An Interview with LTC Ivan Beckman, CO 4th BSTB

By Vincent J. Curtis

Date: 8 Dec 10

Dateline: Forward Operating Base Rushmore

This interview took place in LTC Beckman’s office at FOB Rushmore on Dec 8, 2010.  LTC Beckman is forty-three years old, and calls Hampton Illinois his home town.  He is the commanding officer of the 4th BSTB, Task Force Currahee, 4^th BCT, 101^st Airborne Division.

VJC.  I’m here representing the Buffalo News, and I’m trying to get a grunt’s-eye view of the war; and from that get an assessment of our prospects for success, and get a view of what victory is going to look like around here.

IB.  Okay. Hoo-wah.

VJC:  How long have you been in the military?

IB: Twenty-one years.

Q.  You enlisted as an officer?

A.   Officer.

Q.  You are an airborne Ranger, so you are infantry?

A.  No, I’m an engineer.

Q.  Have you done a tour here before, or is this your first tour of Afghanistan?

A. This is my first tour of Afghanistan.  I did serve one tour in Iraq, 2004 to 2005, and I’ve served quite a lot in Korea, three different tours over there, seven years in Korea.

Q.  What is your job here?

A. I’m a battalion commander of the 4^th Brigade Special Troops Battalion, which has an Engineer company, Military Intelligence company, a Signal company, and a Headquarters company.  The Headquarters company has a military police platoon.  Here in Afghanistan, the Engineer company is doing route clearance missions for the brigade, the Signal company is doing communications missions for the brigade, and the Military Intelligence company is doing military intelligence missions for the brigade.  What I’m mainly focused on is the partnering with the Afghan Uniformed Police here in Paktika provincial headquarters here at Sharana.  We use my battalion staff, staff sections S1, S2, S3, S4, plus the Headquarters company, the company leadership and the military police platoon.  That organization is focused on training and developing the Afghan uniformed police.

Q.  That’s the primary mission of this base, isn’t it?

A. Yes.  Well, this base here is also focused on the Afghan National Army.  That’s not my primary mission, that’s the SFA team, they’re focused on developing the brigade of the ANA.  My primary mission is the AUP.

Q.  There are different components to the AUP, can you tell me what they are?

A. It’s pretty confusing, but its actually the Afghan National Police, the ANP.  The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police, the ANCOP, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the Afghan Border Police, ABP.

Q.  There’s an intelligence school here as well, is there not?

A.  There’s the NDS here.

Q. What does that stand for?

A. I think it stands for National Defense Service.

Q.  What is the difference between an AUP and an ANCOP?

A. The AUP are the police that are out in the districts.  They’re out in the smaller towns throughout Paktika., and throughout the country.  The ANCOP are more specifically trained as a unit to deploy somewhere as a unit.

Q.  How big a unit, platoon, company, battalion?

A.  Throughout Afghanistan there are several battalions.

Q.  They’re like a fire brigade who go into an area that’s been heavily infiltrated by the Taliban and they’re supposed to go in there and clean the mess up?

A.  Well, that’s one thing that they could be used for, yes.

Q.  What else could they be used for?

A. You take an ANCOP unit and put it into a district, and pull all the AUP out and let the ANCOP take over security in that area while we pull the AUP out and train them.  That’s one of the missions that they’re designed to do. So, we can pull the whole district AUP out all at one time, train up the entire district of police, and then when we’re done training them, put them back in and move the ANCOP to another location.

Q. So the average ANCOP unit would consist of a lot more switched on individuals than you would find in the average AUP unit, is that correct?

A. Yes, that’s my assessment.

Q. When a person volunteers to become a police, how does he get slotted into one of these?

A.  We have recruiters, there’s a recruiter here at the HQ, that when someone wants to become a patrolman they come on in, talk to the recruiter, and then they’re screened, they have a screening process looking at the history of that individual, if they have anything on record, and then they have to be sponsored by tribal elders, a village elder, they have to have two sponsors.

Q.  They have written records for these people?

A. Written records?

Q.  It seems to me that this place would have changing names changing faces changing records would be an easy thing to do.  It would almost be farcical to maintain written records around here.  But that’s what we rely on?

A. Yes.  That’s basically what they have right now.

Q.  Well, that’s the truth.  That’s what I want to hear.  So the mission here then is that you’ve got a guard force that looks after the place.  You have a school or several schools here, you’ve got the headquarters for the quick reaction force, and you have the headquarters of the main commander of the police forces in the Paktika province whose name is “Dahlet Khan.”

A.  Dowlat Khan.

Q.  And he’s the provincial police chief?

A.  Yes.

Q. And his boss is the provincial governor, is that correct? That’s his line of authority or does he also go through the police line as well?

A.  Right, His boss is the commander of the 505^th zone, which is Major-General Amadzan.

Q. So, this fellow Dowlat Khan, he’s a brigadier general, is that correct?

A. That’s right.  So they report to the zone.  The zone commander is responsible for several provinces.  But they also report directly to the governor.  The governor is primarily responsible for security, stability, development of the province, so the ANA within the province report to the governor and the AUP report to the governor.

