Thursday, February 20, 2014

Pradaxa: a bid for enrichment

Vincent J. Curtis

15 Feb 14

The report below is in respect to a law suit in which a university located in my hometown is indirectly involved.  The case involves excessive bleeding caused by the use of Pradaxa, a drug said to be superior to warfarin in the control of blood clotting due to irregular heartbeat.  The blood clotting from inrregular heart beat can break free from the heart, travel to the small blood vessels of the brain, and cause a stroke.  Warfarin, pradaxa and other drugs prevent clots from forming to begin with.  This condition has dangers of its own.


I read the excellent report Steve Buist, Investigations Editor of my local newspaper, on the Pradaxa case, presently ongoing in East St. Louis.  Based on what he wrote, there seems to be one or more logically fallacies at the heart of the court case.  The most obvious one may be boiled down to the distinction between the relative and the absolute.

The PHRI study, by which the FDA approved Pradaxa, compared the relative effects of warfarin and two dose levels of Pradaxa.  Among the three, the 150 mg dose of Pradaxa was relatively the best for treating blood coagulation problems.  But that result does not establish that, absolutely, there will be no complications in using the the drug at that concentration.  The case against Boerhringer Ingelheim and PHRI seems to be based upon the belief that Pradaxa was held up to be absolutely safe, when in fact the clinical trials only showed that it was relatively the best treatment among those studied. Moreover, these results are statistical and based upon probabilities; they may not hold in individual cases.

I am a little surprised that the PHRI study did not include a control group of sufferers who were denied any kind of treatment.  A study that included that kind of control group would presumably show that, absolutely, treatment with Pradaxa provided the best of outcomes, again statistically. It would also show that none of the outcomes were as good as perfect health.  These people are suffering a morbidity, after all.  The taking of Pradaxa is to substitute a less bad morbidity for one that is worse.

Thus when people who are being treated with Pradaxa suddenly suffer abnormal bleeding, against what are we to compare that abnormality: relative to a warfarin treatment?  What of the absence of treatment altogether?   Would the patient have suffered a stroke instead of bleeding in that time period?  In individual cases, no one can say what the absolute outcome is going to be.  We know what the statistical average should be in a large number of cases.  We know what we would like it to be in individual cases: to be like the restoration of perfect health; but that ideal is not always possible. And grown people ought to know that.

In addition, when one studies a group of 44,000, as was done in the PHRI study, any outcome which happens six times in a million will not likely be observed.  Thus when jumping to the full population, numbering in the many millions, outcomes are possible which were not observed in clinical trials. Grown-ups ought to know this.

Thus the lawyers for the plaintiffs are going to engage in one or more logical fallacies and are going to try to prove that the scientists at PHRI and at Boerhringer Ingelheim didn't know what they were doing.  The lawyers are going to try to show that they, mere amateurs, are smarter than the scientific experts.  The scientific experts are experts in medicine, not the more obscure realms of logic.  I fear the trial will prove to be a farce of reasoning and argument.

I understand why Boerhringer Ingelheim is dragging its feet.  The plaintiff's lawyers have nothing to go on except the complaints of their clients and the inconclusive FDA report that Buist mentioned in his article.  They are engaging in a fishing expedition so that they can find some statement which in isolation proves to be sensational to their case.  The requirement by the judge that the company provide copies of "any possible derivation of means to document someone's thoughts, words, and deeds short of attaching electrodes to their scalps and electronically downloading what is contained in their minds" is almost inconceivably broad and would likely amount to millions of pages if completely fulfilled.  That is quite a burdensome administrative undertaking, disruptive and costly for the company and of no possible benefit to it.  No doubt some things will be left out, and the failure to deliver some obscure document will be held up as a sign of a guilty conscience and bad faith.  The note taking by the scientists will, in future, be conditioned by the fear that those notes may be subpoenaed as evidence.

Buist's account of the case was excellent.  I fear from his report that the trail will prove to be a farce and will unfairly blacken the reputations of some really good people.  Unfortunately, the lawyers for the plaintiffs will not be made to suffer for their misdeeds, and the trial judge will not be made to suffer for failing to act upon the observation that this case is a farce start to finish.

If you just want new drugs like Viagra, then by all means let trials like that over Pradaxa flourish. But if you want new medicines that treat serious illnesses, then these farce-trials need to be exposed for what they are: a bid for enrichment, first by the lawyers and then by the plaintiffs.
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Friday, February 7, 2014

CCV was never a Good Idea


 
 
Vincent J. Curtis


23 Dec 2013

 

David Pugliese broke the story that the Close Combat Vehicle acquisition project will be cancelled by DND.  The CCV acquisition was plagued with problems from the beginning, and several rounds of requests for proposals were unsatisfactory.

