17 February 2012
Canada needs to keep abreast of changing U.S. military doctrine, contingency planning, and equipment acquisitions. Canada’s foreign policy requires that she maintain good relations with her gigantic neighbour to the south, and Canada is committed to NORAD and NATO. The driver of military action of NORAD and NATO over the last twenty years has been the United States, and this will remain so for the foreseeable future. The principle is, and the practise shows, that Canada sends her military forces abroad in the first instance for furtherance of her alliances.
Hence, a glimpse at what the U.S. is doing might provide a hint at what it is her military could become involved in.
In January, the United States Department of Defense released its planning guidance document called, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century.” The document explicitly named a nuclear-armed Iran and a bold, aggressive China as the potential threats to U.S. interests. The doctrinal answer to these threats was the AirSea Battle concept.
The first requests for equipment acquisitions under the new planning guidance were released in mid-February. Since most everything is done with tools these days, what tools in the way of military equipment the U.S. military is asking for provides a clue as to how it plans to fight.
For the army, the major weapons systems requested are helicopters. Specifically, the AH-64D Apache Longbow Block 3, CH-47 Chinook, UH-60 Black Hawk, and light utility helicopters. The U.S. Army also wants to expand its field tactical networking capability with new radio systems, and has requests in for upgrading the Abrams tank, for new trucks and light tactical vehicles, and rocket launching systems.
The U.S. Navy wants another nuclear powered aircraft carrier, two Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines, two Aegis destroyers, four Littoral Combat Ships, and one Joint High Speed Vessel. Other requests include money for more F/A-18 E and F Super Hornet strike fighters, maritime patrol aircraft; and for the Marines: UH-1 (Huey) helicopters, and AH-1Z Super Cobra attack helicopters.
The U.S. Air Force reduced its request for funding aircraft this year from last year. It still wants, however, more Predator, Reaper, and Global Hawk drones, AC-130 Spectre gunships for special operations, upgrades for the F-22 Raptor, and more money for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.
In general, what the U.S. military wants is more rotary aviation, more ships, and more highly sophisticated aircraft. It is cutting the number of ground forces it has. It is replacing boots on the ground with joysticks that control tools more powerful than a C-7 rifle.
For a Canadian military contribution to an overseas contingency operation to be noticeable - and therefore diplomatically valuable - the CF needs to be equipped with materiel comparable to that of the United States. Given U.S. planning, the equipment needs to enable Canadian Forces to participate in the Air/Sea Battle, or at least serve in a valuable and visible secondary role.
To play a primary role would require an upgrade of the equipment of the RCN, and more sailors to man the extra ships. A capital ship such as an Aegis missile cruiser would help enormously, as well as means of dealing in narrow waters with a large number of fast torpedo boats that might attempt to swarm an aircraft carrier.
The RCAF needs to get over its “fighter-jock” mentality and acquire a vast array of helicopters and drones if it wants to get noticed overseas.
There is no primary role for the army in an Air/Sea battle, as its element is solid. To be visible overseas, it would have to work with the U.S. military in a special role. Since we cannot predict what that role might be, general purpose combat capability for a mid-level conflict provides the flexibility needed to meet future contingencies. Medical and Communications are secondary roles that are visible, and are inexpensive businesses to get into and maintain.
Special Operations are by their nature not visible. However, they are highly visible among those who need to know, and these include military officers and diplomats at the highest levels. Therefore, expanded Canadian Forces special operations capability would be consistent with making the CF a valuable diplomatic tool. CF Spec Ops capability would be enhanced if we had the helicopters, one or two AC-130 Spectre gunships, and a Littoral Combat Ship capable of stealthy delivery of personnel and equipment. In other words, the RCAF and the RCN need to get the equipment that will enable them to support ground forces.
To play a useful role for Canadian diplomacy in the future, the CF needs more and different equipment, and needs to be able to operate as a unified force.
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