Sunday, June 12, 2022

Layered Anti-tank Defence

Vincent J. Curtis

30 Jan 22

The current worries about a Russian invasion of the Donbas region of Ukraine, and past concern about invasions of the Baltic States, put in mind the development of layered anti-tank defense.  The Genforce doctrinal enemy was based upon the Soviet concepts of befehlstaktik employed against the Germans beginning in late 1942 which, in turn, was an evolution of the deep-battle concept of Mikhail Tukhachevsky   If you’ve read Erich von Manstein’s book Lost Victories, the combat and the terrain of Ukraine will be familiar.

The Germans were the first to develop layered anti-tank defense because they were the first to cope with the novel invention: the British tank - in World War 1.  Erich Ludendorff outlined the general principles of layered anti-tank defense – an outgrowth of another new concept, the elastic defense - that are still relevant today.  Ludendorff identified anti-tank mines, ditches, artillery, natural obstacles such as water courses and soft ground, suitable arms in the hands of the infantry, and panzers for counter-attack as its elements.

The aim was to use obstacles like ditches and minefields to canalize and hold the enemy tanks in a kill zone for dedicated artillery to destroy.  Infantry centers of resistance were protected with obstacles and mines from direct assault by tanks, and if tanks did assault an infantry position, the troops would have suitable arms such as, in those days, anti-tank rifles and heavy machine guns.  The illustrious Browning M2 .50 cal heavy machine gun was developed as an anti-tank weapon.

Ludendorff observed that infantry either preceded, accompanied, or followed tanks, and it was the role of machine guns, trench mortars, and artillery to try to separate the infantry protection from the tanks.  (Even then it was recognized that tanks couldn’t hold ground.) Deeper in the battle zone, unaccompanied tanks were vulnerable to attack by heavy anti-tank weapons.  If the enemy incursion grew big enough, the confused and disorganized attackers would themselves be counterattacked with panzers held in reserve. (Op GOODWOOD!)

Strategic principals have changed little since the days of Ludendorff. What has changed are the details of the weaponry.

When the Germans were forced onto the defensive in Russia, a layered anti-tank defense was implemented as part of an elastic defense system.  But didn’t Hitler order a general “stand fast” as the go-to German defense method?  He did; and elastic defense and more generally the German “three-line” defense method are stand fast defenses.  A restored front line was the aim at the end of the battle.  The main line of resistance was expected to be penetrated in places, and was supposed to be restored by counter-attacks from forces held in reserve against attackers disorganized by penetrating the MLR.  The depth of the battle zone in WWI, one to two kilometers; it expanded to ten kilometers in WWII in Russia.  The depth depended on how deep the attackers’ artillery could reach into the battle zone and the speed of the tanks.  Hitler rejected Manstein’s wholesale “mobile operations” method, though he tolerated Manstein employing it in emergencies.

Throughout WWII the sovereign German anti-tank weapon was the 88 mm flak gun.  Kept in depth, a few of these accurate heavy guns destroyed numerous British counterattacks in the desert in 1941 and 1942.  A thin screen of these defeated Operation GOODWOOD, the first British attempt to break out of the Normandy beachhead. (An account of that battle is given by Hans von Luck in his book Panzer Commander.) In GOODWOOD, unaccompanied British tanks met a thin line of unprotected 88s and their crews hidden in woods and tall crops, and the 88s picked off British tanks at long range until the British gave up.

It wasn’t until later in the war that, in desperation, the Germans developed panzerfaust, a 30 to 100 m range, hand-held launcher that fired a shaped charge rather than a kinetic energy warhead to penetrate tank armour.  Earlier, the Germans infantry had the Paks, which proved useless against T-34s.

More to follow!

Part 2:

The German Pak 36, a 37 mm gun, proved completely inadequate against Russian T-34 and KV-1 tanks during the winter of 1941-42.  They were replaced by the Pak 38, a 50 mm version featuring more kinetic energy downrange.  That, in turn was quickly replaced by the Pak 40, a 75 mm gun which fired shaped charge munitions.  Though effective against armour, these were big pieces of equipment, about the size of a pack howitzer, and that, combined with its short range, made it obsolescent well before war’s end.

On the British and Canadian side, a wheeled piece of light artillery, the long barrelled 17 pdr, was specifically developed for the heavy, anti-tank role.  Its high-velocity shell could penetrate the frontal armour of Tigers and Panthers out to 800 m range.  The infantry had the PIAT, a device that used springs to project a shaped charge out to 100 m or so.  The 17 pdr was so effective that the British fitted them into the turrets of Shermans and, called the Firefly, used them in specifically anti-tank roles. Canadian infantry units were also equipped with 6 pdr anti-tank guns which, against Tigers, Panthers, and Mark IV’s, were in the words of Argyll CO Lt-Col Dave Stewart, “not worth a pinch of coon-sh*t.”

The 75 mm Sherman was developed as an infantry support tank.  After the war, tank doctrine changed and allied tanks would henceforth be equipped with guns capable of defeating the enemy’s tanks.  Infantry-held weapons were repeatedly upgraded.  The bazooka and PIAT were replaced in Canadian service with “the 3.5.”  These were replaced by the 84 mm Carl G.  A heavier, long range recoilless gun came out as “the 106 mm.”  As shaped charge, rocket, and guidance technology improved, the TOW (tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided) missile came along, as well as, in the Canadian service, the Eryx, a SRAAW(H) (short-range anti-armour weapon, heavy).

These were to be deployed against Soviet tanks that had increasing sophisticated armour systems.  The Soviet T-55 featured well sloped armour all around, then came the T-62, T-64, and finally the T-72.  Soviet tank doctrine emphasized numbers and mobility, and hence tank weight was restricted to between 40 and 45 tons.  Armour protection needed to be clever to be proof against shaped charges if weight couldn’t be increased.

Chobam armour came along in the 1960s, employing ceramic plates to handle the plasma jet that makes shaped charges effective.  Ceramic is much higher melting than steel, and can defeat a plasm jet from a shaped charge.  As shaped charges became more sophisticated in the way of HESH rounds, explosive reactive armour was developed.  It can also work against armour-piercing fin stabilized discarded sabot rounds (APFSDS).

The Russia T-80 and T-90 main battle tanks are equipped with highly sophisticated armour systems.

The American Javelin is a long range, and the British NLAW a short range, shoulder fired anti-tank system that can defeat the T-90.  Their weakness is that they’re subsonic, and time is required to put rounds on target.  In the Russian doctrine of numbers, time makes the shooter vulnerable to destruction by the tanks remaining.

Missing in modern anti-tank defense is a high-velocity gun, like the Rheinmetall 120 mm L/55 on a carriage.  (Are you listening, Rheinmetall?)

A weakness of large anti-tank systems is vulnerability to air attack.  The steppe of Ukraine is flat and treeless.  There’s no place to hide from the air.  Without air cover, large systems need air protection like MANPADs (man portable air defense systems, e.g. Stinger missiles) to stay operational.  Layered anti-tank defense has become a complicated business of blow and parry!

How can Canada help Ukraine Latvia defeat a tank onslaught?  Well, with earth moving equipment to build tank ditches, with cement and re-bar to build dragon’s teeth and bunkers, with fuses for IEDs.  Canada’s stock of anti-tank weapons is too small to equip out of our inventory.  What Canada has is an economy that can buy things.

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