The U.S. Antional Security Strategy, Part 1

Vincent J. Curtis

1 Feb 26

“The business of America is business” is a saying attributed to President Calvin Coolidge. American businessman and President of the United States Donald J. Trump understands a deeper truth than Coolidge meant: that American military, diplomatic, and cultural power in the world depends upon its economic power. Hence, the success of the American economy and American business is the central concern of Trump’s National Security Strategy. The focus on “America First” or a foreign policy that puts America’s national interest first, places Trump as a disciple of Hans J. Morgenthau, and of Henry Kissinger’s “A New Foreign Policy for the United States”. Published in 1965; Kissinger proposed self-interest as the first principle of American Foreign Policy, and cautioned against deeper American involvement in Vietnam.

The Strategy makes clear that the Trump Administration sees China as America’s chief rival and adversary in the world. ‘Enemy’ is too strong a term to describe Trump’s perception of China, for the Strategy sees continued trade between the two countries, and Trump himself is too clever a negotiator to make clear so stark a relationship between America and Communist China, and between himself and China’s president, Xi Jinping.

The goal of the Strategy is straightforward, “To ensure that America remains the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful, and most successful country for decades to come”. The purpose of the document is to provide coherence and focus to how the United States will interact with the world, by explaining “the essential connection between ends and means: it begins from an accurate assessment of what is desired and what tools are available, or can realistically be created, to achieve the desired outcomes.” The strategy is almost military in its antiseptic analysis.

The Strategy criticizes American strategic goals since the end of the Reagan Administration and the rise of so-called neo-cons in foreign policy, “American strategies since the end of the Cold War have fallen short—they have been laundry lists of wishes or desired end states; have not clearly defined what we want but instead stated vague platitudes; and have often misjudged what we should want.”

The Strategy criticizes the thinking of the “elites” as follows: “Our elites badly miscalculated America’s willingness to shoulder forever global burdens to which the American people saw no connection to the national interest. They overestimated America’s ability to fund, simultaneously, a massive welfare regulatory- administrative state alongside a massive military, diplomatic, intelligence, and foreign aid complex. They placed hugely misguided and destructive bets on globalism and so-called “free trade” that hollowed out the very middle class and industrial base on which American economic and military preeminence depend.” The echoes of Vietnam, of the inflationary pressures of the late 1960s through the 1970s, and everything from Bush 41 onwards reverberate through these passages. That “hollowing out” began with the 1992 NAFTA agreement, and accelerated rapidly in 2002 after China was admitted to the World Trade Organization (Bush 43).

Trump is plainly determined that America will learn from its past mistakes that he observed in his earlier life. “They allowed allies and partners to offload the cost of their defense onto the American people, and sometimes to suck us into conflicts and to suck us into controversies central to their interests but peripheral or irrelevant to our own.” (Saudi Arabia & Kuwait v. Iraq, 1990. NATO.).

The cardinal error made by the “elites” of the past, was, “they undermined … the character of our nation upon which its power, wealth, and decency were built.”

Here Trump observes that beneath America’s economic power is the character of the American people that make that economy actual. The worm of hatred, self-loathing, and contempt for American success began with the Vietnam War, and persists to this day in academia. Trump was a young man in the 1950s and 1960s, and his view of America was shaped in this period of undoubted American greatness, dominance, prosperity, success, and essential goodness.

Next: Ends

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Why the EX?

Vincent J. Curtis

26 Dec 25

This space has consistently argued against the purchase of the Lockheed-Martin F-35 for the RCAF, and instead urged that the Boeing F-15EX be the fighter jet that Canada buy.  The USAF sees some wisdom in this, as it is acquiring about 100 of these thoroughly modernized fighters from Boeing.  The combination of factors for this purchase by the USAF include: delays in delivery of the F-35, the wearing out of the F-15C/D inventory, and the favorable economics of operating a mixed fleet of both F-35 and F-15EX.

The proponents of acquiring the F-15EX emphasize that it is a powerful complement to the F-35, with special emphasis on the “deep magazine” of the F-15EX as compared to the F-35.  In stealth mode, the F-35 can only carry four missiles; whereas the loadout on the F-15EX is 12 missiles.  Hence, if the enemy air defenses are suppressed, an F-15EX sortie can deliver as much firepower as three sorties of F-35s.

Another feature offered as reason for an F-15EX acquisition is lower operating cost.  The fly-away cost of an F-35 is said to be US$82 million; that of an F-15EX is US$90 million, but the mission availability rate of the F-35 is only 67 percent, while that of the F-15EX is 83 percent. In addition, the maintenance costs of the F-35 are very high, and special hangers are required to maintain the radar absorbing coating which preserves its stealthiness. The F-15EX requires no special surface treatments or hanger conditions.

Finally, there is a radical difference in performance. The top speed of an F-35 is Mach 1.6, and it has a service ceiling of 50,000 ft; the top speed of the F-15EX fully loaded is Mach 2.5, with a service ceiling of 60,000 ft., while stripped down (to deal with those pesky Chinese balloons) the F-15EX can reach 65,000 ft, and is rumoured to have a top speed of Mach 2.9.  These, combined with a 9 g turning capability, make the F-15EX very hard to shoot down with a missile; and the new electronic suite in the F-15EX will give the pilot plenty of warning about incoming trouble. The F-15EX outranges the F-35 by several hundred miles, and has a 20,000 hr service life.

So, why should Canada purchase the F-15EX? The primary mission of the RCAF, now and always, is the air defence of North America.  A vital secondary role is the demonstration of Canadian sovereignty over the High Arctic by flights of Canadian combat aircraft in Canadian air space in the far north. For the latter purpose, stealth is not a requirement, and in some ways, i.e. the demonstration of sovereignty, stealth is a detriment: you want to be seen demonstrating sovereignty.  A fighter jet with long-range, high speed, and a deep magazine is the aircraft to deal with a flight of incoming Russian bombers. Being visible might well act as a deterrence, for there’s nothing on an adventurous Russian bomber that hurt an F-15EX.

Now, let’s talk acquisition.  There are serious production delays that retard the acquisition of a fleet of 88 F-35s.  The Boeing production line for F-15EXs is fully up and running and is filling orders at a rate of two aircraft per month. There’s plenty of room for increase to fill an urgent need from Canada. Boeing has previously indicated that money spent by Canada to acquire Super Hornets would be offset by Boeing running more business through its manufacturing facility in Winnipeg, so the industrial offsets are potentially there.

Thus, this proposal boils down to the acquisition of a smaller number of F-35s, and a larger number of F-15EXs, giving the RCAF the potential for SEAD that opens the way for the big puncher.

What about the Gripen E?  Nothing wrong with it.  I’ve likened it to Volvo’s take on the F-16, and we’ll see what it can do against Russia this spring in Ukraine. But how does the Gripen E fit in with the operational concepts elucidated above?

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