China and the new Indo-Pacific Strategy

Vincent J. Curtis

29 Nov 22

Not long after Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was publicly berated by Chinese President Xi Jinping for allegedly leaking the content of confidential discussions to the media, Canada released a “long-awaited” strategy for involvement in the Indo-Pacific theatre.  The document outlines a ten year plan for increasing Canada’s military, diplomatic, and economic involvement in the region to counterbalance China’s expanding presence there.

Several years ago, under President Xi, China introduced its “One Belt, One Road Initiative.”  The aim of the policy is to increase China’s influence, both economic and diplomatic, around the globe, and by implication displace the influence of the United States.  This is a new departure in China’s long history.

For thousands of years, China has been a world onto itself.  It customarily contained between a quarter and a third of all humanity.  It meant something to be Chinese racially and culturally; all others were considered barbarians.  If you were Chinese, you were a subject of the Emperor, and we saw an example of this old mentality in the discovery of Chinese police stations in Canada.  China’s diplomatic interests were with its contiguous neighbours: the Mongols, South-East Asia, Tibet, and Turkic Khanates to the west, including that of the Uyghurs.  China never became an overseas imperial power.  Yes, it sent its people overseas, but not to colonize or rule, as European countries began to do in the 15^th century.

Because of its self-imposed isolation, ordered by the Emperor in the mid-15th century, China fell behind Europe in science, technology, wealth, internal cohesion, and military power.  Consequently, in the 19^th century, China came to be dominated economically by European powers.  Later, Japan, advancing rapidly in development, seized Manchuria from China in 1931, and in 1937 became engaged in a savage war of conquest that did not end until 1945.  The communists took control of “mainland” China in 1949, and under the rule of Mao sent Chinese soldiers into Korea to fight for communist control of the entire peninsula.

The world-wide “One Belt, One Road Initiative” is thus a new departure in China’s diplomatic history.  An offshoot consistent with that policy is aggressive moves into the South China Sea.  It is this part that is bringing China into conflict with the United States, Australia, and the Philippines, and is causing great disquiet in Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia.  India has also taken notice, and physical confrontation has taken place in the Himalayas along the so-called “Line of Actual Control.”  The One Belt, One Road Initiative extends tentacles into Africa and South America, but that is a topic for another day.

Given that it is his signature policy, and has met thus far with disquieting success, President Xi is unlikely to give it up.  The Chinese are very big on Sun Tzu, and that most eminent of Chinese strategists would advise caution, patience, endurance, and to refrain from battle until victory is well-nigh certain.  China will push and menace, but is unlikely to resort to a test of arms unless victory is swift and sure.  Besides, what has China to gain by military conquest: lands that are not contiguous with the mainland?  Lands occupied by barbarians?  The objective of Chinese policy on its far-flung neighbours is the long traditional one of China: dominance and control, not necessarily occupation and governance.

In a conflict with China, the objective of the United States would be regime change.  At a minimum, that would mean replacing Xi Jinping with another communist.  A more ambitious goal would be the wholesale replacement of Communist Party rule, and that would involve bloody revolution.  As General Douglas MacArthur observed, and Japan demonstrated, it is foolish to get involved in a land war in Asia.  If it came to a test of arms, an invasion of China is out of the question.  At best, coastal cities might be occupied.  This points to air and naval power as being the dominant means of prosecuting an armed struggle in peacetime with Communist China.

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