Q.  I’m going to ask some sensitive questions, so if you don’t want to answer them I’ll understand.  What’s your assessment of these men?  What’s your assessment of Dowlat Khan?

A. Assessment of Dowlat Khan.  Okay.  Number one, I consider him an Afghan patriot, he’s very charismatic, he has the right message, he promotes peace and stability and development through the government, and I think he’s an effective police chief.

Q. He’s effective, in your opinion?

A. Yes.

Q. Does he go out and visit his troops?

A. Yes.  He sure does.  Every chance he gets.

Q. You think he’s got the skill set to be in that job, maybe not up to our standards, he’s got the kind of skill to do the job he’s got?

A. Yes.

Q. So you’ve got some faith in this guy?

A. I do. Absolutely.

Q. Can the provincial governor and Karzai have faith in him too?

A. Yes.

Q. What about this LTC Haroom (Battalion Commander of the Quick Reaction Force Battalion stationed at FOB Rushmore.)  What’s your assessment of him?

A.  I really don’t have an assessment of him.  I’m not partnered with him directly. Captain Stiles would be more partnered with him than I am.

Q.  What do you think is the major obstacle or barrier to getting the police up to a standard that’s required for them to be able to take over complete control of security of this place?

A.  For one thing, I think it just takes time to develop the systems, to train the force, to equip the force, and to get good, effective police. It takes time.

Q.  With the time frame of a draw down beginning around 2012, with complete withdrawal by 2014, take that as a standard, is that enough time?

A. I’m not sure.  I support the timeline that has been set, and I think it is achievable. I think it is achievable.  We’re going to have to maintain a presence here.

Q.  Beyond 2014?

A. I think we’re going to have to maintain a presence.  It may not be combat forces, but we’ve got to maintain a NATO presence, an engagement, an international security presence to continue to help beyond 2014.

Q.  Now, is that just to be a conscience, or is that because the national character is not such that they would be able to stand up all by themselves?

A. I think the security forces will be capable of maintaining security and stability, but the entire development of their systems, for example, promotion systems,

Q.  The whole business of administering this thing.

A. I think its going to take many years to develop.  If we look at how professional our forces are, and how long its take us to develop the systems we have in place, where people are promoted based on their performance.

Q. Merit.

A. Merit.  Those systems are going to take some time to develop.

Q.  Will they ever develop in a tribal society like you see here?

A.  Yes.  I believe they will.  I believe they will.  I have confidence in the Afghan government.  They’re ready to develop their own forces.

Q. Let’s talk about the Taliban a little bit.  They’re not the all-conquering power that we kind of make them out to be, are they?

A.  No.

Q. So why is everybody afraid of them?

A. I don’t know.  The Afghan security forces are much stronger than the Taliban.

Q.  Militarily, there is no doubt.  Militarily there is no doubt that the Afghan forces are superior, and yet we’re afraid of what’s going to happen if we pull out.  That sounds to me like a profound difference in motivation.  You don’t disagree?

A. I’m not sure I follow you.

Q.  Napoleon said that the ratio of morale to strength is as three is to one.  Well, we have all the strength, but if the Taliban are still a force to be reckoned with, so much so that we may need to maintain a presence here after 2014, there must be a big difference in motivation between the Taliban and the forces of reason and democracy around here.

A.  Hmm.

Q.  Is there a reason why the Taliban can trust each other and rely on each other and support each other and yet the people that we’re working with cannot?

A.  I think the people we’re working with do trust each other, and there is confidence in the government.  I feel pretty positive about the forward direction that the government is making, including the security forces.

Q.  Still continuing with the Taliban, let’s say the worse comes to worst and with their 500 fighters sort of take over this province.  What is governance going to look like in this place with 500 Taliban running this province?

A. I don’t ever see that happening.

Q.  You don’t see them governing or you don’t ever see them taking it over.

A.  I don’t ever see them taking it over.

Q.  Not while we’re here., but when we pull out and its just the ANA and AUP all by themselves and their constitution, its conceivable that they could collapse, so what is the governance of that province going to look like?

A.  I don’t think that will happen. I think the Afghan security forces are strong enough now to resist the Taliban.  We are stepping back from them, we’re stepping back from the Afghan security forces, letting them do more and more on their own, which they are capable of doing.  We do have some areas where we don’t have any coalition forces present, and are run entirely by Afghan security forces.  I think they are capable on their own, and I don’t see it being taken over by the Taliban.

Q.  Just one last point, and it concerns corruption.  We can give them all the equipment in the world, and probably have, and yet they’re always deficient on the equipment front.  No doubt these guys are selling it on the black market.  Would you assess this problem as being manageable, out of control, or vastly over-blown.

A. I think its manageable.  I think it’s a manageable problem.  Its something that we’re focused on, and we’re paying a lot of attention to.  I think it’s a manageable problem that we have.  We do have lots of Afghan patriots out there, like General Dowlat Khan, that are trying as best they can to fix corruption problems.  There’s a lot of inefficiencies in their systems.  Their systems are not very well developed.  For example, the system of paying cash for employment as opposed to electronic funds transfer, and that’s based on not having banks for them to withdraw their own money from.

