MMPR and the Canadian Constitution

Vincent J. Curtis

8 Sept 15

The Hamilton Spectator today published an article by Jonathon Swanson headlined, "The Best Hope for Electoral Reform."  It was an argument for Mixed Member Proportional Representation, a ramshackle idea that allegedly makes the outcome of elections more "democratic."  Dr. Swanson formerly taught political science and international relations in several universities, and lived in New Zealand when it switched electoral systems.  My response was immediate. 

Sirs;

I welcome Professor Swanson back to Canada after his extended stay in New Zealand.  Dr. Swanson was taken by New Zealand’s switch from plurality election to Mixed Member Proportional Representation, and advocates that Canada adopt the same system, even though Canada does not suffer from the same ills as New Zealand did when it changed.

During his absence, Canada adopted a new law called, ``The Constitution Act, 1867`` and has revised it several times since.  Perusal of that document will show why MMPR will not work and cannot work for Canada.  That cause has a name: Quebec.

Section 51(1)(1) of the Constitution Act begins, “ There shall be assigned to each of the provinces….”  It does not say to each of the parties.  Section 51(1)(2) provides that each province shall be represented by a minimum number of members.

In the 2004 federal election, the Bloc Quebecois returned 54 of 75 candidates to the House of Commons, 18 % of the House, after garnering 12.4 % of the popular vote over all of Canada.  MMPR would have failed to represent the popularity of the Bloc in Quebec, and a failure to recognize the feelings represented by the Bloc would have exacerbated the separatist problem that Canada faced at the time.

We also have in Canada a tradition of Independent members of the House of Commons, of which there were two in the House at the time of dissolution.  Under MMPR there could never be any.  Nor could there be any “crossing of the floor” of the House on a matter of principle, since the member is beholding to his party, not to a constituency.

Provinces and constituencies would cease to be represented by MMPR.  Instead, parties would have their interests represented.  Political parties would decide who would sit in the Commons and who would not.  The voters would not have that say; the party bosses would.

In small counties like New Zealand and Israel, which are culturally homogeneous, the fallacy of MMPR is not obvious.  But in physically large countries that are political unions overcoming great cultural and linguistic differences such as Canada, MMPR will not serve the regional the cultural needs nor account for the cultural sensitivities of that country.  Canada as we know it could not survive under MMPR because one region or another will feel neglected and separate.

Regards;

-30-

This item was published in the Hamilton Spectator on Wednesday, Sept 8th.