Vincent J. Curtis
21 Oct 20
The United States Scouts was a unit of the
United States Army between 1866 and 1942.
It consisted of Native American Indians, who served as guides and, at
times, combat soldiers when the United States settled its West. These were the days before topographical
maps, and local geographical knowledge was essential for successful military
operations against plains Indians hostile to settlement.
Indian scouts were hired for their skills
and their loyalty. They did not train in
the conventional combat methods of the U.S. Army of that period. When they fought, which was often, the Scouts
employed the methods and tactics of Indians.
The last Scout Troop was disbanded in 1942, co-incident with the
disbandment of the last horsed U.S. Cavalry unit at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
Akin to the Scouts, the Canadian Rangers
are hired into the Canadian Army reserve on account of their knowledge and
skills acquired from a lifetime of experience in Canada’s North. They receive little training, and they are equipped
economically. The CBC recently published
an opinion piece by Robert Smol which argued that the Rangers needed to change
– reset – “to keep pace with a changing North.”
Smol’s opinion deserves to be seriously
considered. He holds an M.A. in War
Studies from RMC, served for twenty years in the CAF, and retired as a Captain
in the Int Branch. Smol says that the
Rangers should be trained to a military standard of Army Reserves. He says that the Rangers are the only element
of CAF reserves that cannot be sent directly into combat.
The Rangers have been in the news of late
on account of a few of their members being associated with “far-right” “hate
groups.” Could military training cure
the Rangers of unpopular political views?
Smol thinks yes. “…disgraceful
conduct by non-Indigenous members of the Rangers should be our clarion call for
a Rangers reset.”
I don’t think Smol has considered all the
factors. In the first place, what
offensive and defensive army tactics could the Rangers employ in Canada’s far
north? Are section attacks that are
taught on the Mattawa Plain relevant to warfare on the Arctic tundra? Who would be the enemy, and what would be a
possible strategic situation?
Does the Canadian Army even have a
defensive doctrine that is applicable to tundra? The Russian Steppes are not at all like our
Arctic tundra. You can’t dig slit
trenches in tundra. Maneuver Warfare,
with tanks and wide, sweeping maneuvers as occurred in Russia 1941-1944, simply
isn’t applicable to Canada’s high Arctic.
Before the Rangers are trained in combat operations, maybe the Canadian
Army needs to develop a force employment doctrine for land operations in the
high Arctic first. After that, you still
have to define a place for specifically Ranger operations.
Smol, I think, neglects the reason why
Canada even has a Ranger force outfitted and organized as it is. The first Rangers were organized during World
War II to serve as eyes and ears on the British Columbia coast against possible
Japanese operations. After the war, the
same idea was leveraged to maintain a Canadian military presence throughout the
North. Occupation is an important
component of sovereignty, and nothing says occupation like guys with guns. Aboriginal habitation doesn’t count as a sign
of sovereignty. Yes, Canada maintains a
post at Alert, but the Arctic is a big place, and Alert doesn’t cover the
entire region.
Another advantage to the Rangers as
presently constituted is economy. They
don’t cost a lot of money to get the job they do, done. That job is demonstrating sovereignty. If a military situation arises that is bigger
than a Ranger Patrol can handle, it’s the job of the big boys from down south
to deal with. Rangers are the recce
element.
Nevertheless, Rangers were deployed to
Neskantaga First Nations for a real-world Aid to the Civil Power operation last
November.
Trained militia reservists are known to
have awkward political views. Military
training didn’t cause them, or cure them.
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