 

Julie DiMambro, spokesperson for MND Rob Nicholoson, was quoted as saying, “…our Government has been living up to our promise to give the Canadian military the tools it needs to get the job done….the Canadian Armed Forces are once again the best in the world.”

 

The real story behind the cancellation of this new CCV tool is not the lack money, not a lack of satisfactory options, but the lack of a warfighting doctrine by the army combined with the lack of money.  The Army brass simply does not know what the next job is going to be, and cannot justify to itself buying an expensive tool designed for a job that may not come up.

 

What army reservists are training for is often a good sign of what DND brass expects the army to have to do should the call go out.  Since the end of field operations in Afghanistan, army reservists have not been doing much of anything specific, and nothing that involves the coordinated movement of several companies at a time.  Training from out of the 1960’s: patrolling, light infantry advance-to-contact, has been the army reservist fare since the wind-down of Afghan style tactical scenarios.

 

Some time in February, 2014, several light infantry units of 31 Brigade, 4th Canadian Division, are going to be moved to Rankin Inlet, Nunavut, to undertake an exercise there.  Rankin Inlet lies on the western shore of northern Hudson’s Bay.

 

It is expected that the reservists will operate out of the NORAD Forward Operating Location Rankin Inlet facilities at the Rankin Inlet Airport.  What exactly the reservists are going to practice, few involved seem to know.  What the anticipated OPFOR object this exercise is supposed to defeat is met with a chuckle.  No mechanized combat vehicles or artillery are expected to come along.  Light infantry is going to be plunked down in the middle of the Arctic and expected to do something by itself.

 

DND is going to overpay for the nine-day exercise in the high Arctic, and sources suggest that 31 Brigade is looking for the excess cash.  Deploy, freeze, return, collect.  An object of this exercise may be that it demonstrates to the world Canada’s commitment to the high Arctic.  But no one involved seems to know.

 

The army top command has communicated no idea of the next kind of war the army will be called upon to fight.  They have communicated little idea of how they would like to fight.

 

Spending $2 billion on the acquisition of a new vehicle that is designed to fight best on the terrains of Europe could prove to be financially dislocating.  Investing that much money into what could prove to be the wrong thing does not help burnish reputations or help the soldiers who have to risk their lives working with them.

 

DND did have a particular vehicle in mind when the CCV project began, and would likely have bought it had it been offered.  Rheinmetall makes an all-new Puma CCV for the German Army.  It was designed from the ground up to be able to work closely with the Leopard II tank, which the Canadian army now has in good numbers.  What Rheinmetall actually offered DND as a CCV was not the Puma they hoped and expected, but a reworked and upgraded Marder vehicle, which the German army was taking out of service and replacing with the Puma.  DND turned down the offer for used vehicles.

 

Also offered in the CCV category was the new Swedish CV 90 vehicle.  Whether this vehicle would be able to work closely with non-Swedish tanks and on non-Swedish terrain remained questions.

 

Buying a vehicle now that unquestionably could work with the current inventory of Canadian tanks might have justified the CCV acquisition project to go forward.  Lacking such assurance, a good reason to acquire a CCV regardless was lacking.

 

Through the Canada First Defense Strategy, the Canadian government promised the military a stable and predictable level of funding over a twenty year period.  That promise lasted until the first budget crisis.  The cancellation of the CCV project, however, was not the product of the government failing to live up to the promise for the military to buy new equipment.  This was a decision of the military brass, who can’t justify the expenditure to themselves.

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Book Review: My Share of the Task, a Memoir


 

 
Vincent J. Curtis

30 October 2013


 
My Share of the Task: A Memoir By General Stanley McChrystal

 
Portfolio/Penguin
2013
ISBN 978-59184-475-4
452 Pages
Hardcover
$29.95 US

 

This is as much a book about leadership as it is a history.  General Stanley McChrystal was as important as General David Patraeus was in America’s War on Terrorism in the decade from 2001 to 2010.  McChrystal was the one who organized the counterterrorism effort of the U.S. military against al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The death of al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006 and the destruction of his network were the high achievements of McChrystal’s organization in that decade.  These, combined with the exploitation of the “Anbar Awakening” and the military surge of 2007-8, were what led to an end of the wave of terrorism and civil war that engulfed Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion that brought down Saddam Hussein, and enabled the Coalition to depart Iraq in 2011 with a stable Iraqi government in place.

