Drones, or Tac Air?

Drones versus NATO fires.

Vincent J. Curtis

25 Aug 2025

 The Russo-Ukraine war has seen a significant rise in the use of tactical drones; the Israelis too made much use of drones in their Op RISING LION air offensive against Iran.  Most readers will be familiar with the Reaper and Global Hawk drones, but these new types are smaller, cheaper, and used both for spotting and for tactical strike purposes.  The Ukrainians are using theirs as a practical substitute for Tac Air, long-range artillery, and guided missiles; and ‘substitutes’ is the point, according to Professor Justin Bronk, writing for the RUSI.

These newer drones come in two types, first-person view (FPV) uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), and one-way attack (OWA). Both are playing an increasing role in Ukraine’s defense. Russia has also, by orders of magnitude, scaled up her UAS and OWA capabilities. The battlefields of Ukraine now see millions of FPV-UAS, and thousands of OWA drones to supplement conventional cruise and ballistic missiles for long range strike campaigns.

Professor Bronk lists four reasons why NATO should not follow Ukraine’s example: (1) doing so plays into Russian hands; (2) the Ukrainians are making a virtue of a necessity, as they are lacking in traditional fires; (3) Ukraine still isn’t winning the war despite their proficiency in drones; and (4) drones are fill-ins and supplements to, not replacements for, traditions NATO fires.

Professor Bronk believes it would be a mistake to think that drones “render(s) Western equipment and doctrinal notions such as air superiority and armoured maneuver warfare irrelevant or obsolete.” Rather, he sees drones as a supplement to ‘legacy’ platforms such as artillery, tanks, fighter aircraft, and submarines. The Israelis used drones for SEAD/DEAD against Iran; in the latter case, massed drones acted as “window” once did, saturating Iranian air defense radars, and with some taking on the role of “Wild Weasels.”

Bronk does believe it important for NATO to develop their own counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities, since Russian forces would be expected to use UAS on a vast scale.

The Russians forces already have formidable C-UAS capabilities, which include electronic jamming, modified infantry weapons, and short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems integrated at all levels of their ground forces. Russian forces are already well-adapted to defend against drones, and losses among Ukrainian drone operators are mounting rapidly. However, the training required for C-UAS capability means less training against NATO’s areas of military strength.

Bronk observes that Ukrainian forces inflicted devastating defeats on Russian forces using massed artillery, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and well-motivated infantry; and the switch to reliance on UAS has been driven by necessity, for when available, high-end ATGMs, anti-tank BONUS artillery rounds and regular artillery are preferred by Ukrainian commanders to counter Russian attempts to break through the frontlines. These latter systems are far more responsive and more reliable in knocking out vehicles and in suppressing mass infantry. FPVs are useful for inflicting a steady level of attrition against personnel and vehicles where the frontlines are static.

Bronk feels that UAS should enhance NATO firepower, but not replace NATO artillery and aircraft, which can strike targets responsively.  Drones can enable air forces, long range artillery, and high-end munitions such as AGM-88G AARGM-ER and GMLRS to get through to key targets without interception.

He argues, “nothing can compete with direct-attack munitions such as the GBU-38 JDAM or Paveway IV bombs where air superiority or at least access has been achieved. For unit costs in the region of $20-30,000, such bombs can destroy armoured vehicles, fighting positions, supply dumps, warehouses, factories and command posts. They can be delivered by a single jet with a targeting pod on each sortie.”

Bronk says that it is far easier to counter massed, cheap FPV and OWA drones used for primary lethality than to counter the airpower, long range fires, armour, artillery and mortars of a professional joint force.

Nevertheless, C-UAS capabilities remain essential, and should be seen as a theatre-entry standard for NATO armies in any Article V context against Russia.

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