The Avro Arrow Today

Vincent J. Curtis

3 May 2018

The problem of the timely delivery of an operational F-35 arose seven years ago.  The Conservative government of Stephen Harper, with Defence Minister Peter MacKay, wanted to sole-source a purchase of F-35s from Lockheed-Martin, but could not close the deal because an operational aircraft simply could not be delivered.  Meanwhile, the operational end of the current fleet of CF-18s was getting closer.

The Harper government was offered a proposal that would see the redevelopment the CF-105 Avro Arrow as an alternative to the purchase of an aircraft that may never be delivered because of decisions made by the U.S. congress.  This offer was not taken seriously by the government, and dismissed with the argument that the Arrow was “1950’s technology.”  At the election of 2015, the Trudeau Liberals promised never to buy the F-35, if it ever became available, and would instead hold a competition to replace the aging CF-18s.

Time passed, and the Liberal government just this year got around to starting that competition.  The first new replacements for the CF-18s are not expected to be delivered until 2025, and to fill the operational gap the government resorted to purchasing aging F-18s from Australia.

If Canada had a fleet of fighter aircraft that could reach 70,000 feet altitude in level flight at a speed of Mach 2.3, a wing-loading of under 50 lbs/sq. ft., thrust-to-weight ratio of 1, and had a long combat radius, nobody would be laughing.  Yet, that was the design performance of the Avro Arrow.  The Orenda Iroquois engines, those developed especially for the Arrow, were successfully wind-tunnel tested at that altitude and speed, and the big Arrow carried a lot of internal fuel.  In speed, range, and altitude, that aircraft would outperform any modern fighter, including the F-22 Raptor.  It could intercept a U-2 spy plane at altitude, and any bomber aircraft in the world, then or now, except perhaps the exceptional XB-70.

Where fighter technology has developed since the 1950s is in avionics, in turning capability, and more recently, stealth. The F-15 Eagle and the F-16 Fighting Falcon pioneered 9 g turning capability, and the sub-sonic F-117 Nighthawk pioneered stealth.  The F-22 incorporated these developments into one aircraft, and the F-35 is supposed to be the next generation of avionics.

The characteristic that distinguishes one aircraft from another is its airframe.  Not its engines, not its avionics, as both of these can be changed or improved without anyone saying it was a different aircraft.  A Boeing 747 is still a 747 regardless of whether its engines come from Rolls-Royce, Pratt & Whitney, or GE.  If avionics are changed, or its body stretched, then we might say it is a Mark II, a Block 15, or a J-model of that aircraft, not that it is a different aircraft.  Hence, it is disingenuous to dismiss out of hand the Arrow as “1950s technology.”

If Bombardier were commissioned to make the Arrow airframe, and that airframe were powered by the same Pratt & Whitney engines that drive the F-22 Raptor, and an appropriate avionics and missile package were purchased from Lockheed-Martin or Boeing, then suddenly this aircraft would be a very modern fighter-interceptor.  It would be lacking in stealth, like the F-15.  The airframe may have to be strengthened to handle high-g turns, if dogfighting were one of its expected missions.  But it would be as much a modern platform as the F-35 is, except better in terms of flying performance.  A modern improvement of the Arrow package could be the incorporation of vectored thrust.

If the F-35 is protected from dogfighting on account of its stealth, the Arrow would be protected on account of its speed and altitude.  “Look-down, shoot-down” radars at an altitude of 70,000 ft. would detect “stealthy” aircraft flying far below, and the outcome of that battle would depend upon who had the superior situational awareness and missile performance.

As an Australian politician observed, the F-35 should be called the A-35, since it is more designed for ground attack than fighting the air superiority battle.  Risking an aircraft that costs $200 million to fire multi-million dollar missiles at targets that cost but a few thousand dollars is sensible to a country that has the vast economic resources of the United States.  But to a country like Canada, it doesn’t.  It would make much more economic sense for a country like Canada to use a cheaper aircraft and cheaper technology for that role, like, say, the A-10 Warthog with its 30 mm Gatling gun, or a Super-Tucano.

We are confronted with the fundamental absurdity of the F-35.  A multi-role aircraft is not stellar at any one thing, and you bear the cost of multi-role all the time, even when you executing just one of them.  The F-35 is like a Lamborghini SUV: are you really going to get it muddy?  Are you going to risk busting an axle rooting around in the back country with one?

An Arrow built today is not “1950’s technology.”  It would be highly capable of performing the primary and traditional missions of the RCAF: high altitude interception and winning the air superiority battle.  If the government is prepared to spend $16 billion to acquire a new fighter seven years from now and develop the Canadian aircraft industry at the same time, it ought to brook the professional conservativism of the RCAF brass and examine seriously the proposal of redeveloping Canada’s most famous still-can-do.

-30-