12 Jan12
Responding to the Budget Control Act of August, 2011, and to the failure of a Joint Congressional Committee to agree on some $1 trillion in budget cuts over ten years, the U.S. military is required by law to reduce its expenditures by $487 billion over the next ten years. Without the cut, the U.S. Defense Department was expected to spend between $6,000 and $7,000 billion in that period.
In response to the projected cut, the Pentagon on January 5th released a new strategy paper which maps out how the United States will maintain global dominance a period of reduced budgets and a smaller military. The paper, released at a special press conference featuring President Obama, is entitled: “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century.”
The usual political suspects in the United States are saying the expected things about a plan by President Obama to reduce the military budget.
The plan itself starts with a re-evaluation of long-term strategic threats to U.S. interests in the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It concludes that, at the head of a long list, Iran and China represent the threats which the U.S. military must plan for. Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear device is seen as a threat directly to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, and indirectly to the world economy by Iranian control of the sea lanes in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. Some 40 % of the world’s crude oil moves on gigantic oil tankers through those waters.
Reference in the paper is made to al Qaeda and its affiliates as a threat to U.S. interests, but the strategic plan is to avoid the use of large ground forces to control the threat as was done in Iraq and Afghanistan.
China is seen as a threat due to the belligerent rhetoric coming out of the Chinese military, the cold diplomacy employed by China’s government, and the ever bolder use of her growing naval and air forces. China is foreseen as attempting an “anti-access and area denial” strategy against U.S. intervention in an arc from Japan to the Philippines to eastern India, an area which includes Taiwan, South Korea, and Vietnam.
India is seen as a potential strategic partner in the paper, and is praised as “a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.”
What may be the motivation for the Chinese government’s apparent departure from the long Chinese tradition of contentment with being a regional power was not discussed in the paper.
To fit into a small budget, the U.S. military will reduce personnel. It will lose up to half a million troops out of a current military of 1.6 million, largely coming out of the Army and Marine Corps. There are presently 565,000 soldiers and 201,000 Marines on strength, and between 76,000 and 114,000 will be lost. In addition, some costly procurement programs, such as the acquisition of the F-35, are at risk. The U.S. is expected to draw down between 3,000 and 4,000 of the 80,000 troops that are presently stationed in Europe.
The U.S. will also reduce its nuclear stockpile.
However, a new long-range strategic bomber program has been confirmed.
The AirSea Battle concept is at the heart of the new strategy. This new operational concept is intended “to prepare the U.S. and its allies to deter or defeat Chinese power,” according to Air Force Magazine. The new concept is aimed at aiding Joint Operations between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy, and to avoid duplication of effort.
The U.S. Air Force will seek to be able to revive on short notice operations on air bases abandoned long ago, such as on Saipan and Tinian in the Northern Marianas, U Tapao and Korat in Thailand, Clark Air Base in the Philippines, in Australia, Halim Air Base in Indonesia, and possibly Tan Son Nhut in Vietnam. These would augment fully operational Air Bases presently on Guam, Hickam AFB on Hawaii, Osan and Kunsan in South Korea, Misawa and Yokota in Japan, in addition to the U.S. Naval base at Yokosuka and Sasebo in Japan. The U.S.A.F. wants to be able to disperse operations quickly in the event of a surprise Chinese missile attack, and avoid a Pearl Harbor catastrophe.
The AirSea Battle is intended to defeat an “Anti-Access, Area Denial” strategy employed by the Chinese Navy and Air Force. The A2/AD strategy would protect the Chinese People’s Liberation Army as it invaded China’s neighbors from attacks by the U.S. air power. By denial of safe access to the battle theatre through sea lanes, the Chinese would deter the deployment of the U.S. Army into the field. Such is the rationale of A2/AD.
In addition to defeating Iranian ambitions and deterring Chinese aggression, the strategy paper rounds out the requirements of U.S. military capability under the heads of: counter terrorism and irregular warfare, conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations, deter and defeat aggression, counter WMDs, operate effectively in space and cyberspace, maintain a nuclear deterrent, provide a stabilizing presence, humanitarian and disaster relief, and homeland security.
The strategy intends to use a whole-of-government approach, which means the use of diplomacy to gain the permission of other countries for use of their military facilities and to encourage the deployment the military forces of allies in aid of the U.S. strategy against a common foe.
NORAD is not mentioned in the strategy paper, and NATO only briefly. NATO is seen as a source of augmenting military forces on someone else’s budget, as is presently the case in Afghanistan.
Before he retired in July of last year, Defense Secretary Robert Gates hinted heavily that changes of this nature were coming. The first examples of the use both of the A2/AD strategy and of the AirSea battle were tested by NATO in Libya when he was in office.
A part of Canada’s close and inevitable friendship with the United States is military relevance. Not much is expected of Canada by the United States, but something beyond favorable diplomatic noises is desired. What is it that the Canadian military could do that fits into the new U.S. strategic concept?
Whatever it is, it needs to be “visible” to the American and Canadian public. (“Visibility” is a requirement demanded by retired General Rick Hillier when he was CDS, and was one reason why Canada took on the combat mission in Kandahar in 2006.)
Eyes turn quickly to the navy. A Canadian F-35 does not appear to be operationally relevant to the new concept because the U.S. Air Force will knock out the Chinese Fighter force on its own, and air superiority is the only role the F-35 is suited for. The stealth fighter could be used in a surveillance and reconnaissance role for short ranges in the Pacific if it operated out of a U.S. Air Base. Long range bombing with cruise missiles, as can be done with the B-1, B-2, B-52, and the new strategic bomber, is not in the realm of capability of the F-35.
The new class of frigates and destroyers planned for construction could play a role in a U.S fleet protecting the big aircraft carriers. What could make the RCN really visible would be a capability to destroy fast moving Iranian PT boats and Zodiacs that carry torpedoes in the Straits of Hormuz. If it could be made to work, a Bras d’or class of hydrofoil destroyers would be a real attention-getter in the Straits. A hydrofoil, in virtue of its 71 knot speed and elevation above the water, could, if it mounted powerful, computer aided automatic cannons, quickly disperse and destroy a fleet of PT boats that moved in the 40 knot range, like a fox among chickens. Whatever new ships are built for the RCN, some capability to participate in the AirSea battle needs to be designed in.
The Canadian Army could play a visible role under the heads of counterterrorism and irregular warfare, and conducting stability and counterinsurgency operations. This would be a reprise of the role the army and special operations forces played in Kandahar. However, these heads are seen as secondary to the main mission of the U.S. Joint Forces, which is the air and sea battle in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans.
As events in Libya proved once again, air and sea power alone are not decisive. Ground forces are essential to bring matters to a decisive conclusion. Thus, the AirSea battle may prove to be ineffective as an operational concept except as a preliminary. A survey of the capabilities of the elements of the Canadian Forces shows that the army is the service most likely to provide visible proof of Canadian intent and support of its great ally and neighbor.
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