Q.  We're back to the administration problem again.  There seems to be a very severe shortage of educated people.

A.  It’s a problem that we’re focused on, but I think it’s a manageable problem.

Q.  I know you’re an engineer, and I’d like to ask you an engineering question.

A.  All right.  Hoo-wah.

Q.  Are we going to be able to build enough all-weather, good surface roads to make winning this war a lot easier, or is that going to be left to the Afghans?

A.  I have confidence in our ability to help them build roads.  But that’s not really in my lane, that’s a PRT matter, road construction.  But I see a lot of new roads being built.  The roads are a tremendous help because it helps transportation throughout the province.

Q. Commerce.

A.  Right, commerce – critically important.  Any time we go out into a remote area and talk to the elders out there that’s what they’re concerned with: when are the roads going to be built?  It’s a challenge out here in Paktika because we’re removed from the main stream.

VJC.  Thank-you very much for the interview.  It was very informative, and I appreciate the time you have given me.

IB. Absolutely.  Thank-you.

-30-

Training the AUP

By: Vincent J. Curtis

Date: 9 Dec 2010

Dateline: FOB Rushmore, Afghanistan

Afghanistan has a lot of war materiel.  When the United States begins its drawdown in 2012, not all of it is coming back.  Among the material being left behind is the redoubtable Humvee.

It’s frame strengthened, its sides and bottom covered with armor, a gun turret, its windows bulletproofed, this vehicle has come a long way from the jeep replacement it originally was.  Even so, the Humvee is deemed obsolete by the army, and use of the vehicle by US troops outside the wire is no longer authorized.  The bigger and much more capable MATVs and others like it are now the primary the beasts of burden for US troops in the field.

The Humvee is still a capable vehicle, and many of them are still mechanically fit, and so the US army is turning over its inventory of Humvees in Afghanistan to the Afghan forces, and in particular to the AUP, or Afghan Uniformed Police.  The AUP presently conduct their vehicle patrols in modified Ford Rangers, which are unarmored.  The Humvees represent a big step up in protection and potential for firepower.

A familiarity with driving is not something you can take for granted among Afghans.  Motorcycles are common, but cars are found only in the cities.  The AUP need to be trained in driving across desert roads and through wadis in the heavily armored, four wheel drive Humvee.  That’s where trainers like Sgt Carlson Parks, 27, who hails from South Carolina, come in.

Parks is the master driver and trainer of the Brigade Support Troops Battalion, 4^th Brigade Combat team, 101^st Airborne Division.  He has been in the service since 2001, and for the last three years has been the master driver trainer for his battalion.  His battalion is nicknamed “the Warhawks.”  Sgt Parks normally teaches a three week familiarization course, but due to constraints has had to cut the program down to one week for driving and basic maintenance.  He had sixteen student drivers who, after a week of familiarization training, were assessed for their driving skills over a desert course laid out on the sprawling FOB Sharana.

“[The course] gives them better familiarization with operating the vehicle and also for their own maintenance level that they can do without us,“ said Sgt Parks explaining the purpose of the program.

All sixteen drivers passed the course and were awarded with a course certificate.  The best overall student was also awarded a battalion coin.

Ultimately the job of these drivers is “to go out ahead of us.  Basically doing what they’ve been doing since we got out here: helping to build up rapport in the cities and find the bad guys is the best way to put it,” said Sgt Parks.

The Humvee will make that job just a little safer for them, and it is hoped, will add to their confidence, willingness, and activity.

-30-

An Interview with LTC Dave Womack, CO of 1st of 506th.

Transcription of an interview conducted with Lieutenant Colonel Dave Womack, Commanding Officer, 1^st Bn, 506^th Inf Regt. on Dec 4^th, 2010 in bldg A2 of FOB Kushamond.

By Vincent J. Curtis

Q.  I am here with Lieutenant Colonel Dave Womack.  Can you tell me a little about yourself?

A. I command 1^st of the 506 infantry, which is western Paktika, roughly the size of Connecticutt.  I am from Roanoke, Virginia,  I’m 40 years old, and been married about 19 years.

Q.  From the battalion’s perspective, what can you tell me about the enemy here?

A.  Our mission statement is to try to neutralize the enemy.  Down here, that’s very difficult.  You’ve seen how open it is, and what we’ve learned is it only takes a few Taliban to, really, disrupt a village and hold sway.  As much as the villagers may try to change that, it’s problematic.  That’s our challenge.

Q.  In simple terms, what does ‘neutralize’ mean?

A.  We’re trying to prevent the enemy from holding sway, and whether its kill or capture, or whatever our operations accomplish, get ‘em out of here.

Q.  How many Taliban are in this area, what’s the size of the enemy force here?

A.  I can’t say for sure because there are so many varying degrees.  I think that the biggest thing we can focus on is to get some of the Taliban who are facilitators, that are true believers.  I think that there are a lot of opportunists and criminals who call themselves Taliban are opportunists, but to give you the total number, I don’t know, I think that there are only a handful of true believers.

Q.  So are we talking of hundreds of operatives, or do they number in the thousands?

A.  I think that there’s probably only a couple hundred around here, this large an area.

Q.  You divided the Taliban up into two groups.  Facilitators, what are they?  Would they be people who live in villages all the time and are just friendly, or is that another category.

