It was no blunder: Analysis of the Regensburg lecture by Pope Benedict XVI

By Vincent J. Curtis                                                                   22 September 2006

Journalists the world over ought to take a bow over the violence in the Muslim world that was sparked by their reporting, or misreporting, of the Pope Benedict’s address at the University of Regensburg.  Oh sure, Benedict was making his points.  But if violence is the appropriate response to a papal observation, then scientists and philosophers in the western world have more cause to burn down churches than Muslims do on the basis of what Benedict said.

The subject of Benedict’s lecture was the reduction of the realm to which reason is acceptably applied.  He believes that man is diminished by denying that reason can be applied to matters of faith, and argues that a theology grounded in biblical faith can make important contributions to the debates of our times.

It would be a mistake to believe that the lecture was some kind of blunder, that had the Pope known that Muslims around the world would riot over his words he would not have said them.  This was not a lecture that would have been better prepared by a politically attuned committee of priestly speech writers.  Given his previous career as a theological philosopher, Benedict delivered the world a statement that could be the intended theme of his papacy.

The irrational and disproportionate response by Muslims around the world to his words confirms his essential point, that man is diminished by failing to act with reason.  And journalists need to learn that the method of the sound bite and the ‘gotcha’ quote is not an appropriate way of covering a papal address.  It is not the Pope who is wet behind the ears; it is journalists who have to raise their intellectual game.

Benedict expressed regret at the outrageous violence his words sparked, but he has not withdrawn what he said.

Benedict spoke at length about the incorporation of Hellenic reasoning and philosophical tradition into the Christian faith very early in the Church’s beginning.  He hints that this was no accident, for God himself is logos.  The Greek word logos means ‘word’ or ‘reason’, and from it comes the English word ‘logic.’  The first sentence of the Gospel of John reads, “In the beginning was the logos,” which is translated into English as the “Word.”  John continues, “and the logos is God.”

From its earliest days the Church employed reason to resolve theological disputes and to better understand the meaning of the beliefs it holds.  Benedict argues that it is only because the nature of God is logos that man is able to understand God, however imperfectly, and follow his will.

By extension, a God that were transcendent would be capable of self-contradiction and would therefore be incapable of being understood by man.  Faith would be reduced to fatalism.

When Benedict spoke of the de-Hellenization of faith, he means that reason is wrongly being taken out of faith as it is wrongly being taken out of a related matter of thought, ethics.  The impulse behind this de-Hellenization comes from false expectations that originated out the development of science, from the false belief that the Hellenic character of the exposition of the faith reflects a cultural bias, and the false belief of Protestant reformers that Christian faith was totally conditioned by philosophy, and the Word was being presented merely as one element in an overarching philosophical system.  Benedict argues that Man is diminished by a reduction in the scope of reason, especially in matters of faith.

What Benedict is talking about – the denial that there can be rational truth in faith - is reflected in similar denials about truth in ethics and philosophy.  Mortimer J. Adler, in his book The Four Conditions of Philosophy, fought a similar battle to the one Benedict is fighting in his lecture.  Rational truth does exist in ethics and philosophy, Adler showed, and Benedict argues that rational truth must in faith also, for God is logos.

Benedict’s point to the Muslims is this.  A belief that God is transcendent is untenable.  Only by reason is man capable of understanding God.  That man is capable of reason is because God wants us to understand him, and reason is God’s nature.  Violence is contrary to reason, and therefore of God’s nature, especially in matters of faith.  For there to be dialog instead of violence in the world, it has to be accepted that God acts with logos.

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