Land
Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations
A
Commentary
By
Vincent J. Curtis
1
Feb 07
On January 29, 2007, I was privileged to receive from Col J.B. Simms, Director of Land Concepts and Doctrine, a copy of the final draft of Canada's then new Army of Tomorrow Concept: Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations. What follows below is my review of that draft. The actual publication differs from the final draft in the addition of photographs and the deletion of an organizational chart of a deployed battle group. Some of the paging may also be different.
General Comments
The paper is silent on whether or not the
AoT will still employ the X Corps template as a planning model.
The paper is silent on the planning
structure of a Canadian Mechanized Division.
It is also silent on the structures of possible Light Infantry
Divisions, Airborne Divisions, and Armoured Divisions.
The paper is silent on the issue of
jointness of operations with the air and naval elements of the CF. Although it mentions jointness, it occurs in
sections that are evidently borrowed (lifted) from American publications. There are no planning “sockets” in the AoT
for joint interoperability with other CF elements and interagency ops with
other Canadian government departments and with the agencies of other
governments.
The AoT paper is silent on the future of
Canadian airborne capability.
The AoT paper says nothing directly about
the future capabilities of Canadian artillery.
The paper is silent on the possible future
requirements for the AoT to employ heavy armour. Although all the planning is centered quite
reasonably on a medium weight force (medium weight is a euphemism for “without
tanks”), there is not even a gesture toward the possible need for heavy
armour. We have already seen in Afghanistan
that heavy armour is an extremely useful component for force protection. I regard the Afghanistan experience as a
falsifying counter-example of the exclusive medium weight focus.
The paper is silent on the matter of
tactical aviation. In particular, the
use of aviation platforms such as the AH-64 Apache helicopter and the AC-130
Spectre gunship in future warfighting deployments is not discussed.
The paper seems addicted to the word “exponential.” Apparently, everything gets worse
exponentially. The word appears on pg
28, para 1 and para 3, pg 40 para 4, pg 41 para 2 para 3, twice in para 4, para
5, and para 6; and pg 42 para 1. The
word exponential is not merely overused, it is incorrectly used. A doubling of capacity every two years is not
exponential growth, it is geometric growth.
But things can also grow worse arithmetically, as well as rapidly,
quickly, impetuously, and in many other ways indicating speed. Exponentially was not used correctly in any
of the technical cases to which it was applied.
The AoT paper could usefully have said, but
did not, that the Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group remains the basic planning
template for groupings larger than a battle group, and that the brigade is the
largest grouping expected to be deployed and sustained overseas within the planning
timeframe. An expeditionary grouping
will likely be highly modified from the CMBG planning template in order to meet
the requirements of the specific mission.
The process of modification for a specific mission is called “task
tailoring.” It is out of the need to be
able to “task tailor” overseas deployments that the concept of modularity
arises. Modules of capability are
intended employed conceptually in the fashion of “plug and play” in the
task-tailored deployed force.
The AoT document seems wherever possible to
eschew the use of verbs and Saxon words in preference for euphemisms and
abstractions. Well known Clausewitzian
terms like: concentrate, destroy, decision, envelop, annihilate, battle, and
victory do not appear in it. Instead, innocuous
sounding expressions like “achieve mission success” and “achieve intended
effects” are used. Not even the
expression “gain a decision” can be coaxed out of the fog of harmless sounding
language. The advantage of using
Clausewitzian terms is that all their philosophical import is on the
table. An ambiguous expression like
“achieve mission success” seems intent on concealing the fact that the purpose
of the document to explain how, in future, the Land Force intends to destroy Canada’s
enemies in battle, and to gain such a decisive victory that other nations will
study the decision as the acme of military prowess.
The paper should state early on the
principle that a military force achieves it ends from battle or from the threat
of battle.
Doctrinal adaptiveness and flexibility are
not themes of the AoT. Eg. The
insistence on the medium weight force as doctrinal, not pro tempore. Eg. Not using the word “expect” when speaking
of the future.
I have never been comfortable with the CF
describing itself as a “tactically decisive” force – a description it puts into
the mouths of others in the AoT paper.
It sounds self-congratulatory.
