naval power?

 

Over the past sixty years, Canada’s land contribution to international efforts has not been “tactically decisive.”  In Korea, in peacekeeping, and in Afghanistan, Canada’s contribution has been “strategically relevant” but can hardly be said to be “tactically decisive” because the size of the force we sent was too small.  We contributed troops to a largely U.S. led effort in Korea and Afghanistan.  The CF was “tactically decisive” in the small sphere assigned to it, and the “strategic relevance” of the CF derived from the bragging rights our government had from having troops in harm’s way.

 

Tactically, UN peacekeeping has been a failure.  So much so that Canada no longer has an interest in putting a large blue-bereted force in the field.  Peacekeeping is no longer of strategic relevance to the Canadian government.

 

The bragging rights from having troops in harm’s way is the strategic relevance the CF will likely have for the Federal government for the foreseeable future.

 

But is there not more than bragging rights in the way of strategic relevance that we can expect of the CF?  Does Canada not have interests independent of the United States, NATO, and the UN?

 

Many of those of isolationist persuasion (and with the election of a PQ government in Quebec of Separatist persuasion) would say no.  We live in a fire-proof house far from the sources of conflagration.  But a stronger air force and navy, and a correspondingly weaker army, has advantages of their own to those averse to admitting that we might have independent Canadian foreign interests.

 

A stronger and more capable air force and navy would enable a Canadian military contribution to international joint efforts more relevant and also less hazardous diplomatically than one involving putting large numbers of boots on the ground to make a recognized effort.  They would also give Canada an independent strategic capability.

 

The kinds of effort Canada would require from her Armed Forces in the foreseeable future involve the firing of missiles and the dropping of bombs from a stand-off distance.  Driving home Canadian diplomacy at the point of a bayonet is unlikely to be a requirement, and to have to do that involves some pretty serious political calculations here at home.

 

It is far easier - tactically, politically, and diplomatically - to be able to engage an enemy with sophisticated weapons at long range; and the RCAF and RCN are the services that can provide that kind of strategic relevance and capability.

 

The Canada First Defense Strategy is already in tatters because the government does not have the money it thought it would.  The major investments in the CFDS are not in equipment, but in people and infrastructure.  Perhaps, the CFDS should be reconsidered, with an emphasis on kitting out the RCAF and RCN at the expense of the Army, which will always be too small to be “tactically decisive”.

 

The RCAF and RCN are not arms of tactical decision.  But, the strategic relevance of the RCAF and RCN to the Canadian government domestically and diplomatically in future conflicts ought to outweigh this factor.

-          XXX –

 

Isolationism and the Canadian Forces

 

 

Vincent J. Curtis



7 Nov 12
 

 

With the re-election of Barack Obama as President of the United States, certain things will ensue.

 

The first is that Obama Administration will do its best to ignore the war of Islamic extremism against the west.  The scandal arising from the al Qaeda attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, in which the American Ambassador Chris Stevens was killed, is that the President left four Americans to die at the hands of terrorists because for him to have taken military action would have inconvenienced his re-election campaign.

 

The second is that American economic power and her military power will decline noticeably.  The American budget deficit is wildly out of control, and the political will to do something about it was decisively defeated in the November elections.  American borrowing madness cannot continue indefinitely, and no combination of tax increases and spending cuts elsewhere is going to spare the U.S. defense budget.

 

The power vacuum in the world thus created, combined with unchecked hostility towards western culture, will leave the western world less safe.  The question arises: what can Canada do to avoid being attacked and be able to deter misguided attacks against us?

 

The curious fact about Canadian military interventions abroad is that we have always done so not because we were threatened ourselves but to uphold an alliance.  In 1884, we sent voyageurs to Egypt to help a British expedition relieve General Charles Gordon, who was under siege in Khartoum.  Gordon was trying to hold out against the Dervishes, a 19^th century group of Islamic extremists.  Britain protected us against an American invasion, and with this we demonstrated the value of having Canada in the British Empire.

 

In World War I and II, Canada sent her armed forces to Europe not because she was herself threatened by Germany, but to protect what Canadians felt was near and dear to them.

 

Canada sent troops into harm’s way in Korea to demonstrate support both for the United Nations and also the United States, and then to Afghanistan to show solidarity with the United States, which had been attacked on 9/11.