 

McChrystal spent most of his military career in the Special Operations community of the U.S. military.  He qualified as Airborne, Special Forces, and Ranger and spent most of his development period either in command of units or as the J3 (Operations Officer) of units.  He spent as little time in the Pentagon as he could get away with.  Eventually, the lack of political instincts which would have been developed by a long stay in the Pentagon were to cost him at the end of his career.

 

The military reader can gain on two fronts by reading this book.  The first is on leadership and the second on the development of “industrial counterterrorism.”

 

In taking the reader through his development period, McChrystal enables the student of leadership to gain valuable insights not only into what made McChrystal the General, the Commander, and most importantly the leader he became, but also what makes good military leaders in general in the modern world.  Seeing the finished product in Iraq, the British saw him as a “soldier-monk.”  Supported by his loyal military wife Annie, McChrystal dedicated his life to the war against al Qaeda.  He spent years in Iraq and Afghanistan, living in spare accommodations immersed in the war, and enjoyed next to no down time back home during the prolonged crisis of the war.  McChrystal did not do a “tour”, he fought the war.

 

McChrystal’s great achievement as a leader was the development of Task Force 714.  There was no model for such a thing.  But in order to fight the metastasizing cancer of al Qaeda inspired terrorism in Iraq, McChrystal invented what came to be called “industrial counterterrorism,” and TF714 was the vehicle by which that method of combatting terrorism was deployed.  All the means by which intelligence was gained and analyzed were fused with the means of fighting in TF714, and industrial counterterrorism was the product of a feed-back loop of intelligence and captures run at very high speed.  Based on information provided by intelligence, US and British Special Operators used to go out on several missions a night, capturing terrorists for the further exploitation by the intelligence side.  Without a leader with the man-management skills of McChrystal, industrial counterterrorism would never have come about.  Industrial counterterrorism was only possible because of the vast, but disparate, intelligence and special operations resources of the United States.

 

McChrystal’s downfall came about when he let a trait that made him a great leader – trust – be exploited by people he ought to have been cautious in dealing with.
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Book Review: How to Break a Terrorist


 

 
Vincent J. Curtis


 3 January 2014

 
How to Break A Terrorist by Matthew Alexander With John R. Bruning

 
St. Martin’s Griffin
2008
ISBN 978-0-312-67511-0
287 Pages
Paperback


 

Never trust an interrogator.  That’s the bottom line message of the book.

 

Matthew Alexander is a pseudonym, but the man has appeared on television, which is how he came to my attention.  Alexander was the guy who come up with the clue which led to the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006 by the U.S. military in Iraq.  Al-Zarqawi was the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, and was the man responsible not only for a lot of terrorism in Anbar province, but for sparking the civil war between Shiite and Sunni sects that was only broken by the “surge” of 2007-8.

 

What makes the book interesting is the inside look it gives to the methods of “Industrial Counterterrorism” that was developed by U.S. General Stanley McChrystal to combat al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan.  McChrystal’s book, published in 2013 and reviewed previously, gives the official account of the interrogation which led to the vital clue that ultimately led to the killing of al-Zarqawi.  Alexander’s book, published five years before McChrystal’s book, refutes the official account and Alexander claims for himself the success of having “broken the terrorist” that led to Zarqawi.  Since McChrystal does not deal with Alexander’s claim and admits that his book was written with security of operations in mind, one can conclude that Alexander is right, and that several people were decorated for an achievement they did not themselves gain but were nevertheless decorated for reasons of internal politics.  Alexander was shafted, and this book gains a measure of revenge.

 

At the time of the book’s publication, the enhanced interrogation techniques employed by the CIA to break three of the highest value terrorists in al Qaeda had become known and were highly controversial.  Alexander tossed gasoline on that fire.  His book is sub-titled “The U.S. interrogators who used brains, not brutality, to take down the deadliest man in Iraq.”  He spends several mercifully short chapters needlessly to preen about his skills, and otherwise compare himself favorably to the knuckle-dragging brutes in the CIA.

 

While the thrust of his preening was that brutality was not necessary to the breaking of his terrorist, by focussing on his skills he proves that brains in general do not always suffice either.  Alexander writes about how it was his brains, his experience, his knowledge base, his risk-taking, and his insights which led to success and not those of the team of interrogators that had been assigned to breaking the key terrorist.

 

The book does provide lots of detail about the inner workings of Industrial Counterterrorism, and how U.S. interrogators work to break people and find out what they want to know.  Alexander admits that the person he was to a terrorist was false, and the promises he made them were broken.  He can justify this as the way it works in order to achieve a good end.

 

In all, this book is worth a read.

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