And it can at best be an accidental property. It would be better if the CF described itself
as “tactically proficient and capable of producing decisive results.” Besides being closer to the truth, the statement
aims the CF towards tactical proficiency, something it can actually achieve and
can measure. One can never know whether
the CF is actually tactically decisive or not until it engages in battle; and
even then, it might not be tactically decisive in the next battle.
Specific Observations
The expectation that we shall encounter
media-savvy foes intent on eroding Canada’s will to fight (P 9)
suggests the development of a sophisticated psy-ops capability of our own. There is no reference to the development of
such a capability in the AoT document.
There appears in the AoT document no effort to make the struggle against
an asymmetric threat less asymmetric.
Rather, by focusing on high technologies, the direction is towards
making the opposing forces even more asymmetric. If, as the paper suggests, the danger from
the foe lies in the asymmetry of the threat, then a reduction of the asymmetry by
adding new capabilities is indicated.
Adding new capabilities in no way prevents improving and augmenting our
current capabilities.
The document needs to be careful when
making definitions. For example, on pg
10 there is the statement “Actions consist of those events, behaviours, and
acts that characterize the nature of the conflict.” Part of this is a tautology. Of course actions consist of acts; but
Actions (unqualified) are not acts that characterize the nature of the
conflict. Characterizing Actions consists of acts that
characterize the nature of the conflict.
The statement in the paper simply fails as a definition, and in a
planning document it will not do to be unclear.
The problem continues with the definition
of structures: a structure is not a kind of condition, as the definition
declares it is. The analysis that
follows on pg 11 is impaired by the fuzziness and error that occur because
definitions are not properly rendered.
The argument in para 4, pg 11 has cause and
effect backward. The whole paragraph
ought to be translated into Clausewitzian language to realize its error. The (translated) argument holds that actions
that impact on psychology are more decisive than battle or info ops. Nonsense.
What is true is that morale is important in gaining final victory, and
battle is the means of gaining decisions, both moral and otherwise. Battle
is a more profound changer of morale than talk is. Annihilation of the enemy has the most
profound and long-lasting impact on morale of all, and is the most decisive
kind of victory.
On pg 14, the expression FSE is used in
para 2 but is not defined until para 3.
The diagram on pg 15 of the ADO certainly illustrates
well the complexity of the concept. I
can’t figure out what this aid to understanding is trying to say!
Beginning on pg 15 with the definition of
backcasting there starts a long sequence of definitions of terms of art. It runs through Operational Functionality,
through Modularity, through Delivering Capability, and right on through to pg
30. In general, there is nothing wrong
with defining and employing terms of art.
But because terms of art constitute a special language – occasionally
called jargon – the terms should be capitalized to indicate that the common
noun or verb is being used its special sense.
They are not always, which can lead to confusing and sometimes farcical
assertions.
The section beginning on pg 19 “Delivering
Capability” through to pg 30 is evidently lifted holus-bolus from some American
publication. The section really needs to
be carefully edited. What would be best
is to say that, since the AoT is expected to be deployed and to operate with
coalition forces that standardize on American doctrine, the following section
is an extract of American doctrine to which the AoT will have to adapt itself. By presenting that extract as our own, we
accept responsibility for all its mistakes.
Because the AoT document presents the
Delivering Capability section as its own product, the diagram on pg 26 is
deceptive. The diagram shows AWACS
aircraft observing and fighter jets acting.
The CF air element has no AWACS aircraft nor does it possess any combat
aircraft presently capable of direct fire support of the CF land element. Nor will the CF air element be acquiring any such
aircraft before 2020 at the earliest, when the Joint Strike Fighter will be
available. In other words, there is the
implication of a jointness of operations between two CF elements that simply
isn’t in the offing. (Cf. also the
remarks made above on combat helicopters and gunships.)
The American doctrine writers are quite
unskillful at elaborating a science, as they often attempt to do. The section “delivering capability” is loaded
with conceptual howlers. I will not bore
the reader with an exhaustive list, but limit myself to the observation that
because there are so many the section is dull, awful to read, and conveys
little understanding.
Okay, one little observation. On pg 29 para 3, is the definition of
JIMP. The definition of Joint is
‘involving other national military elements and support organizations.’ This could also be the definition of
Combined, if by ‘other national’ they mean the military elements of other
nations. It is Joint if by other
national military elements they mean other services, like the USAF or USN. The definition of Multinational is the very
definition of Combined. The American
usage of the terms Joint and Combined is completely backwards of the usage of
Winston S. Churchill, who coined the terms, and here they inexplicably dispense
with Combined and substitute Multinational.