 

Canada’s recent effort in Libya was made not because of the threat Gaddafi represented to us, but to help hold the NATO alliance together.

 

A survey of military threats to Canada and estimating the value of the NATO alliance to our security make one wonder whether Canada should change its foreign policy from one of robust engagement to one of cold, calculated isolationism.  The plain fact is that Canada is more likely to become involved in foreign wars because of our alliances than because of anything Canada herself represents to others.

 

A Canadian withdrawal from NATO and the decline of American military power mean that we would have to rely on our own strong right arm should the defense of our national interests require it.  Disengaging also from much of Asia,  Africa, and the of Muslim world would reduce risks of attack and lessen the need for a robust military capability.

 

 The nature of the military capability we keep would need to change in accordance with a foreign policy of selective isolationism.  Our standing military forces are designed as a microcosm of the expeditionary force that we would send to Europe in the event of World War III.  Its capacity to project power unaided is miniscule.  Fortunately, the nature of future conflict with rogue nations and transnational terrorist organizations do not require the raising and sending of a land army overseas to deal a decisive blow against the enemy.

 

The United States tried that in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the limits of the decisiveness of that method are now better understood than they were a decade ago.  If we dispense with the idea of decisiveness against terrorism, then we come to the realization that being able to strike powerful retaliatory blows from the sea and air is the kind of deterrence we can afford in a standing force.

 

Since Canada makes no pretense of being able to decisively defeat anyone, nothing is to be gained by picking on Canada.  And it would be awfully embarrassing for a strutting terror-master to have to explain to his supporters how he came to be staggering and bleeding from a bolt out of the blue delivered by a middle power like Canada.

 

A blue water navy is the arm that is able to strike these kinds of blows.

                                                            - XXX-

 

 

 

Is Decisiveness Possible in Future Wars?

 

 

 

Vincent J. Curtis


22 October 2012

 

 

The war in Afghanistan, the decade long battle against Islamic terrorism, and the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Libya raise the question of whether prolonged land wars and nation-building efforts will eventually bring lasting peace to a harassed western world.

 

In previous wars, the destruction of the enemy army, followed by the occupation of his country, and particularly of his capital, brought a decision to the war.  One side won, and the other side lost.  One side dictated terms, and the other accepted them.  Then, a form of peace reigned for a period of several decades.

 

This patterned followed even in existential wars, such as the American Civil war of 1861-65 and World War II.

 

The war in Afghanistan brought out a third distinction to the meaning of decisive: to the tactical and strategic we can now add grand strategic.

 

There is no question that the ejection of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, the occupation of the country by US and NATO forces and the installation of a NATO supported regime in Kabul constituted a tactical and strategic decision.  Nowhere does a Taliban government or controlled area exist within the country.  All its bases are in Pakistan, and the reduction of these by conventional military forces represents “a bridge too far” in the grand strategic sense.  Yet, a war drags on and few are sanguine of the fate of the Kabul regime when NATO withdraws at the end of 2014.

 

After its Afghan and Iraq experience, the lead western country against al-Qaeda, the United States, has no interest in long term occupation of Islamic countries that have no strategic interest to or resources for the western world.  The wars the US military is preparing for is one against Iran and China, and both of these are seen primarily as Air and Sea affairs.

 

Canada too made a decade long commitment to nation-building and to counter-insurgency in Afghanistan.  Canada’s Regular Forces are designed as embryonic versions of the services that would be called into being in the event of a major land war in Europe.  But the wars likely to require a Canadian commitment in the next thirty years are not of a kind where a major decision can be expected by the effort of land forces.  Al-Qaeda cannot be stamped out by occupying its host country, for there are enough failed and failing states in the Islamic world that the number of hosts for al-Qaeda lies beyond what western land forces can reasonably occupy and control.

 

Since decisiveness itself is out of the question for a military effort against al-Qaeda terrorism, perhaps “decisiveness” should be stricken out of the lexicon of CF requirements.  Instead of dealing “decisive” blows against an enemy, the CF should be capable of delivering “punishing” blows against an enemy, anywhere in the world, at any time, and without the assistance of any other power.

 

The lead services in the delivery of “punishing” blows against and enemy are the Air and especially the Navy.