A.  No.  A facilitator to me implies that they have freedom of movement, that they are tied in, with the capability to bring in foreign fighters, and weapons, munitions.

Q.  And the transients, the ones that don’t actually live in the area and just come through, that’s the hard core group you were speaking of?

A.  I think that’s generally a fair statement.

Q.  Who would then be most responsible for intimidating the local population, the ones that would try and attack the ISAF forces?

A.  I would say that that wouldn’t necessary be the facilitator, although they can do both.  They have soldiers who execute intimidation operations, and they are quite good at it.

Q.  What sort of intimidation operations?  What sort of thing do they do to assert that they are in control, that they are the dominant power?

A.   You read a lot of stories in the press about how they are skilled at going through and holding sway in a village.  But what we’ve seen is that they come through and they forcefully enter qualots and homes, that they take their food, and that they impress the locals not to do anything to support Afghan development.

Q.  If the Taliban are not really offering governance, if they are just there to look after their own survival by preying on the local population, and entertaining themselves or perhaps demonstrating military power by attacking ISAF forces, why are we worried about them politically?  What the gain?  Why should we be concerned about them as a political force?

A.  That’s a little bit above my paygrade.  But I will tell you my assessment that I don’t know we are overly worried about them politically.

Q.  Is some kind of religious fanaticism ultimately what their cause is all about?  Is that how they justify to people everything they do?

A.  Its not that simple, but I think that’s part of it.               

Q.  What sort of weapons do they have in their possession that they can use against us?

A. They like to use various small arms.  They use RPGs, they have a lot of things that were left over from all the fighting that has gone on continuously in this country.  There’s not a great shortage, and one of our goals is to create inflation for weapons supply.  And we know we’re doing that.  We just keep driving the cost of those weapons up.

Q.  Speaking of weapons, where do they get them?  Are these just leftovers, or are they being supplied from an outside power?

A.  I don’t believe its hard to get weapons anywhere in the world these days, unfortunately.  There are plenty of enterprising businessmen that, I’m sure, are willing to profit off it that may or may not believe in the cause.  We know that they get supplies.

Q.  Taking it further, if they are able to purchase supplies from outside the theatre, that must mean they are getting financing from outside the theatre.

A. Well, I’m just a little old battalion commander in western Paktika here, but I think they very well could.  Part of the strategy for defeating all these terrorists, whether you’re talking about al Qaeda or different sub-factions of al Qaeda, we know…follow the money.  Clearly that is one way of defeating the organization.

Q.  What is your estimate of the enemy’s intent?  What do you think they are going to do in this theatre over the next three to six months? 

A.  I think the enemy is trying to discredit [garbled]  They are going to try to disrupt US forces, because that’s all they are capable of.  Disruptive operations.  Focus on information operations.  They still hold some credibility.  They have the capability to influence things.  But everytime they go for a spectacular attack they’ve been defeated.  But they’re going for the information operations picture, trying to generate support, trying to show they are a viable threat, whether they are looking to establish conditions for peace, negotiate from a position of power, you know, to be determined.

Q.  Are your operations attempting to counteract that directly, or is there some different purpose?

A.  No. We are trying to neutralize them, period.

Q.  Does that mean trying to defeat their information operations?  If they try to demonstrate that they’re strong, you turn around and demonstrate that you’re stronger?

A.  They do that all by themselves because without regard they are killing Afghan civilians.  Not so say we’re perfect.  Unfortunately, you know this is war and combat and bad things happen.  But the difference between us and the Taliban is we take ownership of it.  If we make a mistake, we go back in and we tell ‘em, “hey look, we screwed this up.  We’re here to atone for it, make it right.”  We’re very sensitive to their culture, with Pastunwali.  In our area alone, they’ll attack US or Afghan forces, the collateral damage among civilians…  The civilians know that.  They’ll use protected places like mosques to fire at us from.  All the evidence is there, and even the locals know it.  We’re seen examples of locals saying ‘no, you can’t go in here.  We know what you’re going to do and it’s a holy mosque, leave it alone.’  But that goes against everything they’re trying to espouse.  They say one thing but their actions speak differently.  Its maddening when you read from their senior Mullah Omars, guys like that, they’ll talk like ‘hey look, we’re on your side, we’re on Islam’s side,’ but they’re actions are totally counter to it and most locals see right through that.

Q.  Two things fall from that.  Is their primary method of intimidation murder or is it something less?

A.  To answer your question, both.  They have murdered Afghan forces and they have murdered civilians.  They certainly aren’t going to gain much sway doing that,  but we know they do that – we’ve found the bodies.  But I think generally, it’s less severe than that.  And I understand, going in on an unarmed civilian, you’ve got an AK, they don’t.  That’s intimidation right there.

Q.  The civilian population, they’ve been effectively disarmed?  At one time the story was every man had an AK.

A.  I think Afghans still maintain weapons for personal protection.

Q. So why don’t they use them?

A.  Who knows?

Q.  I understand the villagers are quite prepared to let their village elder be beaten up or intimidated by a squad of five or ten guys, and there are at least as large a force of men there who if they had weapons would be able to say, ‘hey wait on.’

