The Glamour Boys are getting nervous

Vincent J. Curtis                                                                            

 January 26, 2006

            The Glamour Boys of the Canadian Forces are getting nervous.  As reported by National Post reporter Chris Wattie, the Canada’s air force is not going to provide air cover to the 2200 ground troop deployment to Kandahar, Afghanistan, and at least one retired air force officer made worrisome noises about our having to rely on other nations for help.  In truth, their worry is that Canada’s air force, on the CF’s largest military deployment since Korea, on this deployment at least, is irrelevant.

The reason for the air forces’ irrelevance on this and many other potential future deployments is the choice of combat roles and aircraft procurement policy that the air force recommended to the government over nearly sixty years.

Since the end of World War II, the air force has recommended air superiority as its principle combat role, and the procurement of combat aircraft since Korea reflects that policy: the CF-100, F-86 Sabre, the Avro Arrow, CF-104, and the CF-18.

The glamour job in any air force is to be a fighter jet jockey, the “Aces”.  The combat role of fighter jets is to gain air superiority.  Generations of air force officers, in other words, have made procurement decisions that virtually ensured that Canada’s air force could not be called upon to provide direct support to Canadian ground troops.

Lower down the pilot pecking order is the flier of ground support aircraft, the kind that directly help the infantry and armoured forces, the kind of aircraft that is needed in the Kandahar deployment.  The kind that would make sense if force unification translated into operational integration.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban have no air force, but they might have surface to air missiles.  That means that even if a token air presence were sent to Kandahar, the fighters would have virtually no role and might be a potential embarrassment if one were shot down by a SAM.

The kind of aircraft that would be useful in Kandahar are: the Apache Longbow helicopter, the A-10 Warthog, and the AC-130 Spectre gunship.  But Canada doesn’t have these, and no one in the air force ever thought to ask for six or twelve, just in case.  Or even as a token, just to try out some concepts that the Germans and Americans had already fully developed.

The Americans call their integration of air power and land forces the ‘AirLand Battle.’  The name of the German doctrine was blitzkrieg.

The operational doctrine of the US Marine Corps, another unified force, closely integrates air, land, and sea power to seize and hold littoral territory.  In Vietnam, in Gulf Wars I and II, and in Afghanistan both jets and helicopters were used to provide overwhelming firepower in support of ground operations.  So it is not as if the Canadian air force or the Canadian Forces as a whole were lacking in good and recent examples of the concept.

The unification of the armed forces 1968 has proven so far to be administrative, not operational.  Paul Hellier’s vision did not extend far beyond solving annoyances of his own personal acquaintance.  And no one after him, either as CDS or as MND, has proven adequately possessed of the idea of truly integrating the unified Canadian Armed Forces both administratively and operationally.

However, air cover is really not necessary to the Kandahar deployment.  The new artillery that Canada has had to acquire for it is much superior to aircraft as fire support, and much less expensive.  In the first place, artillery is “on station” 24/7, in any kind of weather.  The M777 guns can lob a 155 mm shell forty kilometers; and with the “smart” ammunition that comes with it, a shell can be impacted right between a pesky enemy sniper and his equally annoying spotter.

To move beyond the forty kilometer limit of the artillery fan, the troops would have to be transported in LAVs.  The LAVs come equipped with a magnificent 25 mm chain gun.  The Taliban have nothing that can go up against a platoon or a company of LAV mounted Canadian infantry.

If Canada really needed an “eye in the sky” it could obtain a Predator drone equipped with a Hellfire missile.  This again is a cheaper solution to moving a CF-18 squadron into theatre, and more effective in selective ground attack.

In summary, generations of air force officers chose glamour over grub.  On their expert recommendation, Canada purchased combat aircraft that realistically could not be used in direct support of Canada’s troops on the ground.  The unification of 1968 did not result in operational integration because of inter-element jealousy.  Now, the air force is without the tools to participate in Kandahar.  No glamour, no glory.  Maybe no job.  That’s why they’re worried.

                                                            -XXX-

A version of this report was published in Esprit de Corps Magazine