 

The RCAF would have to acquire a capacity to drop bombs or fire long-range missiles, which also requires an improved capacity for air-to-air refueling.  In other words, the RCAF needs to be able to fly all the way around the world, non-stop, with its combat aircraft.

 

The RCN is already capable of sailing all the way around the world, though the lack of a modern replenishment vessel may soon end this capacity.  With modern missile technology, naval ships would be capable of delivering a precision strike from littoral waters.

 

Of the two methods of attack, from the air and from the sea, the naval method seems the more cost effective.  The RCN already possesses ships capable of carrying and firing the missiles in question; and ships have a capacity to linger, which aircraft do not.  The RCAF would have to acquire new aircraft and train new crews in order to possess an offensive bombing capacity.

-30-

 

 

 

 

CCV: APC, IFV, or FIASCO?

 

 

Vincent J. Curtis

25 July 2012

Updated 20 September 2012

 

 

DND’s Close Combat Vehicle Project is off the rails, again.  The vehicle that DND would really like to have as a CCV, the new German Puma, was not offered in recent rounds of solicitation, and the project stalled between October 2011 and May 2012.  It was a reset again in September, 2012.  Without the Puma on offer, the CCV project has been thrown into confusion.  The first CCVs were to be fielded in December, 2012.

 

The failures in the project arise from three deep-seated problems.  The first is that many military writers live in a mad-hatter world where words mean what they want them to mean whenever they want them to mean it.  The second is that, as a customer, the government of Canada is known to be fickle and cheap.  The third is that there is no distinctive purpose for the CCV in Army doctrine.

 

There is nothing wrong with living in a mad-hatter world until one has to communicate with others.  Then, the meaning of words does matter.  The terms “Armoured Personnel Carrier” (APC) and “Infantry Fighting Vehicle” (IFV) are well known in the defense world.  A “Close Combat Vehicle” (CCV) is a strictly Canadian term whose meaning was left deliberately vague.

 

The first APC was invented by none other than Canada’s LGen Guy Simonds, who had the turret removed from the chassis of the Sherman tank, creating space for troops.  The classic example of an APC is the M-113, still in service around the world.  The first IFV was the Russian BMP-1, which came out in the later 1960s.  The Americans matched the BMP series with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, which was first used in combat in the 1991 Gulf War.  The Bradley reputedly destroyed more Iraqi T-72 tanks than the M1A1 Abrams tank did, thanks to the TOW missiles the Bradley carried.

 

Canada’s procurement specialists, when soliciting proposals for the new vehicle, sowed confusion when they persisted in using the term CCV, describing it as a IFV in the non-operative parts of the solicitation.  The first proposal for the CCV Project, released on April 26, 2010, and revised June 4, 2010, operatively defined the required vehicle as: “The CCV will provide a high level of crew protection incorporating mine blast resistance and protection against both improvised explosive devices (IED) and ballistic threats.  The CCV will incorporate a protected main weapon station to engage and defeat the enemy.”

 

If you add the non-operative criterion that the vehicle weigh between 25 and 45 tons, the Sherman tank, which weighed 35 tons, met the description of a CCV perfectly.  The crew of the Sherman was well protected, and the tank had a 75 mm main gun, a co-ax .30 cal, a hull .30 cal, and a turret mounted .50 cal.  About a section of infantry, in addition, could be carried on the Sherman, placing the tank between mines and the troops.

 

Unsurprisingly, all the original CCV submissions were rejected, and a new solicitation of interest and qualification for a CCV was issued on August 26, 2010.  That solicitation operatively defined the vehicle as: “The CCV must be an integrated, supportable, existing or upgraded version of a Military Off-The-Shelf Base Vehicle and MOTS turret, each of which is in production for and/or service with another military recognized by DND….”  This definition eliminates a Somali technical in virtue of the fact that a Toyota pick-up truck is not deemed MOTS, the Technical lacks a turret, and the Somali militias are not recognized by DND.

 

It is only in the non-operative background information, which says that the vehicle should weigh between 25 – 45 tons, and that some vehicles will be used in an IFV role, that one gains a clue as to what the solicitations are driving at.

 

But the background information confuses things when it says “…able to deliver a combat ready Canadian Army infantry section in close combat, while operating in intimate support of CF tanks.”  Well, what is operating in intimate support of tanks: an eight man infantry section or the CCV?  That is the distinction between an APC and an IFV!