A.  Well, I guess the only thing I could do is put it in context.  They’ve been in thirty years of war.  I’d like to believe that we would behave differently if we were in that position when our families were threatened.  I guess the right answer is what can we do to help them.  There is a new initiative, Afghan Local Police, and we other things more traditional here, Locals standing up for protection.  So I’m not going to say its happening or that it hasn’t happened.  Its not happened to the extent that we would like because that would bring about, obviously, more security.  Womack’s opinion is that thirty years of war has numbed some people.  They are professional survivors, Afghans.  They’ve seen Russians, Taliban.  So they’re professional survivors, and I’m sure they’re a bit cynical.  You know, when we way we’re here to help, it doesn’t resonate with them like it does others.

Q.  You mentioned Mullah Omar, and his political message being that they’re on the side of Islam, is anything being done here, or is it necessary that anything be done here to counteract that, to try to convince people that that is not the case?

A.  We try to do it by our actions.  And I tell ‘em, judge me, judge my soldiers by our actions., they’re actions.  We have religious tolerance, we have Muslim soldiers, and they’re not persecuted.  So please, judge us by our actions, we’re very culturally sensitive, whether it be religious, through Islam, or whether it’s just cultural things, in regards to women.  Obviously they see things a little differently than we do.  But we respect that, and try to adjust.  And we won’t see eye to eye on everything, and there are some things we’re not going to negotiate on.  If it involves force protection, I’m going to draw the line.  Now, I’ll try to do it in a way that mitigates any problem,.  Now we have female engagement teams that will search women, because hey, I’m a bad guy, I’m going to dress up as a woman.  We saw it in Iraq, we’re seeing it in Afghanistan.  We’re going to make sure that we search, you know, women.

Q.  How would summarize the sort of operations you’re going to do on a day to day basis to complete the battalion’s mission?

A.  We’re obviously focused on empowerment, and how do we do that, well we partner with ANA/ISAF.  We know that we’re not going to fight our way out of this so we’ve got to empower our partners, in the Afghan army, police, national NBS, which is a great intel platform.  We’ve got to build that capacity so that they can do it themselves and that we’re supporting them.

Q.  So, it then essentially it boils down to a combination of cordon and search operations and humanitarian aid operations, so is that it?

A.  Well, no.  I wish that was it.  I would rather not do cordon and search, I rather get out of that.  I would rather work through the Afghans.  I will tell you cordon and searchs in general.  We’re in a position now where we’ve got a lot of good intel, so we would rather do precision operations that really disrupt less people that have a higher probably of success.  We’ve seen it on small scales where we’re the support by fire for the Afghans, where the Afghans are the ones doing everything.  And I’ll tell you, the Afghan search teams search the Afghans, we don’t.  We empower them.  I would like it to be a unilateral Afghan operation., with us as QRF, providing them with capabilities the coalition has access to and they’re not there yet.

Q.  Do you think you have enough intelligence support to do your work?

A.  I do, and some areas are better than others.  Each place is different.  Where we are now in Kushamond, the place is wide open and probably not as well refined an intel picture, but in some places, it is very clear.  So the goal is to try to get there.  Afghans do it better than we do.  Afghans know who doesn’t belong and who belongs.  You know, we don’t.

VJC: Well, that concludes the interview and thank you sir for your time.  Its much appreciated.

DW:  Thank you for coming down here.

A Small Victory over the Taliban

By: Vincent J. Curtis

Date: 8 Dec 2010

Dateline: In the field outside FOB Kushamond, Dila District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan

It was a day of little activity at FOB Kushamond.  2^nd Lt Jones’s platoon was not scheduled to go out on another patrol for a couple of days, and Rocket Man had not bothered us for the last two.  Rocket Man is the name of the Taliban who has the skill of setting up, aiming, and firing the 107 mm Chinese made rocket.  He rocketed the FOB on a daily basis in October and November, but recently his activity has tapered off.

A little after 2:00 p.m., after the time of the Muslim afternoon prayers, the artillery on the FOB started kicking up a ruckus.  A shot here and a shot there is not unusual at Kushamond, but this was a surprising amount of fire.

I walked over to the 1 Platoon hut to find out what was going on.  2^nd Lt Jones already had his body armor on.  “Get your gear, we’re going to do a BDA, “ he said.  BDA stands for bomb damage assessment.  I expected that we were going to check out the effectiveness of our own shelling, but it turns out that Rocket Man had fired at the District Governor’s Headquarters that afternoon, and we were going to do a BDA on his work.

By 4:00 p.m. we were in the middle of the Afghan desert near a 19^th century-looking fort.  On this occasion, Rocket Man’s aim was not very good.  He may have intended to hit the Governor’s headquarters, but his missiles landed several hundred yards outside the fort.  A group of 4 ANA met us there.  They traveled from Kushamond in a modified Ford Ranger and used the dirt road which got them there quickly from the FOB.  Traveling cross country in a MATV is safer but slower.

