Vincent J. Curtis
12 Nov 2019
Given the
moral cowardice that prevails in much of media (see Northwest University), it is not surprising that Don
Cherry would get fired for having said something that riled up a twitter
mob. It doesn’t matter that what Cherry said was sensible and patriotic.
Cherry hit
upon a painful contradiction in the view that progressives have on immigrants
and immigration. We hope that immigrants come to Canada with the aim of
becoming Canadian and integrating into Canadian society. But if no one
tells them what is expected of them, how are they going to integrate?
What could be more Canadian than honoring our war dead by wearing a poppy on
Remembrance Day?
The
progressive twitter mob were outraged that anyone should place expectations
upon immigrants. Progressives hold that immigrant cultures are superior
to Canadian culture, that immigrants are doing us the favour by coming here,
and that we ought to learn from immigrants. Progressives can’t admit that
there must be something about existing Canadian culture that makes Canada so
appealing that immigrants leave the home of their birth to take their chances
here.
If the plan
is to have immigrants replace us in future, then shouldn’t we make sure that
they will carry on Canadian culture and traditions? If the plan is to
have immigrants substitute and replace Canadian culture, then it is patriotic
to oppose immigration.
Cherry hit
painfully on this contradiction, and so the progressive mob howled in pain and
outrage.
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Vincent J. Curtis
5 Aug 2019
The Normandy campaign concluded at the end
of August, 1944, after the Germans were almost entirely cleared from France and
the 1st Canadian Army was advancing into Belgium. Many “lessons learned” have been written about
the campaign, but what can be said about it from the perspective of 75 years
on?
In a “what-if” scenarios, let’s ask, “what
if the Canadian Army had been equipped with the Mk I Centurion tank?” This thought experiment isn’t all that
far-fetched, as the Centurion was fielded in May, 1945. It was on the design boards in early 1943. What would have happened if the Canadian Army
had been equipped with Centurions and its 20 pdr gun, in Normandy?
It is likely that the 2nd Canadian
Corps would have torn through the German army like a chainsaw through
softwood. One of the main reasons the
Germans were able to hold their own for so long in Normandy was their
superiority in tanks, in particular the Panther and the Tiger. These tanks could, and usually did, defeat
large numbers of Shermans from long range.
The 75 mm gun on the Sherman couldn’t penetrate the frontal armour of a
Tiger even from point-blank range, while the long-barreled German 75 mm and 88
mm guns could brew up a Sherman from over a mile away.
Canadian armour was getting beaten in
detail by these superior German weapons - in those little battles that occur
within the larger one. The Canadians did
not have quickly to hand the means of defeating Panthers and Tigers. What was in their hands was the British 17
pdr gun, which could defeat Panthers and Tigers from long range. The 6 pdr anti-tank gun with which infantry
battalions were equipped was useless except for close range side-shots. The PIAT anti-tank projector had an effective
warhead – if you could crawl within a hundred yards of the target and hit the
thing.
The only tank that could tackle a Tiger or
a Panther was a Sherman Firefly, a Sherman which mounted that 17 pdr gun.
Tac Air, in the shape of formations of
Typhoons, were effective against Tigers and Panthers, but the ground troops
were not equipped with ground to air radio sets, making close cooperation impossible.
The Canadians in Normandy were losing four
and five Shermans for every Panther and Triger killed. If that ratio were dead even, or two to one
in our favor, the Germans could not have held up theCanadian advance for
nearly as long as they did.
What lesson can be drawn from this ‘what-if’
scenario? The immediate lesson is that
Canadian combat troops have to have in their hands the best, most modern
equipment to deal with the enemy. Not
just the best that we can think of, but equal if not better than what the enemy
has. Everybody knew about Tigers since
March, 1943. So, why weren’t our
generals and our engineers trying to figure out ways of dealing with these new battlefield
tactical problems?
Was Clarence Decatur Howe working day and
night? No. Did engineer MacNaughton look
at the bazooka and see a 106 mm recoilless rifle? No. Was Crerar hounding Howe for a new weapon? No. Why
weren’t Crerar and Simonds developing TTPs (tactics, techniques, procedures)
for ground troops to defeat these menaces?
Being generals, they ought to know something about ground combat. They ought to know before their battalion
commanders the tactical problems their platoons are going to face.
As recently as 2006, it was seriously
proposed by our generals that we didn’t need tanks anymore and that the new
doctrine of ‘maneuver warfare’ would overcome any tactical problem. No replacement for the Leopard I’s were in
prospect during the Chretien years, and rather than embarrass the government,
our generals put out the superior doctrine story – even though Genforce employed
tanks and maneuver warfare doctrine already!
The need to put into Canadian hands
equipment that is not just the best, but better than what the enemy has is one
lesson from the Normandy campaign. There
are others. like TTPs
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