 

And what’s this business about tanks?

 

The current Canadian Army operating doctrine, adopted in 2007, is Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations. In it, an overseas deployed Canadian battle-group is defined to be “medium weight.”  Since the upper limit on “medium weight” is 45 tons, and a Leopard 2 weighs 65 tons, the term “medium weight” is a euphemism for “without tanks.”  The euphemism for “without tanks” is repeated in the 2011 Land Operations 2021 publication Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow.  Regardless of actual practise, this means that the tactical folks are planning for another Afghanistan deployment without tanks. Therefore this new CCV may (or may not!) have to make up for that lack of firepower and armoured protection.

 

The potential suppliers of such vehicles are sophisticated enough to see the confusion and contradictory statements of the Canadian solicitations.  They are playing things close to the vest for fear of getting burned.  That is why nothing is going forward despite smoke and handwaving in Ottawa.  Nor will it unless the government decides to go single-source.

-          XXX –

 

Now that the Afghan Surge is Over

 

 

Vincent J. Curtis


 21 September 2012

 

 

The month of September saw the last of the 33,000 surge troops leave Afghanistan, in accordance with President Obama’s directive of eighteen months ago.  Some 68,000 U.S. troops remain.  These are scheduled to leave by the end of 2014.  The question is what will happen to Afghanistan afterwards.

 

By 2014, the U.S. will have spent a dozen years developing Afghan society, building infrastructure, training Afghan police and military, and encouraging democratic governance in that country.  It would be wrong, however, to suggest that the U.S. has staked its prestige in a successful Afghanistan after 2014.  At some point, the Afghans have to take care of themselves.

 

If the history of war is any guide, the crucial factor in keeping the government of Afghanistan out of the hands of the Taliban will be morale.  If the Taliban are not seen as the inevitable victors after an American withdrawal, if Afghan forces do not regard the Taliban as their superiors on the battlefield, then the chances are better than even that the regime in Kabul that America leaves behind in 2014 will survive.  It will survive even the departure of current president Hamid Karzai.

 

This is not to say that the contours of the region of control by Kabul will not change from what they are now, with U.S. troops present.  The area in which the writ of Kabul runs ought to shrink from what it is now.  But this is no reason for despair; it is simply a recognition of the geography of the country and the loss of offensive power backing the Kabul regime occasioned by the departure of U.S. forces.

 

The loss of some space will lead to a crisis of morale – for some.  If the regime and the Afghan armed forces which support it are able to dominate the crisis, then one of two possible outcomes will occur.

 

The first possible outcome is a new equilibrium.  Afghanistan will settle down into a loosely knit country dominated in the hinterland by local warlords, of which the Taliban will be one of several; and the capital area will be controlled by a regime nominally like the one left behind.  Such was the nature of the country from its founding in the 1747 to the 1973 revolution.

 

The second possible outcome is that the Taliban decide to square off with the Kabul regime and fight a real war on real battlefields for control of the entire country.  This they will find difficult to do.  The Taliban, throughout its existence, has never had to fight a battle that required the coordination of battalions of troops, the accurate delivery of firepower, and logistical resupply of ammunition.  They seized power in the 1990s due to a collapse in morale of their opponents, who feared individual retribution; and they lost power in 2002 because of the coordination of U.S. air power with the Northern Alliance troops, who simply showed up.  The speed of the Taliban collapse in 2002 surprised many - they lost both Kabul and Kandahar in a single campaign season - but such is the effect of a sudden loss of morale.

 

While the Taliban may be able to locally outnumber Afghan troops in the mountains, the major cities and population centers are on plains.  The semi-trained Afghan forces greatly outnumber the untrained ragtag forces that the Taliban at the best of times are able to put into the field.  The Taliban can train a dozen for a single operation – as evidenced at Camp Bastion – but putting together the platoons and companies and battalions required to fight a stand-up battle with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and to resupply them are likely beyond their capacity.  The Taliban can dominate here than there with small numbers through threats against individuals.  But when enough Taliban bunch together they become a visible target, hittable even by ANA forces.

