Vincent J. Curtis
23 Dec 20
"We're looking at
systems that are designed to meet the future threats," he said.
"It's easy to build a
ship right now with the current systems that are integrated, and just say
'let's get it done,' but that's not how the military works. We have got to
think of the future."
If you want to know why Defense Procurement of major systems are so expensive and so delayed, all you have to do is reflect upon what Minister of National Defense Harjit Sajjan was quoted as saying.
Keep it Simple, Stupid is not the principle. ‘Let’s get it done’ is wrongheaded in peacetime militaries. Buying a ship that works, whose systems are integrated, whose costs, both capital and operating, are known and well documented – we can’t do that!
Sure, the Arleigh Burke class of missile destroyers, are bigger, faster, more powerful, longer ranging, and cheaper to buy than the Type 26 frigates still on the drawing board; but just going out and buying something in production that works? Preposterous! That’s not how the military works! That’s not the Canadian way! The good is the enemy of the perfect, and we want perfection!
At least, that’s not how a military under no pressure to perform and under considerable pressure to be invisible, works.
As for thinking about the future: the futures being thought about are those of the thinkers, the planners, the talkers themselves. Actually doing something in the future? We have to think about that! “Humm,” they thought, stroking their chins, “we’d be out of a comfortable job and have to battle with the real world if we actually did something!”
Let’s talk about the future for a moment. What power would the RCN be expected to operate against? Germany is on our side now, so the U-boat menace is pretty much confined to Russia, if Vlad were so minded. However, the United States Navy concerns itself a lot with Russia’s submarine threat. Not much left for the RCN to do in that department. The Type 26 is designed to be a close escort vessel for the UK’s new Queen Elizabeth class of aircraft carriers. The frigate is designed to protect the carrier from submarines and provide a line of defense against anti-ship missiles and incoming enemy aircraft. In addition, the Type 26 can deliver cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles of its own, adding punch to the carrier group.
But why is the RCN tying itself down to so limited a role and so expensive a ship?
China is getting aggressive, and the Pacific could turn into a theatre. The Queen Elizabeths, by range and by fuel, are meant to work the North Atlantic, and frigates that escort them would be limited in range for the Indo-Pacific. China’s belt and road policy means that China might own the port facilities where vessels dock in the Indo-Pacific region, so refueling could present security and other problems.
When Sajjan speaks of thinking about the future, insofar as he’s not just deflecting, he’s referring to electronic systems and combat systems on board the ship. Ship technology is mature. The USN is still acquiring Arleigh Burke class destroyers, which tells you something about how US navy brass sees the future. There’s nothing but a little engineering that stands between Lockheed-Martin’s electronic warfare package for Canada’s frigates, and mounting the same gear in a more capable ship like a destroyer.
So far, the concern about the future bit has to do with electronics, not with hull design or weaponry. But hulls built in Canada is what the frigate program is all about. The electronics are American, the vertical launch systems are American, the engines and helicopters are British; the gun is German. Canadian east coast expertise is supposed to integrate them, at $4 billion a pop.
Why do the evasions and excuses of the MND
lead to suspicions of patronage rather than belief in a real step forward in capability?
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