Vincent J. Curtis
26 Nov 2019
Rather than be sent home from Italy humiliated, Simonds instead went to England in January, 1944, as GOC 2nd Canadian Corps. At 41, he was the youngest Corps commander in British Commonwealth forces. Simonds immediately got rid of F.F. Worthington, the father of the Canadian Armoured Corps as GOC 4th Armoured Division, replacing him with George Kitching. He also replaced other McNaughton holdovers.
McNaughton left the Canadian army in Britain poorly trained. Above the company level training was bad, and all-arms combat went unpracticed. Simonds had a lot of preparing to do and little time to do it in. Making matters worse, Crerar was appointed GOC 1st Canadian Army, Simonds’ titular boss, though Montgomery was GOC 21st Army Group, Crerar’s boss.
Simonds began by writing down his battle outlook for his staff, division, and brigade commanders. He described the German method of defense, and held that the key to defeating it lay in repelling its counterattacks while maintaining sufficient reserves that forward movement could be resumed. Any plan had to include forward movement of artillery support. Stylistically, this was refighting the Battle of Hill 70 – bite and hold – with an exploitation phase added. Since divisional artillery could only support one brigade, attacks would be along narrow frontages. That was the standard battle formula.
The 2nd Canadian Corps was activated in France in July, 1944, and Simonds led the Corps through Operations Atlantic, Spring, Totalize, and Tractable before Monty let Crerar on the scene with the activation of the 1st Canadian Army. Atlantic saw the Canadians cross the Orne river, seize the southern half of Caen, and advance towards Verrières Ridge. Spring was the disastrous attempt to seize the ridge, and saw the destruction of the Black Watch and the breaking of the South Saskatchewan Regiment, who were left unsupported on an exposed forward slope of a hill overlooked by German mortars and artillery.
After Spring, Simonds wanted Charles Foulkes, GOC 2nd Div, who was responsible for the debacles (and, coincidentally, an old and future rival), fired. Crerar prevented it, and eventually Foulkes was appointed Simonds’ equal as GOC 1st Canadian Corps, and later CGS after the war ahead of Simonds. Rod Keller was, however, let go as GOC 3rd Div after Totalize, and Simonds fired George Kitching as GOC 4th Div immediately after Tractable. Today, Simonds would be accused of micro-managing his division commanders.
Coming from a military family and spending his entire life in the Regular army, Simonds had probably never been treated with kindness in his life. He seems never to have learned the value of treating subordinates with kindness occasionally. By his own admission, the tightly-wound Simonds was bad tempered, headstrong, and unable to tolerate fools. He maintained a cold, glacial appearance, and he commanded rather than led. He was innovative, hard-driving, and driven himself, as well as ambitious, ruthless, highly self-confident, and arrogant.
Simonds had poisonous personal relations with Crerar, and could not trust him. His Brigade and Divisional commanders simply weren’t as competent as they should have been. The cold, brainy Simonds was probably too impersonal towards his subordinates, commanding where he should have coached or encouraged. When a boss thinks he is surrounded by idiots, the subordinates tend to act accordingly. But after Verrières Ridge, the destruction of Worthington Force, and with Crerar looking to shaft him, it takes a mature man to maintain composure.
As a gunner through and through, Simonds cherished the belief that “artillery conquers, infantry occupies.” Advancing the guns cost him time in his operations – time the Germans used to regroup. He attacked along narrow fronts without thinking that a secondary attack would stretch the German defenses and might create opportunities of its own.
Confining himself to Corps HQ, the formulaic Simonds lacked the battlefield “touch” that Currie demonstrated at 2nd Ypres, and Simonds’ chief antagonist in Normandy, Kurt Meyer, had. His personality, gunner prejudices, and his poorly prepared instrument impaired his operations in Normandy. Still, the technically proficient Simonds was a giant among Canadian generals in World War II.
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