 

This is where morale comes in.  If the ANA believes that the Taliban are unbeatable, if the ANA commanders are incompetent or lazy, if the Taliban are able to undermine the morale of the ANA by threats and assassinations, and if the Kabul regime is so corrupt that it fails to look after the soldiers protecting it, then threat alone can cause a collapse of the ANA despite the disparity in offensive power between the ANA and the Taliban.

 

Afghanistan is a large country with rugged terrain – ideal for small guerrilla bands to dominate here and there.  The big picture, however, is that the Kabul regime is favored by geography to control the most space and the large population centers.  The Kabul regime can survive if its morale holds up, and if that confidence is transmitted to the forces that protect it and to the population it governs.

-30-

 

Vincent J. Curtis is a free-lance writer who was embedded with U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2010, and reported on behalf of the Buffalo News.  A version of this piece was published in the Buffalo News.

Conservative Defense Strategy Goes Kaput

 

 
 
Vincent J. Curtis  


12 July 2012

 

 

First reported in the pages of Esprit de Corps, DND informed the government that the Canada First Defense Strategy was “unaffordable.”  Strange formulation, that.  It is supposed to be the government telling DND that their plans are unaffordable, not the other way around.

 

It turns out this strange formulation was a kabuki theatre way of DND saying that the government can’t have the Strategy – a promise for long term, predictable, and consistent funding for twenty years - and the spending cuts in the Defense budget.  Government speak with forked tongue.

 

The Canada First Defense Strategy is a twenty one page document issued by the Harper government in 2008.  Two pages worth of CFDS are allocated for substantive matters and the rest are filled with self-congratulation.

 

MND Peter MacKay says “[the Canada First Defense Strategy] fulfills the Government’s commitment to provide enhanced security for Canadians and gives the military the long-term support it so critically needs and deserves, now and in the future.”  Perhaps he meant the mere publication of the document fulfilled the Government’s commitment, since the actual fulfillment of the substance was a twenty year endeavour.  The satire writes itself.

 

From start to, now, finish the CFDS was an exercise in blowing hard.  The title itself suggests that somehow previous governments had let the defense of Canada cease to be the primary purpose of the CF (if I may still use that term), and that the new Conservative government were going to set the priorities back to their proper order.  Then, the Army is designed to fight in Afghanistan again!

 

Since the defense of Canada, as a first priority rather than a second or third priority, is the aim of the CFDS, what in those two pages of substance enhances the striking power – the “combat-capability” - of the CF?  What makes the CF better in the defense of Canada?

 

For the Air Force, the fighter aircraft fleet which once consisted of 138 CF-18 Fighters – since shrunk to 77 – will be reduced to 65 aircraft once the acquisition of the F-35 is completed.  Since stealth capability is not required for the defense of North American air space, the actual striking power of the RCAF would be less under CFDS than it was under the Trudeau government of the 1980s and even the Chretien-Martin government of the 90’s and early 00’s.

 

The RCN was offered replacements for its existing fleet, and fifteen ships to replace the existing destroyers and frigates were set aside for the navy.  Newer missiles and more effective guns on the new ships might enhance the striking power of the modernized navy marginally, but a qualitative improvement in the form of a “big honking ship” was never in the offing.

 

The army had the real opportunity to enhance the striking power of the CF in the defense of Canada.  There is talk of Leopard II tanks in CFDS, but the current army operational doctrine Adaptive Dispersed Operations: The Force Employment Concept for Canada’s Army of Tomorrow categorically rejected the employment of battle tanks, despite the lesson of OP MEDUSA.  The army is by this doctrine “a medium-weight force”, and “medium-weight” is a euphemism for “without tanks.”  The euphemisms for going without tanks were repeated in the 2011 Designed Canada’s Army of Tomorrow paper, endorsed by LGen Peter Devlin, CLS no less.

 

So even if tanks are given the army, the army has no plan to use them.

 

What the army is interested in is a “close combat vehicle.”  What is a CCV except a half-assed tank?  The original concept of the Sherman tank was as a CCV for the infantry, and it was employed as such throughout World War II.  The Sherman was fast, mechanically reliable, and was armed with three machine guns and a 75 mm main gun.  What the army wants is a Sherman tank on wheels, an engineering paradox.

