Vincent J. Curtis
5 Apr 2018
After the development of guided missiles in the 1950’s,
fighter aircraft came to be seen as a “platform” for carrying weapons ‘systems.’ The Avro Arrow was designed as a weapons platform. Designed to carry missiles in a pod fitted at
the bottom of the airframe, the Arrow would destroy an enemy aircraft by
dropping a missile from the pod. After
dropping free of the pod, the rocket engine of the missile would ignite, the
guidance system would track the target automatically, fly the missile at near
hypersonic speed to the target, and explode.
The modern F-35 is designed similar to the Arrow.
The F-4 Phantom was the first fighter jet to rely completely
on a missile system of engagement - when it was first produced. Experience in the air war over North Vietnam
proved that a pure missile platform was ineffective. MiG-17s, and -21s flown by the North
Vietnamese were agile dogfighters. If an
American F-4 Phantom got close enough in a dogfight to fire a missile, it was often too close to arm, or it simply missed the agile Russian-built jets. Eventually, the Phantoms were fitted with Vulcan
M-61 20 mm rotary cannons to compensate for the failure of the missile technology
of the age to deliver on the promises.
During that time, John Boyd became one of the most
influential colonels of the USAF. Boyd
learned his trade as a fighter pilot during the Korean War flying F-86 Saber
jets and engaging in dogfights against the better performing MiG-15s of that
day. Out of his experience, Boyd
developed his famous OODA loop theory.
Boyd became an instructor, and head of the academic section, at the USAF
Fighter Weapons School. He had a
standing challenge for any of his students:
meet him at 30,000 feet at a position of advantage, and if Boyd could
not get gun-camera footage of his opponent’s tail within forty seconds, he
would pay $40 to the student. No one
collected. Boyd wrote the fighter
tactics manual.
Boyd also developed his famous Energy-Maneuverability theory. This theory showed mathematically the combat
performance possibilities of aircraft based upon their speed, thrust, drag, and
weight. Boyd was able to generate graphs
and tables which illustrated what fighter pilots ought to do in given situations,
which accelerated his students’ OODA loops; and the results were seen in
improvements in the air war over North Vietnam.
His Aerial Attack Study showed that an agile fighter could out-maneuver
missiles.
The fame of his success caused him to be called to the
Pentagon to rescue the so-called F-X project, the jet that would succeed the
F-4 Phantom. Boyd tore the proposed F-X
design apart, and restarted the project from scratch. Boyd’s work led to the F-15 Eagle, and then,
when he became disappointed with design bureaucrats adding bells and whistles,
to the F-16. Both these aircraft will
perform front-line service into the 2040s.
Boyd grew disenchanted with the F-15 when it became, he thought,
too complex, too expensive, too big, and too reliant on missile technology. Boyd drew around him Pierre Sprey, and
Everest Riccioni, who called themselves the “fighter mafia” to design an
inexpensive, simple, lightweight fighter.
Boyd could see that the F-15 would be too costly to fully equip the USAF
with them, and an inexpensive dogfighter would be necessary to fill the
deficiency in combat aircraft. Thus, the
light-weight F-16, and also, indirectly, the F/A-18.
Even the F-16, embellished by the bureaucrats, became
heavier than Boyd wanted it to be. He
wanted a stripped-down air-to-air specialist, not a multi-role fighter-bomber;
and he wanted passive, rather than active, radar. Nevertheless, an inexpensive and reliable F-16
conducted most of the missions in the 1991 Gulf War.
Boyd died when the F-35 was known as the Joint Strike
Fighter, but his colleague Pierre Sprey became famous for his criticism of the
F-35. Based upon Boyd’s E-M theory, Sprey
argues that the F-35 is a dud of an aircraft: it is too heavy, has too much
drag, is too complex, has too high a wing load to be maneuverable, is utterly
reliant on technology unproven in combat, and its stealth is defeatable. Sprey holds the F-35 would be torn apart in a
dogfight with a MiG-21.
Sprey believes that the USAF bureaucracy is so enamoured
with expensive technology and with the “hi-lo” mixed force concept (F-15, F-16;
F-22, F-35) that the object of the F-35 program is to drop big money in pursuit
of a false ideology. Sprey does not
believe the “platform” concept, and thinks that actual aerial combat will see
the resumption of dogfighting, in which the overpriced, overly complex F-35
would be overwhelmed. He holds that the
original concept, light-weight F-16 with a more powerful engine that is currently
in production is the best air-to-air fighter in future aerial combat.
Despite his vocal opposition, no one who favors the F-35 has
come forward to refute Sprey’s argument.
Boyd’s proven theories haven’t been repealed. And this should give budget makers pause. The Air Force bureaucracies of their own
countries can be as bewitched by expensive technology as those of the
USAF. There is no guarantee that ‘toys
for the boys’ video game technology will work in actual combat, as was seen in
Vietnam. Flying skill, E-M, and OODA
loops may still matter.
The case for a Canadian F-16 is that we have no reason to
take a risk on an expensive dud whose capabilities we will never need or use -
after a stripped-down air to air specialist met 99 + percent of the RCAF missions
over the past fifty-five years, will meet them for the next thirty years, and
can be had for a third of the price of the F-35.
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