22 October 2012
The war in Afghanistan, the decade long battle against
Islamic terrorism, and the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Libya raise the question
of whether prolonged land wars and nation-building efforts will eventually
bring lasting peace to a harassed western world.
In previous wars, the destruction of the enemy army,
followed by the occupation of his country, and particularly of his capital,
brought a decision to the war. One side
won, and the other side lost. One side
dictated terms, and the other accepted them.
Then, a form of peace reigned for a period of several decades.
This patterned followed even in existential wars, such as
the American Civil war of 1861-65 and World War II.
The war in Afghanistan brought out a third distinction to
the meaning of decisive: to the tactical and strategic we can now add grand
strategic.
There is no question that the ejection of the Taliban from power
in Afghanistan, the occupation of the country by US and NATO forces and the
installation of a NATO supported regime in Kabul constituted a tactical and
strategic decision. Nowhere does a
Taliban government or controlled area exist within the country. All its bases are in Pakistan, and the
reduction of these by conventional military forces represents “a bridge too
far” in the grand strategic sense. Yet,
a war drags on and few are sanguine of the fate of the Kabul regime when NATO
withdraws at the end of 2014.
After its Afghan and Iraq experience, the lead western
country against al-Qaeda, the United States, has no interest in long term
occupation of Islamic countries that have no strategic interest to or resources
for the western world. The wars the US
military is preparing for is one against Iran and China, and both of these are
seen primarily as Air and Sea affairs.
Canada too made a decade long commitment to nation-building
and to counter-insurgency in Afghanistan.
Canada’s Regular Forces are designed as embryonic versions of the services
that would be called into being in the event of a major land war in
Europe. But the wars likely to require a
Canadian commitment in the next thirty years are not of a kind where a major
decision can be expected by the effort of land forces. Al-Qaeda cannot be stamped out by occupying
its host country, for there are enough failed and failing states in the Islamic
world that the number of hosts for al-Qaeda lies beyond what western land
forces can reasonably occupy and control.
Since decisiveness itself is out of the question for a
military effort against al-Qaeda terrorism, perhaps “decisiveness” should be
stricken out of the lexicon of CF requirements.
Instead of dealing “decisive” blows against an enemy, the CF should be
capable of delivering “punishing” blows against an enemy, anywhere in the
world, at any time, and without the assistance of any other power.
The lead services in the delivery of “punishing” blows
against and enemy are the Air and especially the Navy.
The RCAF would have to acquire a capacity to drop bombs or
fire long-range missiles, which also requires an improved capacity for
air-to-air refueling. In other words,
the RCAF needs to be able to fly all the way around the world, non-stop, with
its combat aircraft.
The RCN is already capable of sailing all the way around
the world, though the lack of a modern replenishment vessel may soon end this
capacity. With modern missile
technology, naval ships would be capable of delivering a precision strike
from littoral waters.
Of the two methods of attack, from the air and from the sea,
the naval method seems the more cost effective.
The RCN already possesses ships capable of carrying and firing the
missiles in question; and ships have a capacity to linger, which aircraft do
not. The RCAF would have to acquire new
aircraft and train new crews in order to possess an offensive bombing capacity.
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