Monday, May 6, 2013

Why Can’t Our Malians Fight Like Their Malians?


 

 
Vincent J. Curtis


18 March 2013

  

Publisher Scott Taylor has been sounding the tocsin over Canada’s deployment of a C-17 Globemaster aircraft to Mali in aid of the French effort there.

 

As a result of the collapse of the Gadhafi in Libya, for part of which Canada bears responsibility, militarily proficient Tuareg tribesmen returned to their native Mali and nearly destroyed the country.  Troops from mainland France deployed to Mali and restored the situation, and for the sustainment of these forces France asked Canada for the assistance of one of her strategic lift aircraft.  Canada’s commitment has lasted longer than the government projected, and our commitment will likely persist for as long as French combat troops are in theatre.

 

That Mali collapsed ought to give pause to westerners.  Mali was created out of French West Africa in 1960.  It was seen as a stable country in the Treaty of Westphalia sense.  It had borders, a government, and a sense of nationality - leavened and weakened by powerful cross-currents of tribalism and race.  The relationship of tribe, religion, race and nation were supposed to have been settled, and all that remained was for Mali to develop economically and to expand and raise the level of education for it to ripen into a liberal democracy with African roots.

 

The overthrow of the Gadhafi regime disrupted Malian equilibrium with unsettling ease.  Freebooting Tuareg tribesmen, thrown out of work in Libya through the fall of Gadhafi, joined with elements of al-Qaeda, and tried to found a separate country upon the desert wastelands of Northern Mali.  What is worrisome to westerners is the ease with which an African country organized on western lines collapsed in the face of weak tribal forces motivated by grievance and fired by religious zeal.  Malian military forces, trained by western countries, ought to have given a good account of themselves.  In the event, large numbers of these military forces changed sides.

 

The French military theoretician Colonel Ardant Du Picq would account for the collapse of Malian forces before the Tuaregs to differences in morale.  The tribesmen had a cause, while the trained military force did not.  They did not even have professional pride, apparently, despite western training.

 

After an independent Azawad was declared, France deployed its military.  The French military provided the air power and the corseting on the ground that enabled fresh Malian forces to drive out the al Qaeda forces who had hijacked the rebellion.  The appearance of western civilization was thus restored, but France has more mopping up to do.

 

After sixty-five years of French governance followed by another sixty as an independent country, showing all the signs that a civilized political culture had taken root, Mali in this crisis reverted to the kind of Africa that the Saracens overran in the seventh century.  The larger question that Mali raises is when NATO partners should serve as fire brigades for liberal democracy.

 

After Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and now Mali, western countries ought to become alive to the differences between western civilization and other civilizations in the rest of the world.  It may rankle some to hear it said, but the wondrous beliefs of liberty, equality, justice for all before the law, and respect for human rights which were born of the Western experience, are not the cultural inheritance of large portions of the world.  Even the experience of these values for a long time seems to make no lasting impression in the Middle East and in large parts of Africa.

 

Those of the third world who speak in terms of western values talk in a learned language.  The collapse of Mali shows that there is little cultural basis for them.  Western values are forms to be observed until something thrusting comes along, such as a return to tribalism.

 

The French are admirable for the way in which they tend to the countries born of their empire.  The front line of western civilization runs through Mali, and because of decisive French action al-Qaeda presently has no Treaty of Westphalia to hide behind like they had in Afghanistan.

 

But is rescuing Africa the best medium term strategy against Islamic extremism?  Should the west be on the offensive everywhere?  Would it not be better to wait and allow extremist anti-western forces to gain a foothold somewhere, the better for them to concentrate?  Islamic extremism is no more the cultural inheritance of sub-Sahara Africa than liberal democracy is.

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