Vincent J. Curtis
12 July 2012
First reported in the pages of Esprit de Corps, DND informed the government that the Canada First Defense Strategy was “unaffordable.” Strange formulation, that. It is supposed to be the government telling
DND that their plans are unaffordable, not the other way around.
It turns out this strange formulation was a kabuki theatre
way of DND saying that the government can’t have the Strategy – a promise for
long term, predictable, and consistent funding for twenty years - and the spending cuts in the Defense
budget. Government speak with forked
tongue.
The Canada First
Defense Strategy is a twenty one page document issued by the Harper
government in 2008. Two pages worth of CFDS are allocated for substantive
matters and the rest are filled with self-congratulation.
MND Peter MacKay says “[the Canada First Defense Strategy] fulfills the Government’s commitment
to provide enhanced security for Canadians and gives the military the long-term
support it so critically needs and deserves, now and in the future.” Perhaps he meant the mere publication of the
document fulfilled the Government’s commitment, since the actual fulfillment of
the substance was a twenty year endeavour.
The satire writes itself.
From start to, now, finish the CFDS was an exercise in blowing hard. The title itself suggests that somehow
previous governments had let the defense of Canada cease to be the primary
purpose of the CF (if I may still use that term), and that the new Conservative
government were going to set the priorities back to their proper order. Then, the Army is designed to fight in
Afghanistan again!
Since the defense of Canada, as a first priority rather than
a second or third priority, is the aim of the CFDS, what in those two pages of substance enhances the striking power – the “combat-capability” - of the CF? What makes the CF better in the defense of
Canada?
For the Air Force, the fighter aircraft fleet which once
consisted of 138 CF-18 Fighters – since shrunk to 77 – will be reduced to 65
aircraft once the acquisition of the F-35 is completed. Since stealth capability is not required for
the defense of North American air space, the actual striking power of the RCAF
would be less under CFDS than it was
under the Trudeau government of the 1980s and even the Chretien-Martin
government of the 90’s and early 00’s.
The RCN was offered replacements for its existing fleet, and
fifteen ships to replace the existing destroyers and frigates were set aside
for the navy. Newer missiles and more
effective guns on the new ships might enhance the striking power of the
modernized navy marginally, but a qualitative improvement in the form of a “big
honking ship” was never in the offing.
The army had the real opportunity to enhance the striking
power of the CF in the defense of Canada.
There is talk of Leopard II tanks in CFDS,
but the current army operational doctrine Adaptive
Dispersed Operations: The Force Employment Concept for Canada’s Army of
Tomorrow categorically rejected the employment of battle tanks, despite the
lesson of OP MEDUSA. The army is by this
doctrine “a medium-weight force”, and “medium-weight” is a euphemism for
“without tanks.” The euphemisms for going
without tanks were repeated in the 2011 Designed
Canada’s Army of Tomorrow paper, endorsed by LGen Peter Devlin, CLS no
less.
So even if tanks are given the army, the army has no plan to
use them.
What the army is interested in is a “close combat vehicle.” What is a CCV except a half-assed tank? The original concept of the Sherman tank was
as a CCV for the infantry, and it was employed as such throughout World War II. The Sherman was fast, mechanically reliable,
and was armed with three machine guns and a 75 mm main gun. What the army wants is a Sherman tank on
wheels, an engineering paradox.
Likewise there is no mention in ADO or CFDS of the acquisition
and deployment of new artillery, such as the M777 system used in Afghanistan,
or airborne or airmobile forces. The
latter, however, might be buried in the SOF regiment, whose operations would be
mightily enhanced by the acquisition of a couple of AC-130 Spectre gunships,
but these also go unmentioned in the CFDS
and ADO.
The only real weapons system that would enhance the striking
power of the army against all enemies, whether asymmetric Taliban-like or
symmetric peer-to-peer, and be light enough to be rapidly transportable, is an
attack helicopter. The one proposal out
there for the acquisition of attack helicopters for the army does not come from
DND.
The CFDS proffered
nothing more than a slight reduction in the striking power of the CF.
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XXX –
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