 

Likewise there is no mention in ADO or CFDS of the acquisition and deployment of new artillery, such as the M777 system used in Afghanistan, or airborne or airmobile forces.  The latter, however, might be buried in the SOF regiment, whose operations would be mightily enhanced by the acquisition of a couple of AC-130 Spectre gunships, but these also go unmentioned in the CFDS and ADO.

 

The only real weapons system that would enhance the striking power of the army against all enemies, whether asymmetric Taliban-like or symmetric peer-to-peer, and be light enough to be rapidly transportable, is an attack helicopter.  The one proposal out there for the acquisition of attack helicopters for the army does not come from DND.

 

The CFDS proffered nothing more than a slight reduction in the striking power of the CF.

-          XXX –

 A version of this appeared in Esprit de Corps magazine.

 

No Pilots? What is wrong with the RCAF?

 

 

 

Vincent J. Curtis                                                           4 July 2012

 

 

            News item: “While Canada is poised to begin taking delivery of 15 new Chinook CF-47F heavy lift helicopters… a crippling shortage of trained aircrew means that even if Boeing delivers them all on time, it will take until June 2017 before the RCAF will have the fleet fully operational.  Earlier this year, the commander of the RCAF, LGen André Deschamps, briefed a Senate committee on the fact that Canada has had to recruit foreign pilots (mostly British RAF) to assist with the training of new pilots.”

 

If there ever was an argument to transfer rotary aviation from the Air Force to the Army, this is it.

 

From among the ardent thousands who staff the RCAF, it will take five years starting from now for LGen Deschamps to find a couple dozen of them to pilot this new aircraft.  Perhaps these new people are currently in the enrollment process and it will take an estimated five years to complete.

 

It is not as if the arrival of these new helicopters comes as a news flash to the Air Force. The contract with Boeing was signed in August, 2009, and so it will be eight years from the time the Air Force was officially notified to the time it is completely ready for action.  Lucky for us their forbears in the RCAF were a little quicker off the mark: eight years is the difference in time between the Mk I Spitfire and the Vampire jet.

 

Previously I’ve argued that the Air Force should postpone purchase of the F-35 for twenty years in order to give the jet a chance to mature technologically and for costs to become more affordable.  To fill the gap, we would purchase 65 modern F-16 fighters, still in production and currently in Block 60 plus of development, and 65 AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters.  The combined cost of each pair of aircraft is $10 million less than a single F-35 jet if purchased according to original government estimates, now, ahem, a little out of date.  After twenty years, the F-16 would be ready for retirement and the then-current F-35 can be purchased at costs reasonable and predictable at that time.  The RCAF does not need new capabilities in its fighter jets, what it needs are new airframes.

 

The bonus to the CF (if I may still use that term) is the additional combat power all these modern attack helicopters would provide that would not be available even if the F-35 were operational now.  Of course, that new combat power would be used tactically and often in support of embattled ground troops, which is something the RCAF has historically not done.  And since the Apache flies, by rights it should belong to the Air Force.

 

The revelation that the Air Force cannot even manage to come up with a couple dozen pilots until eight years after notification obviously puts paid to the idea that they could come up in any reasonable time with a hundred or so ardent young men who would love to fly an Apache Longbow, with all its whiz-bang technology, in combat.

 

Thus if the Army wants to have the speed, range, and firepower of attack helicopters to compliment the doctrine of Adaptive Dispersed Operations it will have to take on the task itself.  There is nothing sacrosanct about helicopters being an Air Force thing: rotary aviation belongs to the Army in the United States military, and the Americans are more into rotary aviation than anyone else.

 

The old doctrinal Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group used to have a squadron of Griffon helicopters assigned to it, so in theory at least the brigade commander had at his disposal all the basic necessities of rotary aviation under his tactical control.  It just so happened that the helicopter squadron folks wore blue and were administered through the air element command.  It would not be so hard conceptually to put all these folks in green instead, and to expand the tactical and operational capabilities of the rotary assets at the disposal of the brigade commander.  One could even substitute one for one an attack helicopter squadron for an armoured squadron in the brigade.  It would be easy also to include the heavy lift capabilities of the Chinook helicopters in that modernized doctrinal brigade group.

 

Competition is what makes free enterprise the most cost efficient way to run an economy.  Competition is what makes individuals work harder to get ahead, and produce a better organization.  Perhaps competition in the aviation field is what the Air Force needs to shake itself out of its doldrums.

-         XXX –