The section Tactical Decisiveness shows
some of the ill effects of following American thought too closely. In para 3 of pg 31 is the statement:
non-linear battlespace characterized by increased breadth, depth, and
height. You can’t get more rectilinear
than breadth, depth, and height.
The section on Full Spectrum Engagement
would be immensely simplified if the word ‘envelop’ were used instead of the
expression ‘gain positional advantage;’ and the word ‘annihilate’ were used
instead of ‘to position Land Forces at decisive points to dislocate or disrupt
the adversary.’ This section contains a
confused mishmash of Jominian position theory and maneuver warfare theory. The gaining of decisive points is Jominian in
outlook, while dislocation and disruption are terms of maneuver warfare theory.
When forecasting the future, it is better
to say “is expected to be….” rather than say “is characterized by…” (cf. pg 33 para 1) The difference lies between an expectation
and some fictional reality that bears no necessary relationship with the
future. An expectation is a more
flexible approach to the elaboration of the doctrine that is intended to answer
the needs of the future. An expectation
also plays into commander’s intent because the followers are led to understand
the leader’s approach to dealing with a problem. It follows naturally that if the problem is
not exactly as expected then adjustments have to be made to the plan. The statement that the future “is
characterized by…” is tantamount to the order: you will believe this, and is
deadening to intellectual initiative. We
want intellectual initiative in our leadership and that is why we have mission
command.
The argument to “Whole of Government
Integrated Effects” is that the elements listed are proximate causes to the
achievement of the aim. The trouble is
that these proximate causes are neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve the
aim (which isn’t stated by the way); and the theory which leads to the
assertion that these are proximate causes to achieving the aim isn’t elaborated
either. The section appears to be a
mishmash of maneuver warfare in a 3BW conflict.
Given that the enemy is said to be clever and adaptive and aims his
attacks at the will to persist in Canada, there is no justification
for saying that the key elements of integrated effects will lead to victory. It is better to present these “integrated
effects” as our strengths which we will try to apply to the enemy’s weaknesses. (Cf. my comments above on reducing asymmetry
by adding new capabilities as well as improving our current ones.)
The section on Sustainment is a confession
of a characteristic Canadian weakness.
The obvious solution to a lack of logistical lift is to acquire more
lift capacity. This section of a
planning document proposes that we figure out clever ways of doing with
less! The section uses the jargon word
airframe in a place where the word aircraft is expected, and expresses the view
that CSS does not have people: Sustainment is a system that needs combat
skills.
The section on “Towards the Future” is an
indirect tribute to the effectiveness of al Qaeda and especially of the concept
of commander’s intent. That al Qaeda
works at all is due to an understanding of the intent of Osama bin Laden, not
because he is able to communicate with and closely control his followers. Against this, the AoT proposes to place an
elaborate battlefield computer network that will presumably give the deployed
force the situational awareness it needs to protect itself and to engage the
enemy with the advantage of surprise in our favour. What is clear from the very argument given to
advocate the tactical employment of electronic technologies is that it would be
unwise to place too much reliance on the battlefield computer network because
the clever terrorists might be able to make it crash at a critical moment or
even be able to tap into it themselves. Technology,
in other words, is not a substitute for good leadership and tactical
proficiency. It is an aid for reducing
our casualties and increasing theirs, when it works.
Summation
The aim of the AoT document is to introduce
the idea of what it calls Adaptive Dispersed Operations and to advance the idea
that ADO is the
force employment concept for a deployed CF Land force. Much of the ADO concept is borrowed from American
publications, and appears to be a mishmash of maneuver warfare theory applied
to a Three Block War scenario. Much is
made of the adoption of a tactical computer network that would greatly improve
the situational awareness of the field commanders. How such a network would be useful in Iraq and Afghanistan remains to be
seen. Other than the Shield idea, which
is purely defensive, no effort is made to relate how the changes proposed would
address the strategy of an enemy that is intent on attacking the will to fight
in Canada.
The force employment paper is silent on
many areas of military capability that will need to be addressed before the
planning horizon of 2021 is reached.
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