The danger of setting off an IED with a Ford Ranger is not as great as it used to be.  As American vehicles up-armored and got heavier as a result, the Taliban increased the weight required to set off the pressure plate which triggers the IED.  In this way, they reduced the likelihood that a local Afghan will set off the IED himself.

The Currahees perform a BDA on Rocket Man’s work because the impact crater and angle of the imbedded rocket points back to the launch point.  Enough BDAs, and the Currahees may be able to triangulate a few of Rocket Man’s favorite launching sites.

The work done, we head back to the FOB.  Not far along, the lead vehicle, callsign Gunfighter one-two, reported one individual seen in a tower 800 meters away to our ten o’clock.  His heat signature had given him away.  Although the ground is rough, the terrain is flat and one can see a great distance.  Looking through the windows of the MATV, one could see the structure behind a screen of trees.

Immediately, 2Lt Jones ordered the patrol to make straight for the position.  About 200 meters out we halted and dismounted.  The gunners in the MATVs provided overwatch, and support fire if we needed it.  The Gunfighters moved in on foot to discover a Taliban observation post and a cache of IED components.

No one was there, but Gunfighter one-seven reported one individual moving away on a motorcycle at high speed with an AK slung over his back.  “He was 700 meters away when we spotted him, and 900 before we could get a ‘make’ on him.  So we let ‘em go,” said M/Sgt Mason.

The complex was of an abandoned and ruined home.  The trees were an old wind-break.  The half of the roof on the mail building had collapsed.  There were two outbuildings, one of which was connected to the mail building by a roofed-over trench.

A search of the main building revealed a cache of IED components hidden behind a false wall.  Access from the outside was blocked by a poorly made adobe work that patched over the original doorway.  Tearing away the adobe, the Gunfighters created an opening large enough to remove all the material.  By volume most of it was used, empty one gallon plastic jugs.  But filled with explosive powder and connected to a detonator and it becomes and IED.  All this material was stacked in the middle of the compound and M/Sgt Mason set it alight with a thermite grenade.

The place provided an excellent, well-concealed observation point and work area.  The trees ordinarily screened it from view.  Had it not been for the thermal signature of the individual, the Gunfighters would not have found it, or suspected it.  Before we left, the Gunfighters grenaded the trench and the outbuilding it connected to.

From here we moved to another suspected OP.  It too was empty, but the abandoned structures provided concealment and a good view of the countryside.  The exact grid references of both these positions are now likely marked on the artillery map.

The Gunfighters returned to FOB Kushamond well after dark, and after scheduled chow time.  However, we were greeted with a warm dinner of roasted chicken left in the chow hall for us by the thoughtful cooks.

The intent of LTC Dave Womack, the commanding officer of 1/506 Inf, , to which Charlie company, nicknamed the Gunfighters belongs, is to disrupt Taliban operations.  By finding these hiding places, with an uncanny, to them, ability to detect and then to chase these isolated individuals, and by killing or capturing the talented hard-core Taliban like Rocket Man, Womack hopes to demoralize the less ardent among the Taliban and cause them to quit the fight.  I’m sure the motorcyclist was shocked to see the MATVs sudden turn and rush his position.  He was lucky the position had a hidden escape route.

This BDA mission was a microcosm of Womack’s strategy in action.

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Mission to Hajj Wadi

By Vincent J. Curtis

Date: 5 Dec 10

Dateline: Forward Operating Base Kushamond

Hajj Wadi is a village located nine miles west of FOB Kushamond.  It consists of three to five qualots, and has a population of about thirty people who subsist by tending goats.  When it was visited earlier in the week by US forces, no men were found.  Hajj Wadi should be the farthest thing from a strategically important place, except that the Taliban use it as a stop over point as they travel east and west.  The Currahees are trying to disrupt the travel plans of the Taliban by denying them use of this place.

The Currahees is the name given to the 4^th Brigade Combat Team, 101^st Airborne Division.  The two infantry battalions of the 4^th BCT are the first and second battalions of the 506^th Infantry Regiment.  The First Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Womack, has stationed an infantry company, Charlie company, nicknamed “The Gunfighters”, at FOB Kushamond, commanded by Captain Andrew Hill.

Last night, the Currahees sent out another patrol from FOB Kushamond to Hajj Wadi in the hopes of catching the Taliban asleep and unawares.  The patrol was based upon 1^st Platoon, Charlie company.  The patrol consisted of six vehicles, five of which carried four men each, and a sixth which carried six men.   On the patrol were 4 soldiers of the Afghan National Army (ANA), one interpreter, or ‘Terp’ as they are called here, one reporter, and twenty-two Currahees under the command of Second Lieutenant Matthew Jones, 23, of Jacksonville Florida.  The patrol was to travel at night across country to avoid setting off IEDs on the way.  It would navigate to the village and surround it before dawn.  At dawn, the patrol would dismount, and with the ANA forces in the lead search the village for weapons and Taliban.

