Soft power threats in the High Arctic

Vincent J. Curtis

6 Sept 23

In the first week of August, 2023, a joint naval task force of Russian and Chinese vessels suddenly appeared off the Aleutian Islands of Alaska.  The United States Navy dispatched four Arleigh Burke class destroyers to warn them off; and the task force, at the end of August, returned to base having completed patrol of 13,000 km in length.  This demonstration by the Russians and Chinese was intended to embarrass the United States by showing that it was vulnerable, and that US naval assets were not so powerful as to be able to defend in strength everywhere.

Given Canada’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy, you have to wonder if Canada could be in for similar treatment?  There are, however, a few factors that militate against it: the first being accessibility.  Canada’s High Arctic region is choked with ice for the entire year.

During the Cold War, an attack by the Soviet Union over the pole with the aim of gaining lodgement in Canada’s far North was considered unfeasible.  The extreme weather, high latitudes (which made navigation by compass impossible), and complete absence of infrastructure and population meant that only a small force, operating at the limits of capability, could land and survive.  The Canadian response might amount to a search and rescue operation!

But suppose there was a soft-power invasion instead?  The belt-and-road initiative by China is an exercise in soft-power.  Chinese imperialism does not take the European form of territorial conquest of distant lands, and of governance of distant lands by Chinese officials.  Chinese imperialism takes the form of domination and control.  The Chinese regime operates on theory that China can be only where Chinese are: it explains both the reluctance to conquer foreign lands and the presence of Chinese police stations and Confucius Institutes in Canada.

The aim of a Chinese soft power attack in Canada’s High Arctic would be twofold: first, to humiliate the Canadian government; second, to demonstrate that Canadian sovereign writ does not run over some of the territory claimed by Canada.  This latter part means, diplomatically, that those territories are open to exploration and economic exploitation to nations capable of doing so.  Opening a mine in the high Arctic in “disputed” territory is not as hostile as a military occupation; and a military response by Canada would make Canada appear the aggressor.  We may think this absurd, but China and Russia together have enough influence in the world to make a vote in the United Nations condemning Canada a distinct possibility; and both Russia and China have veto power in the UN Security Council.

What might a soft-power invasion look like?  A Chinese icebreaker passes through the Bering Straits into the Arctic Ocean on a scientific mission.  The vessel enters the Northwest Passage, and stops at Alexander Island to take scientific measurements.  (Alexander Island lies on the north side of the passage, and is uninhabited.)  It might leave a remote weather station, or geologists night search for valuable minerals such as deposits of rare earth metals.  All very innocuous and non-hostile.

But what happened?  Chinese nationals landed on Canadian territory not at a Port of Entry.  There were no CBSA officials to check their passports.  There was no one there to arrest them.  In short, there was no Canadian authority within a thousand kilometers to check them.

Canada would have to mount a naval response: carrying CBSA and RCMP officers to put a stop to the Chinese mission.  Soldiers, or armed naval personnel, would have to accompany the landing party.  Military police would lack the jurisdiction to make arrests.  The RCN ship would need to have guns in case the Chinese vessel had weaponry secreted somewhere.

Air power alone is no longer enough to defend Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic.  Canada needs to be able to put boots on the ground, and the RCN has to be able to deliver and sustain them.

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