Vincent J. Curtis
8 Oct 2019
The question I hope to answer over the next several columns is why Arthur Currie was a better general than Guy Simonds. From his experience in the Boer War, Sam Hughes believed that the Canadian amateur was a better soldier in fighting war than the British professional. Hughes’ evidence was the manifest success of the Boer commandos in holding off the British for so long and worsting them in many encounters. Is the superiority of Currie over Simonds an example of the superiority in war of the amateur over the British trained professional, or, in the Canadian context, of the militia officer over the Regular, as Hughes believed?
The explanation of why Currie was superior can be found under the headings of training, experience, talent, personality, and instrument. By instrument I mean that the Canadian Corps of 1917-18 was a superior fighting instrument to the 2nd Canadian Corps of June – August 1944. As will be shown later, this too has to do with experience.
The philosopher Aristotle said that science was knowledge of the general, while experience was knowledge of the particular. Hence, it was possible for the man of pure experience to hit upon the correct solution to a problem faster than the man of pure science because the man of experience may have seen a similar problem solved before. With this stipulated, let us now examine the knowledge and experience of Arthur Currie.
Currie was born in 1875, and received a high school education. He found employment as a teacher in Victoria, B.C., later he became an insurance salesman and then a land speculator. At the age of 21, he joined the 5th (B.C.) Field Artillery Regiment in 1897 as a gunner. He was commissioned in 1900 and progressed rapidly through the ranks. He came to command his regiment in 1909. Currie was an enthusiastic student, said to take every course available. Being artillery, the tactical courses would have been about the brigade and divisional battles and the artillery fire planning for each.
A friend and subordinate of Currie’s was Garnet Hughes, son of Victoria M.P. Sam Hughes, who was Minister of Militia and Defense from 1911 to 1916. When war broke out in August, 1914, Hughes appointed Currie GOC 2nd Brigade, 1st Canadian Division in September, 1914. In October, from Valcartier, Currie took his Brigade to Britain.
The 1st Canadian Division was in the line in April, 1915, at Ypres, when the Germans launched their very first gas attack. Poisonous chlorine caused the French colonial troops to break for the rear, leaving the flank of the Canadian position hanging. Currie demonstrated coolness, bravery, and a real tactical instinct when he led his brigade to counterattack into the flank of the advancing Germans. He persuaded a couple of British brigades to help out and together the German breakthrough was stanched. As a result of his actions, Currie was promoted to Major General and the command of 1st Canadian Division.
Between April 1915 and April 1917, the Currie method of meticulous preparation and artillery support was demonstrated at Mont Sorrel in June, 1916. The Corps only participated in the Battle of the Somme near the end. By 1917, the Canadian Corps was commanded by Julian Byng, who tasked Currie with studying the battles of the Somme and Verdun and to make recommendations. Currie questioned both senior and junior French officers and compared the impressions of the senior officers with the experiences of the junior.
Currie found that French success resulted from careful staff work, thorough artillery preparation and support, surprise, and a high state of training among the assault troops. The Canadian platoon was reorganized into task groupings to better deal with common tactical problems: the machine gun nest, clearing a section of trench, and beating off German counterattacks. Over the course of two years, Currie came to master the set-piece battle and accepted the strategy of bite and hold.
At Vimy, the fruits of the study became manifest.
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Next month: Currie as Corps Commander
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