The vehicles the patrol used are called MATV, for mine-resistant all-terrain vehicle.  This twelve ton behemoth, built on an Oshkosh chassis, is the ultimate in four wheel drive.  Despite its weight and height it is extremely cross country capable.  It boasts heavy armor, shaped to deflect the blast of an IED away, and a turret which can mount either a machine gun or a automatic belt-felt cannon that fires 40 mm grenades and is called an ‘area suppression’ weapon.   Inside is sophisticated electric gear that enables cross country movement at night with lights out.  A GPS informs the driver of his exact location and enables him to navigate at night without a map.  He also has a night vision display which enables him to see the ground around him, in 2-D.  The driver of my vehicle was PFC William Stratton, 19, of Lockley, Alabama.  The gunner of the vehicle has a display which mine , PV2 Jesse Questad, 20, of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, nicknamed “Q-Ball”, likened to a video game.  It is a combination of night vision and heat signature device that enables him to observe all round the vehicle to a distance of several kilometers, night or day, and he can pinpoint a distance to an object to within a meter.  Our patrol departed the FOB at about 11:00 p.m. and arrived at Hajj Wadi at 4:00 a.m.  Along the way, gunner Questad spotted only a couple of dogs, one fox, and one motorcyclist in the distance.

Cross country here is extremely rough.  The land is extensively cultivated, and the irrigation system means there are earthen speed bumps or ditches every twenty yards or so.  There was also a wadi to be crossed along the way, and with high banks and a soft bottom presented a formidable obstacle even to the MATVs.  The patrol progressed at walking speed practically the entire way.

The trip out was not entirely uneventful.  The lead vehicle had to put out foot patrols to find a good spot to enter the wadi and to get out.  The wadi’s banks were steep, and only skillful and careful driving kept the top-heavy MATVs from turning over going in and coming out of the wadi.

As the patrol moved into its final waiting position, one of the vehicles reported that he was “over on his side.”  To have a vehicle out endangered the mission.  It would a long time before a recovery vehicle could arrive, and having not enough vehicles would enable any Taliban to escape through the hole in the perimeter.   Losing a vehicle and the Taliban would not impress the locals with American strength.

The driver was surprised by an obstacle in the dark and was stuck with two wheels in the air.  The vehicle was almost over but was balanced precariously.  Pausing to think, and inspecting the obstacle carefully, the driver planned his escape.  By locking all four wheels, using an extra low gear, and steering just so he managed to slide his MATV off the obstacle without going completely over.

That crisis over, it was time to wait.  Waiting and boredom occur frequently on patrols like this one.  Two hours would pass before the patrol made its final move into the village.  In my vehicle to escape the boredom Jones, Questad, Stratton, and I  played knowledge games, such as matching a movie actor’s name to each letter of the alphabet, and then a game of trivia questions.  When those petered out, we listened to music from Jones’s i-pod over the vehicle’s intercom.  At five minutes to H-hour Jones, was informed by the tactical operations center that two F-16 fighter jets, call signs Viper two-five and Viper two-six, were on station and available in case we needed assistance.  We dismounted and moved in.

The patrol’s approach to the village went undetected, and this time more than a dozen surprised men were found in the village.  The ANA searched the qualots and brought the men out along with their families. As the search progressed, everyone was tense and alert.  With all the doors and corners of the qualots, a Taliban could come out firing at any time.  When shooting starts, the situation can get out of control in a hurry.  Only when the search was completed and the situation understood did the tension relax just a little.

The first man that was caught was photographed, fingerprinted, and his name taken by the Currahees, first to be checked against the database of known Taliban, and also to add identities and biometric data to the database.  All this was done in real time with hand-held devices that possessed wireless satellite links.  If a Taliban was among the men found in the village, we would have known within five minutes of taking his data.   The wife of the first man and her children sat huddled together in the dark against the wall of their qualot and looked on as his biometric data was taken.  As the search progressed, the ANA gathered the rest of the men together into one place.  The village elders and some younger individuals were questioned both by the ANA and by 2^nd Lt Jones through the Terp named ‘Mikey.’

Besides the individual, there were two distinct groups caught up in the search, corresponding to two distinct qualots which made up Hajj Wadi.  The elder of the first group said plainly that Taliban do come and go through his village on a weekly basis; that they ride two to a motorcycle, pointed out the quarters they stayed in, and gave the names of two that he knew.  In his bearing and facial expressions, he looked like a man who just wished to left in peace.  He understood that there was a struggle going on, and in a temperate way wanted no part of it.

The women of this group sat huddled together with their children against the wall of the qualot and shivered in the cold.  They eyed the proceedings carefully.  When it became clear that nothing bad was going to happen, they trickled back into their homes.  It seemed that the women’s presence was a sign of weakness and submission of the village to us, and when that signal was no longer necessary they returned to whatever warmth their homes offered.

As the women shivered, the men built themselves a fire from dried thornbushes, which they lit with a match.  The men and boys grouped around the fire and soaked up its warmth.  The men were identified one by one and questioned; but the elder of this group was questioned in front of everyone.  He spoke so that all could hear.

The second group, only of men, was gathered around the village mosque, and was handled, and behaved, largely like the first.  This group’s elder seemed to have something to hide and was probed by 2^nd Lt Jones.  The probing did not provide useful information, but it did indicate to all the US forces were on to them, being the second visit in a short time.  The predator drone threat is known even out here, and to be under surveillance means paralysis or death to the Taliban.  If they move, they get killed from the sky; and if they don’t move they cannot spread their influence. The village, being watched, is too dangerous for the Taliban and for villagers who might become collateral damage from a missile strike, and consequently don’t want the Taliban around.

