Thursday, November 15, 2012

Is Decisiveness Possible in Future Wars?


 

 

 
Vincent J. Curtis


22 October 2012

 

 

The war in Afghanistan, the decade long battle against Islamic terrorism, and the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Libya raise the question of whether prolonged land wars and nation-building efforts will eventually bring lasting peace to a harassed western world.

 

In previous wars, the destruction of the enemy army, followed by the occupation of his country, and particularly of his capital, brought a decision to the war.  One side won, and the other side lost.  One side dictated terms, and the other accepted them.  Then, a form of peace reigned for a period of several decades.

 

This patterned followed even in existential wars, such as the American Civil war of 1861-65 and World War II.

 

The war in Afghanistan brought out a third distinction to the meaning of decisive: to the tactical and strategic we can now add grand strategic.

 

There is no question that the ejection of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, the occupation of the country by US and NATO forces and the installation of a NATO supported regime in Kabul constituted a tactical and strategic decision.  Nowhere does a Taliban government or controlled area exist within the country.  All its bases are in Pakistan, and the reduction of these by conventional military forces represents “a bridge too far” in the grand strategic sense.  Yet, a war drags on and few are sanguine of the fate of the Kabul regime when NATO withdraws at the end of 2014.

 

After its Afghan and Iraq experience, the lead western country against al-Qaeda, the United States, has no interest in long term occupation of Islamic countries that have no strategic interest to or resources for the western world.  The wars the US military is preparing for is one against Iran and China, and both of these are seen primarily as Air and Sea affairs.

 

Canada too made a decade long commitment to nation-building and to counter-insurgency in Afghanistan.  Canada’s Regular Forces are designed as embryonic versions of the services that would be called into being in the event of a major land war in Europe.  But the wars likely to require a Canadian commitment in the next thirty years are not of a kind where a major decision can be expected by the effort of land forces.  Al-Qaeda cannot be stamped out by occupying its host country, for there are enough failed and failing states in the Islamic world that the number of hosts for al-Qaeda lies beyond what western land forces can reasonably occupy and control.

 

Since decisiveness itself is out of the question for a military effort against al-Qaeda terrorism, perhaps “decisiveness” should be stricken out of the lexicon of CF requirements.  Instead of dealing “decisive” blows against an enemy, the CF should be capable of delivering “punishing” blows against an enemy, anywhere in the world, at any time, and without the assistance of any other power.

 

The lead services in the delivery of “punishing” blows against and enemy are the Air and especially the Navy.

 

The RCAF would have to acquire a capacity to drop bombs or fire long-range missiles, which also requires an improved capacity for air-to-air refueling.  In other words, the RCAF needs to be able to fly all the way around the world, non-stop, with its combat aircraft.

 

The RCN is already capable of sailing all the way around the world, though the lack of a modern replenishment vessel may soon end this capacity.  With modern missile technology, naval ships would be capable of delivering a precision strike from littoral waters.

 

Of the two methods of attack, from the air and from the sea, the naval method seems the more cost effective.  The RCN already possesses ships capable of carrying and firing the missiles in question; and ships have a capacity to linger, which aircraft do not.  The RCAF would have to acquire new aircraft and train new crews in order to possess an offensive bombing capacity.
-30-
 
 

 

 

No comments:

Post a Comment