That That sinking feeling

Vincent J. Curtis

8 Sept 2026

 When I heard that Canada was about to announce the winner of the submarine competition, the rumor was that the contract would be split half-and-half: 6 subs would be purchased from Germany, and six of the Hanwau Ocean KSS-IIIs from Korea. A sensible decision, I thought. We’d get subs optimized for each ocean and for each strategic threat, Russia in the Atlantic and China in the Pacific; and because the Koreans promised fast delivery, we’d have a fleet in being by the mid-2030s.

But then it was announced that all the subs would be built by Germany and none by Korea. My heart sank a little.

The decision to go entirely with the German design was a way of delaying the expenditure of money. The Koreans would have outfitted Canada with a submarine fleet before the end of the 2030s, while the Germans could not complete a 12-submarine contract until the 2040s. Besides that, denying Korea so much as a third of the contract, i.e. four subs, missed an opportunity to build a stronger diplomatic relationship with a country in the hotter strategic region, the Indo-Pacific.

The decision to go entirely with the German design fits almost too well with the Prime Minister’s personal prejudices. Mark Carney is a known Europhile, and also, strangely, a Sinophile. The Korean sub, versions of which are already in operation, would have given the RCN a strategic strike capability. Besides torpedoes, the Korean sub had a VLS, capable of firing up to ten SLBMs. This means the RCN would have been capable of striking Shanghai with ballistic missiles from very far away in the Pacific Ocean. That would be decidedly unfriendly.

The German sub design, besides torpedoes, has an additional anti-ship missile system. I find this kind of weird on a sub, for this system makes the sub somewhat less of an offensive threat. A sub is already an anti-ship platform; adding anti-ship missiles doesn’t seem that much of additional capability; while the capability to launch a salvo of SLBMs imparts to the vessel a strategic threat.

Given the accusations of conflict of interest that once swirled around Mark Carney after his assumption of office, I looked for a business relationship between Brookfield, Carney’s old company, and Thyssenkrupp, whose Maritime Division is the principal contractor building the German sub. Turns out there is a connection. In January, 2020, Brookfield, along with Temasek Holdings, bid $16.6 billion for Thyssenkrupp’s Elevator division. Though Brookfield’s bid did not win, it was a business deal that no doubt enabled Mark Carney to become personally acquainted with members of the board of Thyssenkrupp. That was all I found. Atlas Electronik, the major subcontractor, has had no connection with Brookfield. Siemens Steam Turbine has had connections with Brookfield, but the German sub, the Type 212CD, is not going to be powered by steam turbine technology; it’s got hydrogen fuel-cell, and two diesel engines.

Noteworthy is that the Germans and the Norwegians who were supposed to be the first to acquire the TKMS submarine have said they will stand aside and let Canada be the lead country on the acquisition; at 12 Canada would have as large a fleet of these as the Germans and Norwegians combined. Given that the Type 212CD is a new design and a new build, I’m getting the feeling that Canada will be used to work out the bugs that will inevitably arise in a new build. The Korean sub is already in serial production, and the novelty to the KSS-III version is upgraded lithium-ion batteries, extending speed and endurance. Canada would have acquired from Korea a proven vessel; the same can’t be said about the German boat.

The all-German acquisition program fits too well into the personal prejudices of the Prime Minister: a Europhile, a Sinophile uncomfortable with an Indo-Pacific Strategy specifically aimed against China, a submarine capable of strategic strikes against China. Then, there’s doing business with old pals.

-30-