The morning was extremely cold and everyone was happy when it was time to head back.  The villagers sought the warmth of their homes, and we of our vehicles. 

Though no weapons or Taliban were found, the mission was ranked a success because it probably, for a while, neutralized the village as a Taliban asset; and neutralization of the threat is the mission of the battalion.  In addition, the database of biometric information was increased and may prove useful in the future.

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Where the rubber meets the road: on to FOB Kushamond

By: Vincent J. Curtis

Date: 3 Dec 10

Dateline: Forward Operating Base Kushamond, Afghanistan

Forward Operating Base Kushamond, in the Dila District of Paktika province, is where the rubber meets the road in this war.  This FOB is rocketed regularly by the Taliban, and is located in an area which the Taliban exert a strong control.  US/ANA forces are only able to contest a portion of Dila district, the entire western area of the district is entirely uninfluenced by US/ANA.

FOB Kushamond lies about 45 minutes helicopter ride away to the south west from the main base at FOB Sharana.  The UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters fly low enough for a passenger to observe individual people and animals on the ground, but high enough to get a wide view of the countryside.  In most places the countryside is relatively flat and is crisscrossed with wadis, river beds that are dry or frozen over at this time of year.  In some places, rock formations that look like stacks of dinner plates pierce the surface at a steep angle.  There are also miles long rows of craters that appear frequently.  These are supposed to be a natural geological feature, and were not created by artillery shelling.

The broad valley is littered with small villages, and scores of mud walled forts dot the landscape.  There are numerous rectangular walled forts, complete with turrets, in the Beau Geste style, scattered about..  These are probably leftovers from the British occupation of the 19^th century and maybe also the Russian of the 1980s.  An individual country dwelling here is called a qualat, and consists of multiroomed living quarters for the people and a large enclosure for the animals.  The enclosing barrier is a wall made of mud, and the effect from the air is of a small fort.  Several qualats grouped together form a village.  A small village sometimes takes its name for the dominant person living there.

FOB Kushamond lies near the center of a grouping of six small towns, which are more significant than a village.  The local bazaar which services these towns lies about one kilometer north of the FOB.  The ground the FOB occupies is not in itself of particular strategic importance, such as the junction of several roads would be, but it is convenient for its expanse of flat terrain.  The name Kushamond comes from the Anglicization of the Russian name for this place, for the detailed map the Russians made of this area is the map used by the Currahees in the tactical operations center and platoon huts.

The man in charge here is Capt Andrew Hill.  His titles include company commander and owner of the battle space.  His First Sergeant is David Cavataio, and his XO is Capt Seth Varayon.  Two of the company’s platoons are located in the FOB, while a third is detached to a location called FOB KKC.  In addition to the two platoons of Currahees here, a platoon of contractors belonging to the Asian Security Guard are in the FOB and are responsible for guarding the perimeter and towers.  A platoon plus of ANA are also located here.  The ANA take the lead in interacting with the locals, and the Currahees provide mentoring to the ANA and the real military power when it is required.

Capt Hill’s battle space is about the size of Rhode Island in extent, and he has his company of Currahees as his primary means of exerting control.  Opposing him are between 200 and 300 Taliban.  The number can vary because this area is a zone of passage to the more strategic areas to the east and west of Paktika province, and Taliban can come and go.  Many of the villages are found completely devoid of men.  In the towns, the situation is less bleak.  The Taliban largely live outside the towns and villages, and exert control over the population by daily visits of groups of five or ten men.  Their main means of exerting control is intimidation through beatings and threats of beatings of the elders.  As a rule, the Taliban refrain from murder, reserving that treatment for those accused of spying.  The Taliban have a well-developed network that keeps them informed of Currahee patrolling activities.

Strangely, the villagers allow their elders to be beaten and intimidated even though they possess the power themselves to stop if they chose to band together.

The village elders are supposed to meet with the District Governor, an appointee of the Karzai regime, on a weekly basis.  That did not begin to happen until recently, when the Taliban began a slow withdrawal into winter quarters.  One demonstration of Taliban control was over the bazaar.  The bazaar did not open because the Taliban forbade it, and it was opened recently only when the Taliban gave permission.  This may be a sign of the weakening grip of the Taliban as winter comes on.  Another sign is of the drop in the rocket attacks made against FOB Kushamond between October and early December.

The Taliban are equipped with AK-47s, belt fed medium machine guns, RPGs, 82 mm mortars, and 107 mm Chinese-made rockets.  They also have Diska .51 caliber heavy machine guns mounted on trucks.  They tend to identify themselves to the villages through the wearing of black clothing.  Capt Hill estimates that the Taliban will try to continue to dominate the area politically through intimidation tactics when their activity resumes in the spring.

(The writing of this story was interrupted for an hour due to an attack by some of the aforementioned 107 mm rockets.)

In the meantime, the district governor will try to win the loyalty of the population by civic development projects constructed over the winter.

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